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Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of
the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World
Aya Gruber*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of what I have learned and internalized about the Japanese
internment came from my mother, Mariko Hirata. My mother was just a
young girl when her own government imprisoned her. Growing up, I
heard all about the cold, the dirt, the embarrassing communal showers,
the shame, and the guns. My mother painted a picture of her family's
perpetually dusty tar-paper shack, where they slept five to a room
underneath oiled-paper windows in the dead of the Wyoming winter. At
five years old, my mother played with the round horntoad droppings
under the beds, believing they looked like little billiard balls. My mother
recalled with ire observing her father taken away to pick potatoes,
accompanied by armed soldiers.1 She related with sorrow the taunts of
the white children from outside the barbed wire and fences, while like a
Kafka-esque vision, she and other Japanese children saluted the
American flag. She also told me about the prelude to and aftermath of
Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; J.D., Harvard
Law School magna cum laude; B.A., U.C. Berkeley summa cum laude; Assistant Public Defender,
Washington, D.C.; Assistant Federal Defender, Southern District of Florida. This Article is
dedicated to the members of my family who suffered through the internment: Mariko Hirata, Mutsu
Onaga, Toshi Abbott, Yoshinori Hirata, Nuiko Hirata, Ray Hirata, and Rumi Hirata, as well as the
thousands of other families who suffered. This Article is also for the thousands of families,
especially in the Arab world, currently distressed over their loved ones in U.S. detention. I further
dedicate this work to Fred Korematsu, a hero and champion of liberties for people of all races, who
recently passed away. I thank the FIU College of Law faculty and administration for their support
and ideas, particularly Thomas Baker, Jorge Esquirol, Karen Pita Loor, Leonard Strickman, and
Ediberto Roman for their advice on previous drafts. I also appreciate the input of Luis Salas, John
Stack, and Robert Chesney on terrorism and related issues. Finally, I must praise the diligent work
done by my research assistant, Daniel Cruz and editors, Leita Walker and Rebecca Martin.
1. Internee William Kochiyama recalls that at the entrance of the assembly center "'stood two
lines of troops with rifles and fixed bayonets pointed at the evacuees."' THE COMMISSION ON
WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 136 (1982)
(hereinafter INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS) (quoting William Kochiyama).
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the internment: The pain her family felt in leaving their home, only
permitted to bring a few solitary belongings, and reporting to a relocation
center with the trepidation of a family whose fate was unknown. She
recounted the extreme desperation and despair her family felt when,
upon release, they lived in abject poverty in a boarding house, having
been stripped of their home, land, and possessions.2
In 1988 The Miami News ran an article on the Japanese reparations
bill, which had just been signed into law by President Reagan, and
interviewed my mother. Her interview demonstrated the lingering pain
of internment:
For Marie Gruber, the internment camp was in Heart Mountain,
Wyo., where she and her family lived in tar-paper shacks with wood
floors.
"I was very young, but I could understand the gist of it from my
parents. My father was worried that something was happening like
over in Germany. 'Maybe they want to get us all together and then
drop a bomb on us,' he'd say. But being 5 years old, a lot of it was 'I
want to go out and play,' but we were in a barren desert near Cheyenne,
Wyoming, in barracks surrounded by barbed wire," Gruber said.
She doesn't buy the grumbling about Pearl Harbor and American
POWs. "Those people were directly affected by a war act one country
perpetrated on another. This was our own government that did this to
US."
3
The sorrow and indignity of forced incarceration has remained for
years in my family4 and the psyche of the Japanese-American
community.5 At the time of the internment there was little resistance or
2. See FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS 173-
74 (1976) (discussing property seizures during the internment).
3. Pete Collins, Justice Served by $20,000 Payments to Internees, MIAMI NEWS, Aug. 11,
1988, at 5A (quoting internee Marie Gruber).
4. My grandfather, Yoshinori Hirata, who was stripped of his farm land and sent into forced
labor at gunpoint, passed away in 1980, long before the government's apology could reach his ears.
Nuiko Hirata, my grandmother, is ailing, and for the first time in more than fifty years no longer
remembers the pain, frustration, and embarrassment of internment. Up until her stroke a few months
ago, she could recall with vivid accuracy how vigorously she scrubbed and scrubbed, but to no
avail-their barrack in the camps never got clean. My aunt, Mutsu Onaga, was a teenager during the
internment and, even now in her seventies, feels the anger and sorrow as if they were fresh. She still
talks about the internment with vitriol-the lack of privacy, embarrassment, and frustration.
5. A fellow child of the internment, Michael Yoshii, explains how his parents' pain welled
deep beneath the surface, stating,
"When I first learned of the internment as a youth, I found that it was a difficult matter to
discuss with my parents. My perception of them was that they did not speak honestly
about the camp experience .... Their words said one thing, while their hearts were
holding something else deep inside."
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outcry, even from the Japanese community. Many Japanese were loath
to make a fuss and prided themselves on being cooperative.6 Their pain,
while perhaps not outwardly manifested,7 runs like a deep fissure through
their hearts and through the soul of the Japanese-American community.
8
In the legal arena, until recently, the internment's significance
seemed to reduce to little more than a couple of cases, namely
Korematsu v. United States9 and Hirabayashi v. United States,10 taught in
constitutional law classes representing our Supreme Court's sordid past.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the Bush
Administration's ensuing terrorism policies, the Japanese internment has
risen to the surface, not just as a reminder of the past, but as a
commentary on the present and foreshadowing of the future.1'
Recounting the events of the internment now is more important than
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 1, at 297 (quoting Michael Yoshii).
6. One internment survivor explains,
"Society has stripped a whole group of people of confidence. We are afraid to speak out.
We will try to keep the peace at any price. We will not make waves. It makes us
uncomfortable to stand out. We want to blend in. We want to be middle America."
Id. at 299 (quoting Kiyo Sato-Viacrucis).
7. Dr. Tetsuden Kashima, a sociologist at the University of Washington Department of
American Ethnic Studies, describes how Japanese Americans of the internment generation suffer
from "'social amnesia [as]... a group phenomenon, in which attempts are made to suppress feelings
and memories of particular moments or extended time periods.., to cover up less than pleasant
memories."' Id. at 297-98 (quoting Tetsuden Kashima).
8. My family shares this negative experience with tens of thousands of others. According to
the U.S. Department of the Interior, 120,313 Japanese were interned during World War II. See U.S.
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, WRA, THE EVACUATED PEOPLE: A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION 2 (1946),
reprinted in WENDY NG, JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 39
(Greenwood Press 2002).
9. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the exclusion of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast).
10. 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew order placed on ethnic Japanese). Both Korematsu
and Hirabayashi have been widely repudiated. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, expressed his
displeasure at the Court's decision striking down a late-term abortion statute by stating, "I am
optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in
the history of this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott." Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Brennan called Korematsu one
of "the most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the
name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it." Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Thomas Baker
observes that "the Supreme Court's performance [in the internment cases] has gone down in history
as one of its most craven moments." Thomas E. Baker, At War with the Constitution: A History
Lesson from the Chief Justice, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 69, 75 (1999).
11. Japanese internees fear that the lack of judicial repudiation of the internment will have
negative consequences for those caught in the terror net. See Peter S. Canellos, Japanese Internees
See Modern Parallels, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2003, at Al ("Ever since the war on terrorism
began, those who lived through the Japanese internment are shocked that... American courts have
never held that the government lacked the authority to hold people in wartime without presenting
evidence.").
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ever, as memories fade and a new generation of lawyers emerges. 12  I
was personally surprised and saddened to hear my own students justify
racial profiling to fight terrorism because, "we did it with the Japanese in
World War II and Korematsu is still good law.",
13
The comparisons of terrorism detentions and the internment are
compelling and the subject of much scholarly discourse. 14 Not since the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, an event that stood as a predicate to the
massive detention of Japanese Americans, had foreign agents attacked
the United States on its own soil. 15 Similar to the sweeping tide of anti-
Japanese sentiment and rhetoric after Pearl Harbor, after 9/11, there arose
a national feeling of animosity directed overtly toward Arab and South-
Asian ethnic minorities or, more subtly, toward vaguely defined
"terrorists," who seemed to reduce to little more than citizens of a select
group of countries, subscribers to a certain set of religious beliefs, or
certain ethnic groups.' 6  On the basis of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush
12. Scholars note that the Bush Administration's post-9/11 policies have "occurred despite the
government's official acknowledgement of the injustice in the wholesale incarceration of Japanese-
Americans. Sadly, the Bush Administration has seemingly ignored this history." Susan Kiyomi
Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution " in a Time of Crisis, 10
ASIAN L.J. 37, 45 (2003).
13. Similar statements occurred both in my criminal procedure class and a colleague's class.
See also Chris K. lijima, Shooting Justice Jackson's "Loaded Weapon" at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial
Abdication at the Convergence of Korematsu and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 132 n.132
(2004) (noting "the recent sentiment that has attempted to 'sanitize' the Japanese American
internment"). Alfred Yen observes that Korematsu's legacy is not necessarily one of total disrepute
and shame. Rather, he asserts that the internment was "praised with faint damnation" by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and that the Chief Justice "seem[ed] curiously untroubled by either internment or
the Korematsu majority." Alfred C. Yen, Praising with Faint Damnation-The Troubling
Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1998). See also Jerry Kang, Denying
Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 1001 (2004) (stating that
Rehnquist's "strategy... is the return of the Korematsu mindset"); Eric Yamamoto et al., American
Racial Justice on Trial-Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on
Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1277-78 n.58 (2003) (noting "Chief Justice Rehnquist's approval
of the original Korematsu decision.., as part of his philosophy of almost total judicial deference to
the executive branch ... during war").
14. Since 9/11, a number of legal scholars have revived the Korematsu discourse. See, e.g.,
lijima, supra note 13; Serrano & Minami, supra note 12, at 40; Mark Tushnet, Defending
Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WiS. L. REV. 273; Elbert Lin, Case
Comment, Korematsu Continued, 112 YALE L.J. 1911 (2003). The internment was also revisited in
the popular press. See, e.g., Mike Boehm, Repeating the History, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at E2;
Canellos, supra note 11; Angie Chuang, Embracing the Future, Remembering the Past, OREGONIAN,
Sept. 12, 2003, at C2; Annie Nakao, Haunting Echoes of Japanese Internment, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
18, 2003, at D8; Aretha Williams, Cancer of Hatred and Intolerance Alive on American Soil, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 31, 2004, at I1E.
15. See Eric L. Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment's True
Legacy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 106 (2003) ("Pearl Harbor is, after all, the clearest and most
recent analogue to the attacks of September 11 .").
16. See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 345,
367 (2003) ("Within a week of the attack, the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported
2006] RAISING THE RED FLAG
Administration initiated two regime-changing wars, detained tens of
thousands of people,' 7  and even took U.S. citizens into military
custody.' 8  Civil libertarians criticize the policies as exemplifying
governmental overreaching that deprives individuals of their liberty
without reasonable basis or process.' 9 In response, the Administration
and its supporters have developed discursive mechanisms for quelling
public concern. The Administration has successfully engineered a
prevailing ideology of executive deference.2 ° Closely related are
propagandized notions of patriotism that equate a defense of civil
liberties with treason. For example, Attorney General Ashcroft
responded to criticism of Department of Justice overreaching by stating,
[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they
erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give
ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends.
They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of
evil.2'
hundreds of cases of Muslims being threatened, harassed, and attacked. A vigilante killed an Arizona
Sikh man he mistook for a Muslim.").
17. It is extremely difficult to determine the number of detainees held in U.S. custody here and
abroad, not only because the Pentagon refuses to release such information, but also because the
situation is volatile. As of the writing of this Article, the International Commission of the Red Cross
estimated there to be at least 5000 detainees in Iraq, 550 in Afghanistan, and between 550 and 600 in
Guantanamo. See International Convention of the Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/eng (follow
"ICRC detention visits" hyperlink; then follow "US detention related to the events of II September
2001" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 1, 2006); see also DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, ENDING SECRET
DETENTIONS 12 (Michael Posner, ed., Human Rights First, 2004), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/USlaw/PDF/EndingSecretDetentionsweb.pdf, at 12 ("In early January 2004,
the total number of detainees [in Iraq] was approximately 12,000 .. "). In addition, there are
detainees held outside these regions both known and unknown to international officials. See CHRIS
MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA
467 (2004) (stating that the United States "[is] said to be holding as many as ten thousand people" at
various detention facilities worldwide); see also U.S. Counts 108 Deaths in Custody in Iraq,
Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A7 ("About 65,000 prisoners have been taken during the
U.S.-led wars, most of whom have been freed.").
18. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (allowing U.S. citizen to be held as enemy
combatant); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (finding lack of jurisdiction over detainee's
habeas petition).
19. See lijima, supra note 13; Serrano & Minami, supra note 12.
20. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("We have consistently reiterated the principle of deference to the executive. . . when national
security concerns are implicated.").
21. DOJ Oversight: Preserving our Freedoms while Defending against Terrorism: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John
Ashcroft), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfin?id=l 21 &wit-id=42.
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Critics of the government also censure its policies by arguing that
President Bush has stepped dangerously close to the line crossed by the
Roosevelt Administration in enacting internment policies.22  Bush
defenders are quick to assert that currently there has been no systematic
detention of ethnic Arab-American citizens. 23  Of course, civil
libertarians respond that the few citizen detentions, combined with the
massive detentions of noncitizens, represent as big, or nearly as big, a
humanitarian crisis as the large-scale detention of citizens. 24 Moreover,
Administration defenders assert that Bush's policies are far more
progressive than those regarding the Japanese in World War 11.25 This
assertion has found surprising backing from liberal law professors who
claim that the current policies manifest civil libertarian evolution from
World War 11.26 These scholars have set forth what I term "distancing
arguments," positing simply that American society and government have
progressed from the time of the Japanese internment, such that an abuse
of that type and/or magnitude is unlikely to occur again.
27
Former internees, like Holocaust survivors, hope that prolonging the
collective memory of the events will operate to ensure that such practices
are never again repeated.28  One internment survivor asked, "'how could
22. See Serrano & Minami, supra note 12.
23. However, hundreds of Arab noncitizens have been detained on U.S. soil as have thousands
abroad. Bush defenders might respond that aliens are not entitled to the same rights as citizens,
relying on cases such as United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990), Leng May
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958), and Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925). One could
argue, however, that these cases represented serious blows to civil rights. See generally Natsu
Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American " and What is Protected by Enhanced Law
Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 23 (2003-04) (examining the
negative impact of enlarged law enforcement powers over noncitizens).
24. They argue that the greatest harm is not attendant to citizenship status, but rather to the
deprivation of individual liberty without reasonable basis or process-especially when that
deprivation is based on race or ethnicity. The Supreme Court itself has recognized the harms of
unjust deprivation of noncitizens' liberty. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)
(holding that statute permitting indefinite detention of certain aliens violated due process).
25. Regarding post-9/l I detention of Arab immigrants, Justice Department officials stated,
"Any comparison to the Japanese-American internment... is far off base. 'All of the actions we
have taken have been mindful of the problems in the past."' Curt Anderson, Courts Back Feds in
Legal War on Terror, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 26, 2003, available at http://mailmanl.u.
washington.edu/pipermaiUhmetnews/2003-June/005821 .html (quoting Justice Department
spokeswoman Barbara Comstock).
26. Professor Eric Muller states, for example, "I do not think it helpful or accurate to say, as
David Cole does, that these sorts of comparatively minor burdens [on Arabs] reflect 'the rationale
used to intern 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II."' Muller, supra note 15,
at 123 (quoting David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 976 (2002)).
27. E.g., Tushnet, supra note 14, at 296.
28. When Fred Korematsu was awarded the Medal of Freedom in 1998, he remarked, "We
should be vigilant to make sure this will never happen again." Brief for Fred Korematsu et al. as
RAISING THE RED FLAG
this ever happen in a democracy? How could this happen to American
citizens without the benefit of a trial?' . .. 'Everyone that was
evacuated, we had in our minds that it shouldn't happen to anybody ever
again.' ' 29 The reminder of atrocities from the past serves as a check on
present and future government power.30  The rhetoric of conservatives
and scholars who extol society's progress undercuts the persuasive force
of this reminder. Conservatives often employ distancing arguments to
separate current controversial rights infringements from past abuses now
considered unquestionably oppressive.31  Especially in times of
emergency, the idiom of progress is engaged to silence comparisons to
past atrocities and allay fears of government overreaching.
32
This Article examines through a critical lens the claim that the
United States' policy toward ethnic minorities during times of distress
has progressed since the time of World War II, rendering internment
comparisons irrelevant. It seeks to answer the important question of
whether our nation has learned history's lessons. Professor Thomas
Baker queries,
rHlistory tells this story: In past wars the Executive Branch has
prosecuted the war abroad and has had its way with civil liberties at
home, while the Supreme Court has merely stood by, for the most part,
perhaps disapproving the most grievous and least justified domestic
transgressions but even then usually only after-the-fact.
Have things changed? Is America different today? Does the
Constitution mean something different? Do these same powers attend
the newly declared "war on terrorism"?33
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-
1027).
29. Collins, supra note 3 (quoting Mari Michener, wife of novelist James Michener and a
former internee). Another internment survivor remarked, "'It is important to ensure that this
violation of human rights is not repeated'... 'for any race, any religion, any group at any time."'
Chuang, supra note 14 (quoting Fred Hansen).
30. Jerry Fowler, director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum observes, "A common
response to the Holocaust is 'never again.' The reality around the globe is that we've fallen
woefully short of that goal." Gary Soulsman, A Mandate and a Mission: Keep Truth Alive, THE
NEWS JOURNAL, April 15, 2001, available at http://www.delawareonline.com/newsjoumal/local/
2001/holocaust/children side2.html.
31. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing distancing arguments in gender
and race context).
32. Indeed, during World War II, Justice Jackson observed optimistically, "Modem American
law has come a long way since the time when outbreak of war made every enemy national an
outlaw, subject to both public and private slaughter, cruelty and plunder." Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1950). At the time, however, not only did the government imprison enemy
nationals, it also imprisoned its own citizenry.
33. Thomas E. Baker, At War with Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
2006]
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In answering this question, the Article compares and contrasts the
law of the Japanese internment with the law pertaining to the current
terrorism detentions. Specifically, the Article creates a framework in
which the relevant Supreme Court cases can be evaluated to determine
whether the United States, as defined by its governing laws, has in fact
evolved since the time of Korematsu. Part II of the Article discusses
post-9/11 invocations of the internment to criticize the current use of
state power and the distancing arguments forged in response. Part II also
proposes that the validity of the distancing arguments can be evaluated
through a comparative legal assessment. Part III of the Article sets forth
the relevant internment and terrorism detention cases as a preface to a
methodological comparison of the laws. Part IV deconstructs and
analyzes the law of war, as articulated by relevant cases, with a particular
emphasis on the jurisprudential choices made by the Court in the
internment and terrorism cases. By comparing these choices, the Article
concludes that although in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld34 the Supreme Court did
close some of the avenues toward oppressive governmental activity
present in the internment cases, the Court nonetheless left several
avenues open and even expanded them. Consequently, the cautions of
Korematsu remain relevant despite fairly widespread belief that the
Hamdi decision manifested civil libertarian progress.35
II. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE INTERNMENT, DISTANCING
ARGUMENTS, AND THE ROLE OF LAW AS ARBITER
A. The Internment Reborn
As stated above, many legal scholars invoke the Japanese internment
to caution the Bush Administration of the dangers of governmental
219, 220 (2002). See also Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1019 (2003) ("Experience shows that when grave national
crises are upon us, democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protection of human
rights and civil liberties, indeed of basic and fundamental legal principles, is concerned.").
34. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
35. The Washington Post declared in a headline, "Supreme Court Backs Civil Liberties in
Terror Cases," and quoted Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights as saying, "'This
is a major victory for the rule of law and affirms the right of every person, citizen or noncitizen,
detained by the United States to test the legality of his or her detention in a U.S. court."' Fred
Barbash, Supreme Court Backs Civil Liberties in Terror Cases, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 28,
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/Al1657-2004Jun28.html (quoting Michael
Ratner). By contrast, members of the Bush Administration characterized the case as upholding
executive wartime power. Spokesman Mark Corallo said the Administration was pleased the Court
"'upheld the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to detain enemy
combatants, including U.S. citizens."' Id. (quoting Mark Corallo).
[Vol. 54
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overreaching.36 Professor Eric Muller describes the use of the Japanese
internment as a rhetorical tool to criticize Bush Administration
antiterrorism policies:
Critics charged that by pursuing investigative and enforcement policies
that took national origin into account, the government was making not
only bad new rules but a bad old mistake-the mistake that led to the
incarceration of 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry, or "Nikkei,"
durine World War II. and the iudicial approval of much of that program
in Korematsu v. United States.
37
Examining the legal literature, there are two different but related
areas in which the Japanese internment has reemerged as a tool of
modern critique: racial profiling of terrorists and military detention
without criminal process.
Scholars have drawn upon the internment to caution against the use
of race-based terrorism policies, in the face of the increasing acceptance
and encouragement of such policies by the American public. Experts
and news organizations have documented a resurgence of racial and
ethnic profiling during the War on Terror.38 Professor David Cole
observes that before 9/11, racial profiling was more taboo than
applauded, both legally and in the social consciousness. 39 Legally, racial
profiling had been the subject of high-profile civil law suits,
40
settlements, 41  and the most exacting standard of governmental
36. See sources cited supra note 14; see also Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule By Law:
The Detention of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 225, 278 (2003) (arguing that preserving the rule
of law is important in wartime); Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality after September 11?
American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 60-61 (2002)
(analyzing how to effectively oppose unchecked political power in wartime); Serrano & Minami,
supra note 12, at 40 (arguing that preserving the rule of law is important in wartime).
37. Muller, supra note 15, at 104-05.
38. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THREAT AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING,
DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES vi (2004), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/rpreport.pdf ("Racial profiling of citizens and
visitors of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, and others who appear to be from these areas or
members of the Muslim and Sikh faiths, has substantially increased since September 11,2001.").
39. Cole observes, "Before September 11, about 80 percent of the American public considered
racial profiling wrong. State legislatures, local police departments, and the President had
condemned the practice and ordered data collection on the racial patterns of stops and searches."
Cole, supra note 26, at 974.
40. John M. Broder, California Ending Use of Minor Traffic Stops as Search Pretext, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at Al8 (discussing high-profile lawsuits against police for racial profiling);
Tina Kelley, Police Dept. Settles Race Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at B9 (same).
41. See Michael Powell, N.Y Settles Lawsuit On Racial Profiling; Police Must Report Frisk
Cases, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2003, at A3 ("The police department ... will pay a total of $167,500
to the 10 black men who filed the federal civil rights lawsuit."); Racial Profiling Cases Settled, N.Y.
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42justification, strict scrutiny. Widespread media reporting on "driving
while black,, 43 and race-based abuses committed by police officers
44
made many wary of law enforcement's use of racial profiling as even an
unofficial police tactic. After 9/11, the government embraced an overt
and extensive policy of racial decision making. The government began
to use its broad immigration powers to selectively detain immigrants of
Arab nationality and ethnicity.45  In addition, ethnic Arabs were
46systematically singled out for police investigation and detention.
Unlike the above-mentioned aversion to racial profiling by police, after
9/11, the public generally accepted the propriety of race-based measures
in the name of terrorism prevention.47 Even African Americans and
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at B7 ("The state has paid $575,000 to settle lawsuits filed by 12 motorists who
allege they were subjected to racially profiling by state troopers.").
42. Ironically, Korematsu set up the rigid standard of justification for race-based policies.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944). Strict scrutiny requires that the race-based policy be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest. The Korematsu Court, however, found that the
Japanese internment met this test. Id at 223.
43. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, An Inside Story of Racial Bias and Denial:
New Jersey Files Reveal Drama Behind Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, § 1 (Metro), at 53.
44. See, e.g., Richard Fausset et al., Police Beating Touches Old Wounds, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
2004, at B 1 (discussing recent race-based beating).
45. The 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act set forth special
procedures governing the removal of aliens suspected of terrorist activity. Specifically, the
amendments authorized the Attorney General to "retain" in custody aliens suspected of terrorism.
Permanent residents could contest the detention, but they bore the burden to prove that they met
conditions for release. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214. Subsequently, the definition of "terrorist activity" was dramatically expanded by the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
46. Professor Natsu Taylor Saito remarks,
Noncitizens, both temporary visitors and permanent residents, have been subjected to a
variety of harsh measures, including the expedition of thousands of deportations; the
"disappearance" and detention of at least 1,200 people; interrogations in the form of
"voluntary interviews" with officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ....
Most of these measures have targeted men from Middle Eastern or predominantly
Muslim countries .... [T]he government's actions are largely immune from
constitutional challenge thanks to a long history of Supreme Court cases stating that the
"political branches" of government, i.e., the executive and the legislature, have
essentially unfettered power with respect to immigration.
Saito, supra note 23, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
47. See Cole, supra note 26, at 974 (noting that sixty percent of Americans favor ethnic
profiling of Arabs and Muslims). Peter N. Kirsanow, a Bush appointee to the Commission on Civil
Rights, disturbingly stated that "'If there's another terrorist attack and if it's from a certain ethnic
community or certain ethnicities that the terrorists are from, you can forget civil rights in this
country.... I think we will have a return to Korematsu."' He added, "'Not too many people will be
crying in their beer if there are more detentions, more stops and more profiling."' Andrew Chow,
Landmark APA Legal Team Demands Commissioner's Ouster, ASiANWEEK, Aug. 15, 2002,
http://www.asianweek.com/2002_08_09/newskorematsu.html (quoting Peter N. Kirsanow).
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Latinas tended to favor ethnic and racial profiling so long as directed
against "terrorists. '48
In the face of such widespread acceptance of racial profiling in the
name of national security, commentators began to appeal to imagery of
the internment to counsel the government and public of the perils of
racial profiling. They employed the internment to emphasize the evil of
using race as a basis for rights deprivations. 49 Professor Deborah
Ramirez, for example, stated, "The public support for racial profiling as a
method for preventing acts of espionage or terrorism is reminiscent of
sentiment expressed in this country prior to the internment of Japanese-
Americans residing on the West Coast during World War 11."50 The
comparison of current views of Arab Americans with historical views of
Japanese Americans stands as a caution to society not to fall prey to the
pernicious social psychology that predicated Japanese internment.
Moreover, reminders of the Japanese internment are meant to evoke
feelings of distaste and guilt in the general public regarding race-based
policies. The internment has come to represent one of history's most
serious incidents of racial oppression, exceeded perhaps only by
genocide.5' Recalling the internment thus causes unease about the use of
race in governmental decision making. Historians, lawyers, and laymen
alike look with utter disdain upon General John L. DeWitt's 52 racist
48. According to some news organizations, after 9/11, African Americans, as a group, were
most likely to support racial profiling to combat terrorism. See Catherine Donaldson Evans, Terror
Probe Changes Face of Racial Profiling Debate, Fox NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, http://www.foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,35521,00.html ("A recent Gallup poll found that African-Americans are more
likely than other racial and ethnic groups to support profiling and tight airport security checks for
Arabs and Arab-Americans since the Sept. 11 disaster.").
49. David Cole observed, "The argument that we cannot afford to rely on something other than
racial or ethnic proxies for suspicion, after all, is precisely the rationale used to intern 110,000
persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II." Cole, supra note 26, at 976.
50. Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2003).
51. See Joseph Onek, Critique 19 J.L. & RELIGION 85, 85 (2003-04) ("World War II saw one of
the greatest stains on American democracy and certainly one of the greatest overreactions, the
internment of Japanese Americans ..."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1257, 1294 (2004) ("The World War II internment of Japanese-Americans
was a tragic injustice ... perpetrated by all three branches of the national government."); Juan R.
Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of
Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 668-69 (2002) ("[T]he Supreme Court... passed to
one of its least glorious moments, succumbing perhaps to the war hysteria of the moment, by
approving the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent."); Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy
Comment, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) and the Detention of United States
Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112 YALE L.J. 961, 968 (2003) (calling the Japanese internment "one
of the darker moments in the history of the U.S. government's treatment of its own citizens").
52. General DeWitt was a U.S. Army Commander of the Fourth Army headquarters at the
Presidio in San Francisco. In his office, he oversaw the internment of more than 115,000 Japanese.
In addition, General DeWitt testified in front of Congress and authored a report in support of the
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sentiment that "a Jap is a Jap,'53 in light of the terrible events that
sentiment brought about.5 4 This feeling of aversion can then effectively
transfer to some of the Anti-Arab rhetoric after 9/11, like Congressman
John Cooksey's statement that the police would be justified in stopping
any person with "a diaper on his head and a fan belt wrapped around the
diaper."'55
Commentators further bring up the Japanese internment to illustrate
the dangerous flaw in race-based reasoning, arguing that unfounded or
even slightly correlative assumptions about race not only lead to grave
civil libertarian injuries, but also undermine security by focusing
government efforts on inaccurate dangerousness predictors.56 Professor
David Cole states, "we have targeted immigrants based on their Arab
identity, and in doing so have fallen prey to the same kind of ethnic
stereotyping that characterized the fundamental error of the Japanese
internment. JOHN L. DEWITT, OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE
EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST (1942).
53. The full text of this statement, which appeared in Hearst's San Francisco News on April 13,
1943, reads,
"I don't want any Jap back on the Coast .... There is no way to determine their
loyalty .... It makes no difference whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen-he is
still a Japanese. Giving him a piece of paper won't change him .... I don't care what
they do with the Japs as long as they don't send them back here. A Jap is a Jap."
Jerry Kang, supra note 13, at 987 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1911, at 13-14 (1942) (Tolan Committee
Report)). DeWitt also stated,
You needn't worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for the
Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the Japanese all the time
until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he
is allowed in this area-problems which I don't want to have to worry about.
Investigation of Congested Areas: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. On Naval
Affairs, 78th Cong. 740 (1943) (testimony of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding
General of Western Defense Command).
54. Professor Keith Aoki, however, cautions us not to forget the institutional foundations of the
internment. He criticizes "various accounts of the internment of Japanese Americans... assigning
blame to renegade 'bad actors' such as Lt. DeWitt or persons in the War Department who
deliberately withheld, or lied about, information regarding the nature of the threat posed by Japanese
Americans on the West Coast." Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth Century "Alien
Land Laws " as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 69 (1998).
55. John LaPlante, La. Congressman's Comments on Racial Profiling Surprise Some, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Sept. 20, 2001, at 1 B.
56. The logical error is that the government substitutes race for more accurate and
individualized determinations of disloyalty or criminality. Even if it were true that "all terrorists are
Arab," which is itself a ridiculous statement (even Al Qaeda includes Africans, Asians, and
Caucasians) it does not logically follow that "all Arabs are terrorists." This, in turn, makes
concentrating on race a poor substitute for concentrating on more relevant factors. Race is thus a
distraction, and racial policies render the nation less safe. Moreover, making any correlative link
between race and terrorism or criminality is scientifically difficult given selective enforcement and
prosecution. Deborah Ramirez adds, "The main limitation is that [racial profiling] data focus[es] on
arrests and convictions, rather than on the actual incidence of criminal conduct, and these numbers
cannot account for law enforcement or prosecutorial discretion." Ramirez, supra note 50, at 1211.
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internment. ''57  The argument is that by using the broad category of
ethnicity as a proxy for terrorism, the government is committing the
same logical error the Roosevelt Administration committed by using
ethnicity as a proxy for disloyalty.
58
In addition to drawing upon the internment as a persuasive tool
against racial profiling, scholars invoke the internment to criticize the
government's imposition of detention without process.59  They
understand Korematsu to represent a principle of detention without
credible basis or appropriate judicial oversight.6 ° Professor Chris lijima
argues that one of the most disturbing aspects of the Japanese internment
is that persons were stripped of liberty, not on the basis of any specific
finding of individual dangerousness or disloyalty, but rather on the mere
basis of unsubstantiated "military necessity. 61  Professor Dean
Hashimoto opines that the "central lesson we learn from Korematsu
appears to be that there is an important role for judicial review of
substantive decisions by military authorities" and that "the Court should
recognize that Korematsu stands for the principle of judicial
abstention. 62 Inherent in such analyses of Korematsu are two criticisms:
first, that the executive branch deprived persons of liberty without
process and without proper basis for denying process; 63 and second, that
57. Cole, supra note 26, at 994.
58. See Ramirez, supra note 50, at 1211 (discussing the problems with using race as
justification to conduct a traffic stop). David Cole observes, "In arguments that eerily foreshadow
the 'sleeper' theories advanced about Al Qaeda today, government officials argued that the fact that
Japanese aliens and citizens living among us had taken no subversive action yet only underscored
how dangerous they were." Cole, supra note 26, at 992.
59. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 26, at 989-94; David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18 (2003); Muller, supra note 15, at
119 (all referencing the Japanese internment of World War I).
60. See Tania Cruz, Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of Civil
Liberties When "Fears and Prejudices are Aroused," 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 129, 134 (2003) ("The
[Korematsu] Court's deference, despite its pronouncement of heightened scrutiny, has been sharply
criticized as subverting civil liberties to falsified claims of national security.").
61. lijima, supra note 13, at 123-25. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219
(1944) (relying on "the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an
immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal").
62. Dean M. Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative
Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 124-25 (1996).
63. Justice Murphy noted,
The main reasons relied upon by those responsible for the forced evacuation, therefore,
do not prove a reasonable relation between the group characteristics of Japanese
Americans and the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. The reasons appear,
instead, to be largely an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and
insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
2006]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
the Supreme Court neglected its duty to assess the factual adequacy of
purported reasons for the detention scheme.
64
The Roosevelt Administration relied on the military judgment that
there were "disloyal" members of the Japanese-American community
65
to conclude that it was necessary to detain persons without regard to
basic due process. 66  Critics argue that the evidence underlying the
assumption that Japanese presence on the West Coast represented a
danger was false, spurious, and biased.67 They further assert that even if
the government's claims of danger were slightly credible, some
individual process, such as individual loyalty hearings,68 could have been
69afforded to the Japanese, rather than process-less detention en masse.
64. See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR
POWERS SINCE 1918, at 261 (1989) (describing the Japanese internment cases as "[t]he most
egregious example of abdication in the form of ritualistic approval [that] occurred during World War
II"); Cruz, supra note 60, at 17 1:
Today, the judiciary needs to be the final arbiter and protector of fundamental liberties of
citizens and noncitizens alike. If it abdicates this role, as it did in Korematsu, then the
very democratic foundation of the country is at risk. If the executive's expansive
authority over American civil liberties is not checked, the excesses of today will haunt us
tomorrow.
65. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (citing military opinion that "'there were disloyal members
of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained'
(quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943))).
66. The Court characterized exclusion as the result of a military belief "that in a critical hour
[disloyal] persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace
to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to
guard against it." Id. Recognizing the "hardship" on the Japanese, the Court explained,
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike,
both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure.
Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden
is always heavier.
Id. at 219.
67. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 13, at 1274-75 ("[T]he key West Coast military
commander ordering the internment based his decisions on invidious racial stereotypes about
inscrutable, inherently disloyal Japanese-Americans and on falsified evidence of espionage and
sabotage .... ).
68. Justice Murphy criticized the Court's refusal to require some procedure:
It seems incredible that ... it would have been impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the
mere 112,000 persons involved-or at least for the 70,000 American citizens---especially
when a large part of this number represented children and elderly men and women. Any
inconvenience that may have accompanied an attempt to conform to procedural due
process cannot be said to justify violations of constitutional rights of individuals.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 241-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69. Gil Gott notes that DeWitt's reasoning for denying individual process "boiled down to a
racist assumption that there was no way to separate the 'sheep from the goats' because the Japanese
were such a 'tightly-knit racial group."' Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents. Japanese American
Internment as Foreign Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179, 234 (1998) (quoting PETER IRONS, JUSTICE
AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 208 (1983)).
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Scholars draw upon similar arguments to criticize the detentions of
citizen Yaser Hamdi, citizen Jose Padilla, and the Guantanamo prisoners.
Experts maintain that, like the Japanese, these individuals have been
subject to incarceration with little or no process, without compelling
reasons for denying process. 70  Critics reject the government's
contentions that civilian criminal courts are ill equipped to handle
terrorism cases 71 and that detainees are not entitled to the protections of
the Geneva Convention.72  Furthermore, scholars are highly critical of
the process afforded to individuals who wish to challenge the detention.
Although the Supreme Court ruled that Yaser Hamdi was entitled to a
low-level evidentiary hearing to contest his status as an unlawful
combatant,73 that process falls far short of even a pretrial detention
hearing in criminal court. 74 In addition, while Supreme Court has stated
70. See, e.g., Lugosi, supra note 36, at 254 ("At least in principle, there is no difference
between the role of the Mobbs Declarations in Hamdi and Padilla and the order of General DeWitt
justifying the indefinite detention of citizens like Korematsu in concentration camps during World
War Two.").
71. For example, Professor Jonathan Turley rejects the argument that criminal courts cannot
safely accommodate terrorism prosecutions:
[T]his general argument ignores the long experience of federal courts in handling national
security cases, including terrorist cases involving Al Qaeda operatives. Congress has
already addressed the dangers of the release of national security information in such trials
with the enactment of the Classified Information Procedures Act ("CIPA") in 1980.
Under CIPA, the government is able to apply many of the same restrictions under federal
law as it would in a military tribunal, including non-public hearings, ex parte and in
camera reviews, and redacted evidence.
Jonathan Turley, Trials and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a
Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649, 745-46 (2002).
72. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention sets forth the categories of persons captured who may
be considered prisoners of war, which include those "who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form
themselves into regular armed units." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, art. 4, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. One can see ample grounds for detainees who fought
openly against the invading U.S. forces to claim that they are prisoners of war. The Convention
further states as follows: "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons.., belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention
until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." Id. at art. 5. The
government's position that it can freely categorize detainees as unlawful combatants has garnered
much criticism. See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of
War:" The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 60 (2003) ("Interpolating
unrecognized exceptions into the contours of prisoner of war status, particularly when done by the
world's leading military superpower, undermines the Geneva Conventions as a whole."). The
International Red Cross is unwavering in its position that Taliban detainees are prisoners of war.
Red Cross: Detainees "are POWs," CNN.COM, Feb. 8, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/
WORLD/europe/02/08/ret.cuba.redcross.
73. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 601-02 (2004). See infra Part I1. D (discussing the low
burden on the government to justify continued detention).
74. Under the Federal Bail Reform Act, the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence at a contested hearing "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably
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that U.S. courts have jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees' habeas
corpus claims,75 the government continues to urge district courts to
abstain from hearing such petitions.76 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit
recently ruled that President Bush's treatment of the Guantanamo
detainees was perfectly legal.77 Internment invocations are accordingly
used to emphasize grave harm of process-less incarceration in the name
of national security. Critics warn that "some in government are seeking
to resurrect ... Korematsu to justify the Bush Administration's present-
day national security curtailment of civil liberties. 78
Thus, the Japanese internment has become a dialectical tool to
counsel against race-based reasoning and hasty deprivations of liberty in
the name of security. Critics hope that by drawing upon the internment,
members of the Bush Administration and political right will be moved to
tone down rights-violating policies in an effort to avoid creating a legacy
of harm and abuse.7 9 Professor Michael Ratner cautions that the Bush
Administration, like the Roosevelt Administration, may very well face
future reprobation and a legacy of stigma based on its post-9/1 I policies:
[S]omeday in the future, we will look back on the actions of the Bush
Administration and see them as we now view the actions of the
Roosevelt administration in establishing internment camps for the
Japanese-as one of the most shameful episodes of United States
history. I hope that we will come to understand that the struggle for
assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (2000).
75. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 561 (2004).
76. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d*33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622
(2005) ("The government's initial argument is that the district court should have abstained from
exercising jurisdiction over Hamdan's habeas corpus petition."). See also Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross
Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al ("Some
officials, notably Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have said the detainees may be held until the
effort against terrorism ends.").
77. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 42. The court held that district courts could hear habeas petitions for
the narrow purpose of determining whether the Guantanamo military commissions had proper
jurisdiction over the detainees and substantively ruled that the military commissions were legal,
rejecting both that the Geneva convention could be enforced in the United States and that it applied
to the prisoners. Id. at 40-41.
78. Yamamoto et al., supra note 13, at 1272.
79. Indeed, President Bush drew on the persuasive power of invoking the internment in his
swearing in of Transportation Secretary Norman Minetta. He stated, "[Minetta's] life is a story of
determination and courage and service. As a child, he lived in an internment camp." George W.
Bush, Remarks by the President at Swearing-In Ceremony for Secretary of Transportation Norm
Minetta (Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010208-
3.html. It is unlikely that Bush would enjoy being remembered among the ranks of those who
incarcerated Secretary Minetta and his family.
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freedom from executive tyranny is a necessity; it is a struggle we all
must join.
80
B. Distancing Terrorism Policies from the Internment
The invocation of past deprivations to caution against current
government abuse is a broadly used tactic of civil libertarians in a wide
81 82array of issues, including gender discrimination, 1 racial discrimination,
and anti-Semitism. 83  Feminists draw upon the struggles of the
foremothers of enfranchisement to highlight the current struggle for
gender equality.84 Race theorists discuss Jim Crow laws and segregation
to caution against current de jure and de facto racism. 85 Members of the
Jewish community invoke the Holocaust to respond to current anti-
80. Michael Ratner, Moving Away From the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive
Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1521-22 (2003).
81. Feminists, for example, counter the argument that "society has come a long way," making
gender discrimination an antiquated issue. See Betty Friedan, Feminism's Next Step, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 13 ("The women's movement in some form will never be over. But
the rights that women have struggled to win in the last decade are in deadly danger, with right-wing
groups in Congress determined to gut laws against sex discrimination and to abolish legal
abortion....").
82. Justice Ginsburg has responded to the argument that affirmative action is unjustified
because society has progressed to the point where minorities have true equal opportunity:
[I]t remains the current reality that many minority students encounter markedly
inadequate and unequal educational opportunities. Despite these inequalities, some
minority students are able to meet the high threshold requirements set for admission to
the country's finest undergraduate and graduate educational institutions. As lower school
education in minority communities improves, an increase in the number of such students
may be anticipated. From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast,
that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
83. Scholars continue to invoke the "never again" catchphrase associated with the Holocaust as
a discursive vehicle to criticize and engage in analysis of current genocides and government abuses.
See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan & Vivile F. Rodin, Racism Genocide & Mass Murder. Toward a Legal
Theory About Group Deprivations, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 133, 221 (2003-04) (."Never again' is a
phrase that should be of universal relevance to Jews and non-Jews alike.").
84. See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the
Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 198-204 (1994) (discussing the history of the gender
enfranchisement movement as a vehicle for discussing the ways in which the Supreme Court has
historically played and currently plays a role in reinforcing patterns of gender domination).
85. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a
Color Blind Society, 36 AKRON L. REV. 693, 705 (2003) ("America has had a long history of racism
[and] discrimination.., firmly rooted in the legacies of slavery, Jim Crowism, 'separate but equal,'
and segregation. The problem plaguing America today is that it has not dealt with the deep-seated
and fundamental attitudes of White superiority and Black inferiority and the presumption of a race
neutral and a color blind society.").
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Semitism. 86 The illustration of past harms is helpful in striving for full
equality and cautioning against backsliding into or continuing to
perpetuate bigotry and oppression.
Many, however, vigorously reject that society is still infested with
tyranny and bigotry. These individuals argue that the status quo
represents a neutral, or at least acceptable, set of norms-a "fair" playing
field in which all, or at least most, members of society have equality of
opportunity to achieve. 87 When confronted with comparisons of current
situations to past deprivations of liberty and equality, conservative
defenders of the status quo often respond by asserting that society has
"gotten better" and thus comparisons to past abuses are not only
disanalogous but also disingenuous.88
In this vein, many dismiss arguments that the Bush Administration is
abusing rights and assert the Administration is responding to the threat of
terrorism appropriately, fairly, and with due regard for procedural
safeguards. 89  They argue that the government has struck the correct
balance between liberty and security without exceeding the boundaries of
executive power. Bush Administration supporters claim that critics
mistakenly view its policies as abusive. One conservative scholar
asserts, "To a surprising degree, opposition to the executive response to
86. See generally Vera Ranki, Holocaust History & the Law: Recent Trials Emerging Theories,
9 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15 passim (1997) (discussing the relevance of the Holocaust in
a postmodern legal world).
87. In response to pro-affirmative action arguments, conservative Larry Elder asserts that "the
progress of American blacks is simply astounding" and concludes that "[t]he road to success is
simple, if not easily applied-hard work, sacrifice, and above all, the refusal to think like a
victicrat." Larry Elder, The Progress of American Blacks, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Sept. 4, 2004,
http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3900.
88. Conservative Michael Horowitz argues against slavery reparations:
No evidence-based attempt has been made to prove that living individuals have been
adversely affected by a slave system that was ended over 150 years ago. But there is
plenty of evidence the hardships that occurred were hardships that individuals could and
did overcome. The black middle-class in America is a prosperous community that is now
larger in absolute terms than the black underclass.
David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks-and Racist
Too, FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE, Jan. 3, 2001, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.
asp?ID=l 153.
89. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, The Cheney World View, With an Emphasis on Boldness, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at P3 ("[T]he nation could not be safe without a president who was
instinctively ready to go on offense to eliminate threats to the United States."); Laura McCallum,
Republicans Praise Bush 's Handling of Terrorism; Delegates Approve Platform, MINNESOTA
PUBLIC RADIO, Aug. 4, 2004, http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/08/30_ap_
mcdayl/ (discussing President Bush's 2004 political platform and citing various sources of support
for his re-election).
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terror is premised on a mistaken, and sometimes overly apocalyptic,
depiction of the powers that have accrued to the government.
90
Defenders of the War on Terror offer different responses to the civil
libertarian invocation of Korematsu. More radical Bush supporters
actually justify the Japanese internment as both necessary and vital to the
defense of the nation and, indeed, the safety of the Japanese, and
conclude that the internment is not an instance of tyranny at all.91 For
example, Congressman Howard Coble, then Chairman of the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, stated
during a 2003 radio interview:
"We were at war. [Japanese Americans] were an endangered
species" . . . . "For many of these Japanese-Americans, it wasn't safe
for them to be on the street."
"Some probably were intent on doing harm to us". . . just as some
of these Arab Americans are probably intent on doing harm to us."
92
Most Bush Administration defenders, however, seek to distance current
policies from Roosevelt's policies regarding the Japanese. These
distancing tactics are not only set forth by the political right, but also by
scholars who take an optimistic view of society's ability to learn from
past atrocities. There are several types of distancing arguments advanced
by defenders of the status quo, which are analyzed below.
Some distancing arguments highlight factual differences between the
internment and current detentions. They assert the government interned
the Japanese solely on the basis of racial prejudice and contrast the
Japanese internment with, for example, Yaser Hamdi's detention, which
they characterize as based upon individual dangerous conduct.
93
Supporters of Secretary Rumsfeld in Hamdi argued against internment
comparisons, stating, "Hamdi introduced no evidence of unreasonable
racial stereotyping" and "the Mobbs Declaration does not recite
generalizations regarding groups of which Hamdi happens to be a
member; rather, it recites specific facts regarding Hamdi's actions in
90. Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 663, 666
(2004).
91. See, e.g., MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR "RACIAL
PROFILING" IN WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR xxxiii-xxxv (2004).
92. N.C. Rep.: WWII Internment Camps Were Meant to Help, ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 05,
2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77677,00.html (quoting Howard Coble).




support of the Taliban war effort." 94  Such arguments distance current
policies from the internment by claiming that while impermissible racism
underlay the internment, "legitimate" justifications underlie the current
terrorism detentions.
Critics of the Administration advance several responses to the
contention that the current detentions are not racialized. First, they argue
that the Bush Administration is, in fact, overtly embracing many race-
based antiterrorism policies.95  Moreover, scholars note that, while
perhaps not as obvious, there is a definitive racial dimension to the
terrorism detentions, including Hamdi's. 96 They caution those quick to
separate the "military judgment" in Hamdi's case from the "racism" in
Korematsu's case to remember that the Supreme Court in Korematsu
specifically deferred to DeWitt's racist assumptions as proper "military
judgment." Professor Thomas W. Joo observes that "the 'Arab' racial
construct has rapidly taken center stage in the wake of September 1 1"
and cautions that "[r]ace and executive power are closely intertwined in
the current national security crisis, as they have been in past crises, real
and perceived.,
97
Other distancing arguments distinguish the internment by comparing
the severity of the internment to the severity of current antiterrorism
policies. Professor Eric Muller, for example, proposes that in assessing
current policies, we should "step out of the shadow" of Korematsu.
98
Rejecting the contention that race-based reasoning is never acceptable, 99
he states, "I have shown that, to the extent one must identify a
'fundamental error' in the Japanese-American internment, it was not the
inference that supported the program but the staggering burdens that the
program imposed on the strength of that inference." 100 Muller further
characterizes Bush's actions as Comparatively restrained and attempts to
sanitize Bush's race-based interrogation policies on the ground that
94. Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
95. See, e.g., Lugosi, supra note 36, at 241 (asserting the possibility that Hamdi's incarceration
was because of his ethnic origin); Serrano & Minami, supra note 12, at 46 (discussing the FBI &
INS's use of racial profiling).
96. See lijima, supra note 13, at 128-34 (discussing the racial underpinnings of the Hamdi
case).
97. Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the
Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 46-47
(2002). He explains, "Excessive deference to the executive may legitimate racial reasoning, and
racial reasoning may legitimate expansion of executive power." Id. at 47.
98. Muller, supra note 15, at 130.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 119.
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the Bush administration was acting on an inference not that young male
Arab aliens who had arrived on certain sorts of visas during a specified
time period might be terrorists, but that they might be more likely than
others to know terrorists, or to have information that seemed innocent
to them but would be useful to investigators.
10 1
One can certainly question Muller's contention that selective
detention and interrogation of Arab men is acceptable because they were
not presumed to be terrorists.10 2  During the internment, the presumed
disloyalty of the Japanese was not the only basis for detention. Rather,
government officials posited many "neutral" reasons for the internment
including preventing Japanese soldiers from posing as Americans and
protecting Japanese Americans from external harm. 10 3 Moreover, many
would disagree with the specific contention that race-based policies are
acceptable so long as the attendant deprivations are not great. 1°4 As the
Supreme Court has recognized elsewhere, there is harm inherent in racial
decision making.10 5  Both the internment and current racial profiling
demonstrate such harm with particularity. 0 6  Consequently, it is not
101. Id. at 122-23 (footnotes omitted).
102. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the
"Racing" ofArab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11-17 (2001) (comparing experiences
of today's Arabs and Muslims being racially constructed as terrorists to experiences of wartime
Japanese Americans being racially constructed as saboteurs); see also Adam Liptak, For Post-9/JJ
Material Witness, It Is a Terror of a Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (explaining
the use of material witness detention against Arabs after 9/11).
103. See INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 1, at 176 (quoting Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt as
saying, "the question of the alien Japanese and all Japanese presents a problem in control, separate
and distinct from that of the German and Italian."); MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED:
POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 109 (1949) (quoting Portland Mayor Earl Riley testifying
before the Tolan Committee stating, "for [the Japanese Americans'] own protection, they should be
evacuated").
104. Consider the following hypothetical: During World War I1, officials in their "military
expertise" determined that there would be an invasion of certain areas of California. They deemed it
necessary to evacuate a portion of California, install military operations there, and relocate all
100,000 residents of a town. In fact, this military judgment was based on reckless intelligence
gathering, faulty assumptions, and incompetence. In retrospect, many would consider this action a
terrible mistake and condemn the negligent intelligence gathering. However, it can hardly be said
that this scenario adequately mirrors the harm and shame of the Japanese internment.
105. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting race-based juror challenges and
emphasizing the idea that racialized harm is distinct from other harms). See also Tania Tetlow, How
Batson Spawned Shaw-Requiring the Government to Treat Citizens as Individuals When it Cannot,
49 Loy. L. REV. 133, 144 (2004) ("The Batson cases did not depend entirely on the argument that
race is irrelevant to predictions of the voting behavior of a particular juror. The majority relied more
heavily on the argument that racial stereotypes, regardless of their truth, cause harm."). The
Supreme Court has recognized that racial discrimination not only harms individuals tangibly, but
also harms entire races psychologically and governmental integrity generally. See Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 985 (1996) (explaining the harms caused by racial stereotyping).
106. See Saito, supra note 102, at 9 (stating that "as we look briefly at the history of Asians in
America, we see the internment emerging as a somewhat extreme, but not aberrant, manifestation of
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accurate to state that a faulty racial judgment is no worse than a faulty
military judgment.
Likewise, it is untenable to hold that a "correct"'10 7 racial judgment
stands on the same footing as any other military judgment, so long as it
does not lead to enormous deprivations. 10 8  Even assuming that current
deprivations are not as bad as in World War II, which is not necessarily
true, 109 the current security situation is also not as dire as in World War
II, which involved an imminent invasion during a world war. The
Roosevelt Administration thus set racist and extremely harmful policy in
the face of a massive threat. The Bush Administration set racist and
harmful, albeit less sweeping, policy in the face of a much less severe
threat." 0 In the wake of 9/11, a single attack carried out by a terrorist
group, not a nation, the Bush Administration has initiated two wars and
detained thousands of individuals." First, many would scoff at the
notion that such actions evidence "restraint." Moreover, any "restrained"
nature of Bush's policies may be less a function of society's evolution
and more a function of the fact that the predicate danger has not reached
the level of World War 11.112 Because the government is currently
engaging in race-based deprivations with relatively minimal predicate
danger logically indicates that when faced with graver dangers, like those
a well-entrenched pattern of discrimination rooted in a racialized identification of Asian-Americans
as perpetually 'foreign').
107. Whether racial judgments can be correct is questionable. See, e.g., Jeremiah Wagner,
Racial (De)Profiling: Modeling a Remedy For Racial Profiling After the School Desegregation
Cases, 22 LAW & INEQ. 73, 88 (2004) (stating that racial profiling "becomes 'a self-fulfilling
prophecy where law enforcement agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves generated as a
result of the discretionary allocation of resources and targeted drug enforcement efforts"' (quoting
David Rudovsky, Breaking the Pattern of Racial Profiling, 38 TRIAL 29, 30 (2002)).
108. See Muller, supra note 15, at 130 (noting that "profiling might sometimes be rational").
109. One could contest the argument that the current terrorism cases do not represent as grave a
deprivation as the Japanese internment. Although there may be fewer terrorism detainees than there
were internees, terrorism detention is much harsher. Terror detainees are held in jails, and
sometimes in barbed wire and cages. They are kept from their families and held incommunicado,
save for regular interrogation by U.S. officials. See infra notes 526-28 and accompanying text
(describing conditions for terrorism detainees); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN
DIGNITY DENIED: TORTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR' (2004),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511452004.
110. Of course, proponents of racial profiling as part of the War on Terror paint a grim picture of
America's security situation. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1257, 1281 (2004) (asserting that racial profiling is justified by "compelling interests
in national self-preservation, national security, and protection of innocent civilians from military or
terrorist attack by foreign enemies"). Such danger, however, can barely be compared to the dangers
of full-blown war and invasion.
11. PEARLSTEIN, supra note 17, at 7.
112. See infra notes 168-77, 192-95 and accompanying text (Supreme Court description of the
threat facing the United States during World War II).
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of World War II, the Administration will resort to more repressive racial
policies. 1
13
Other distancing arguments are not related to race but rather to the
issue of unfair detention. Some defenders of the terrorism detentions
offer unsupported yet vehement assertions that invocations of Korematsu
are misplaced'14 The Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, for example, summarily
stated, "There is not the slightest resemblance of a foreign battlefield
detention to the roundly and properly discredited mass arrest and
detention of Japanese-Americans in California in Korematsu.""5  The
district court in Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld 16 similarly
dismissed the invocation of Korematsu as an example of partisan
alarmism.'1 7 Others forge more substantive arguments distinguishing the
internment from current detention policy.
Professor Mark Tushnet, for example, has "defended" Korematsu as
a process of "social learning" whereby past discredited suspensions of
civil liberties remain in the collective social conscious and serve to limit
future suspensions of civil liberties." 8 Tushnet hypothesizes that during
times of emergency, the government acts hastily on imperfect
information; 19 military judgment is exercised; and executive deference is
widespread. 20  Judges are loath to intervene in substantive policy
making, and they exercise judicial oversight, if at all, in an ex post
113. Bruce Ackerman provides a bleak view of the state of future civil liberties:
After each successful attack, politicians will come up with repressive laws and promise
greater security-only to find that a different terrorist band manages to strike a few years
later.... Even if the next half-century sees only four or five attacks on the scale of
September 11, this destructive cycle will prove devastating to civil liberties by 2050.
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029-30 (2004).
114. Others go even farther and argue that, in fact, current terrorism detainees enjoy too much
process. See e.g., Matthew J. Franck, Harmful Rulings: Enemy Combatants and an Irresponsible
Court, NAT'L REVIEW, June 29, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/franck
200406291303.asp (criticizing the Hamdi and Rasul decisions for granting too many rights to
detainees).
115. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003).
116. 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
117. The court criticized the government's hyperbolic assertion that giving Padilla counsel
would lead to terrorist attacks but noted, "More than a match for that are passages in the amicus
curiae submissions in this case, where lawyers raise the specter of Korematsu v. United States." 243
F. Supp. 2d at 57.
118. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 274.
119. See id. at 291 ("The fact that policies are developed in uncertain times on the basis of
information not fully available outside the decision-making bureaucracy may account for the courts'
initial acquiescence in the policies, and for the subsequent critical reactions when the previously
unavailable information becomes available.").
120. ld. at 294.
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fashion. 12 1 The result is that many emergency decisions abridging civil
liberties are repudiated only in future times when more accurate
information is available. 2 2  His view of the cycle of military
misjudgment, civil liberty abridgment, and executive deference,
however, is optimistic. The government does not in fact repeat the same
mistakes over and over. Rather, with each successive emergency, the
government's policies become less hasty and less extreme.' 23  To
illustrate this point, Tushnet highlights differences between Roosevelt's
actions and Bush's terrorism policies. 124  Although he characterizes
Bush's philosophy as virtually identical to that of the wartime Roosevelt
Administration, he asserts that social learning is evidenced by the Bush
Administration's failure to act to the full extent of its claimed power.'
25
Asserting that "by and large [Bush's] actions have been more restrained
than would be authorized by the administration's asserted legal theories,"
Tushnet concludes, "Social learning elsewhere in the society appears to
have produced a political dynamic that restrains the administration."'
' 26
Professor Tushnet's hypothesis about social learning is based in part
on empirical conclusions about the way the public and government
officials think and behave.' 27 He seems to assume that public awareness
of civil liberties and race relations has evolved since World War II.
There is evidence, however, that this is not the case. Just as there was
general public support but particular civil libertarian outcry during the
internment, 128 there is general public support but particular civil
libertarian resistance to post-9/1 I anti-Arab policies. 129 Like the scholars
121. Id. at 291. See also Baker, supra note 33, at 220 (asserting that during emergencies,
judicial review is exercised rarely and then only after the fact).
122. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 287 ("The retrospective critical view is a compound of two
other judgments: that the threat to which the actions were responses was exaggerated, and that the
responses were excessive in relation to the exaggerated threats (obviously) and even to the real
threats that existed.").
123. Id. at 283-84. In fairness, Tushnet qualifies his theory by noting that social learning is
imperfect and that there is not always a fair analogy to be drawn between past emergencies and
present threats. He states, "We learn from our mistakes to the extent that we do not repeat precisely
the same errors, but it seems that we do not learn enough to keep us from making new and different
mistakes." Id. at 292.
124. Id. at 295-96.
125. Id. at 296.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 305.
128. See GRODZINS, supra note 103, at 197 (noting the criticisms of mass evacuation from civil
libertarian groups); Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren,
Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 111 (1998) (describing popular
support for internment).
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (addressing the concerns of civil libertarians that
individuals are being deprived of their liberty).
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who currently criticize Bush, during World War II, "[l]awyers... openly
discussed the constitutional barriers to a mass internment of civilians
based on racial classification."
'1 30
Moreover, the fact that the Bush Administration and general public
are not calling for Arab internment may be more a product of the specific
circumstances facing the nation than a product of social learning.1 31 The
Bush Administration's seemingly "restrained" manner may be explained
better by other specific factual circumstances than the Administration's
having learned from the internment. 132  Consequently, one may
hypothesize that the public and politicians have learned from past abuses,
but this hypothesis is difficult to support by clear empirical evidence
because the factual differences between post-9/11 America and World
War II America are compelling enough to explain any differences
between the Bush and Roosevelt Administrations' policies.
Professor Tushnet's distancing argument, however, is not solely
based on empirical claims about the public and government's ability to
learn from past events. 133  He also sets forth a legal basis for society's
claimed evolutionary progression. 34  Tushnet asserts, "Judges and
scholars develop doctrines and approaches that preclude the repetition of
130. Gott, supra note 69, at 226. Professor Gott observes that there was in fact a social outcry
against the internment:
Initial public opinion among whites after Japan's attack did not suggest that concentration
camps were imminent. Even the Los Angeles Times, which would later play a key role
in fanning the flames of racist hatred, initially published editorials that defended the
loyalty of Japanese Americans, referring to them as "good Americans."
Id.
131. For example, the diversity of ethnicities represented by Arabs and Muslims would
complicate any project of mass internment. See Chisun Lee, Rounding Up the 'Enemy:' Sixty Years
After It Jailed Japanese Americans, Would the U.S. Consider Another Ethnic Internment?, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, July 31-Aug. 6, 2002, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/
issues/023 1/lee.php (explaining that "the diversity of nationalities linked to today's terrorism might
complicate a massive roundup"). Moreover, the Bush Administration has utilized its ability to hold
internees abroad and in secrecy, which would have been difficult to accomplish during World War
II. See supra note 17.
132. These circumstances include the ability of the Bush Administration to intern many Arabs
and Muslims on immigration grounds, the diverse nature of the group, the lack of recent attacks
inside the United States, the prohibitive costs, Bush's obsession with Iraq, and the ability to carry out
extraterritorial secret detentions. One should be skeptical of purported Bush Administration
restraint, given its consistent position that there should be unfettered executive discretion when it
comes to national security decisions. In fact, Bush and his supporters have sought to establish even
greater executive power to act unilaterally than what previously existed. See, e.g., Brief for
American Center for Law & Justice as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioners, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (arguing that Bush's actions regarding Padilla were
nonjusticiable political questions).
133. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 292.
134. Id.
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the last generation's mistakes."'' 35 Initially, one may wonder just how far
removed from the last deprivation courts must be to exercise such
retrospective evaluation. Indeed, the Korematsu Court, even given the
"calm perspective of hindsight,"'136  did not create a doctrine of
repudiation or restraint. In fact, the Court did what Tushnet objects to
most when it incorporated wartime political decision making into the
body of the Constitution. 137 Tushnet, of course, could respond that the
Korematsu decision came at a politicized and still tumultuous time, such
that the Court was guided by popular passion and could not exercise
calm hindsight. Given that more than a half-century has passed since
World War II, the Supreme Court should have done better with Padilla
and Hamdi.138 The question is whether it has.
C. Law as the Framework for Assessing the Distancing Arguments
In examining whether the government has improved its treatment of
civil rights since Korematsu, this Article concentrates on the Supreme
Court's legal choices as the measure of progress. While one could look
at factors such as public opinion, governmental actions, or media to
gauge the movement of society, 139 such empirical factors might not be
good indicators of progress because they are difficult to quantify 40 and
depend on variable conditions. 14' Moreover, the United States of today
135. Id.
136. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944).
137. Much to the disappointment of Justice Jackson, see infra notes 148-49 and accompanying
text, the Court ruled that the government had the constitutional authority to create the exclusion
order and that such order comported with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause. Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 224.
138. The legal repudiation of the internment has largely been a product of nonjudicial
commentary. The few cases that comment on the internment criticize it in dicta only. As a result,
Korematsu is technically "good law." Nowhere in any of the terrorism cases does the Court take the
opportunity to condemn Korematsu or Hirabayashi.
139. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 283-84.
140. Public opinion is notoriously difficult to gauge. Moreover, opinion polls show that the
public is not sensitized to the concept of race-based internment. Research shows that nearly the
same percentage of New Yorkers supported Arab internment camps two years after 9/11 as two
weeks after. See Marc Humbert, Poll: Third of New Yorkers Support Internment Camps for Some,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24, 2001, available at http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/safety/
nyintemment.htm.
141. See Karen Patterson, The American Psyche; Shaken and Stirred by Attacks, We're United in
Our Individualism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 1, 2002, at I J (stating that many of the studies of
attitudes toward Arab Americans are not fully accurate because they were "assembled hastily, have
small numbers of subjects, lack random samples, and focus on college students"). It is indeed
difficult to determine where Americans generally stand on Bush's policies. This is evident simply
by looking at opinion polls of his performance throughout his first term. The results of a number of
polls can be found at http://pollingreport.com/terror.htm.
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is faced with extremely different factual circumstances than the United
States of the 1940s. Because of the distinctions between World War II
and 9/11, it is difficult to conclude that current policy and social attitude
evidence an advancing civil libertarian learning curve. Consequently,
this Article considers legal movements as a more concrete and accurate
way of examining the evolution of society's disposition toward civil
liberties. The movement in Supreme Court jurisprudence, for example,
from Dred Scott v. Sanford,142 to Brown v. Board of Education,143 to
Regents at the University of California v. Bakke, 144 back to Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Dena,145 and again to Grutter v. Bollinger,146 says
something about the progression of society in the arena of civil rights,
equal protection, and race relations.
In addition to being a more administrable way of measuring the
progress of society, the law plays a special role as both a legitimator of
de facto conditions and a creator of new societal dispositions. Professor
Thomas W. Joo observes, "Because of its peculiar position as the official
voice of society, law plays an important role in the construction of social
institutions and beliefs, even those that are not typically considered
'legal."",147 This is precisely why Justice Jackson feared the legacy of the
Korematsu decision, even though by the time the Korematsu decision
was issued, the camps were officially finished. 48 He decried the ability
of Korematsu to "lie[] about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need."t 4 9 On a related note, Professor Tushnet argues that emergency
detention power should be expressly exempted from constitutional
142. 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that Dred Scott, a black man, was not permitted citizenship nor
the ability to gain his freedom by moving into a free territory).
143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional and requiring
racial integration of schools).
144. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (permitting government funded school to consider race in admissions
to the Universities of California, relying on value of diversity).
145. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (disallowing government to consider race in the granting of contracts
despite diversity gains).
146. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (reaffirming Bakke and holding that schools may take into account
race in admissions for diversity purposes).
147. Joo, supra note 97, at 1. He further states, "By demanding precise articulation and
justification, law can transform vague and contested ideas into legitimate and even enforceable
concepts. In doing so, the law not only reflects social institutions but actively constructs them." Id.
at 1-2.
148. Korematsu was decided on December 18, 1944. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). Public Proclamation 21, which rescinded General DeWitt's mass exclusion order, was
issued on December 17, 1944, thus marking the official end of internment policies. See NG, supra
note 8, at 97 (discussing Public Proclamation 21).
149. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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analysis precisely because of the force of the rule of law." 0 His concern
is that judicial opinions rationalizing expansive executive power during
exigencies will lead to the President's invocation of such powers more
often and in less exigent circumstances. 151
The role of the courts in times of emergency is a popular topic for
legal scholars. One prominent theorist, Professor Bruce Ackerman, has
hypothesized an alternate constitutional paradigm that would allow for
some legislative control over military decisions, while relieving courts of
any obligation to rule on their constitutionality.15 2  Others reject the
premise that courts should stay out of emergency decision making and
argue for a jealous guarding of judicial power to vindicate civil liberties.
David Cole, for example, urges that no matter the emergency, "[p]utting
innocent people who pose no danger behind bars to reassure a panicked
public is normatively unacceptable."' 153 This Article neither supports an
alternate constitutional scheme to account for judicial abdication during
times of emergency, nor defends the ability of the Court to avoid
political pressure.' 54  Rather, it recognizes that novel constitutional
150. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 304-05.
151. Id.at303-04.
152. See Ackerman, supra note 113, at 1037 ("My aim is to design a constitutional framework
for a temporary state of emergency that enables government to discharge the reassurance function
without doing long-term damage to individual rights."). Ackerman sees the structure of judicial
review as historically and currently incapable of managing the executive's drive to impose long-
lasting limitations on liberty. Id. at 1029-30. He thus proposes a system in which the legislature
acts as a "supermajoritarian escalator" such that as the length of emergency detention increases, the
legislature must vote with increasing unanimity to maintain it. Id. at 1042. Judicial review is
extremely limited. Id. at 1067-68. Ackerman concludes that the "emergency constitution," which
compels legislative oversight, is better than a system in which the courts handle emergency matters
through total judicial abdication. Id.
153. David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE
L.J. 1753, 1758 (2004). He further states, "Ackerman proposes to do away with the two guarantees
essential to any acceptable system of nonwartime preventive detention-a threshold requirement of
objective suspicion and access to prompt judicial review. Eliminating either guarantee would violate
fundamental commands of both American constitutional law and international human rights law."
Id. at 1759. Cole also expresses skepticism about the ability of the legislature, even as constructed
by Ackerman, to be the vindicator of individual rights during times of emergency. Id. at 1764.
Moreover, Cole is less pessimistic about the judicial ability to control the government in the
aftermath of terrorist attacks. Id. at 1763.
154. This Article seeks to caution against harmful rulings, while recognizing that the Court has
some potential to rule the correct way. This is not to say, however, that the Court is immune to
social and political pressures. However, the fact that social and political pressure caused an unjust
decision by the Supreme Court does not necessarily justify tinkering with the structure of
government to account for the decision. Rather the sentiments giving rise to the political or social
pressure and the attendant unjust decisions -should be addressed as a matter of law, policy, and
theory. Dealing with external prejudices has been a struggle of the Supreme Court for generations.
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construction and judicial abdication are examples of the many
jurisprudential choices made by courts. 155
The issue central to this Article is whether the current Supreme
Court's choices in the terrorism cases evidence progress, such that the
admonitory invocation of the internment is no longer expedient. Because
the terrorism cases make no mention of race or equal protection, it is
difficult to compare the equal protection dimensions of the internment
and terrorism cases. As a result, this jurisprudential comparison will
concern choices made by the Court regarding detention power and
process, without specific regard to race.156 As a preface to this analysis,
Part III summarizes the relevant internment and terrorism detention
cases.
III. THE INTERNMENT AND TERRORISM DETENTION CASES
A. The Internment Cases
1. Hirabayashi v. United States
Gordon Hirabayashi's case' 57 was the first of a series of cases
challenging the World War II restrictions on the rights of the Japanese
decided by the Supreme Court. 158 After the formal declaration of war
against Japan, the President issued Executive Order 9066, which called
for "every possible protection against espionage and sabotage,"', 59 and
served as the basis for several military directives restricting the rights of
155. I leave it to constitutionalists and legal positivists to worry about courts destroying
constitutional text or the purity of precedence to bolster executive power during emergencies.
Justice Scalia, for example, decries the plurality's "Mr. Fix-It Mentality" in Hamdi. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The plurality seems to view it as its mission to
Make Everything Come Out Right."). Thomas Baker similarly criticizes the lasting effect of "crisis"
rulings. Thomas E. Baker, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in a Crisis: A Few Pages of History, 3
NEV. L.J. 23, 23 (2002) ("The lasting problem is that, when the crisis is over and things get back to
normal, we tend to hold onto the crisis constitution instead of returning to the normal constitution.").
156. One could argue that the Supreme Court made a specific jurisprudential choice in not
addressing the underlying racial issues in any of the internment cases. On the other hand, because of
the paucity of detainees in Hamdi's and Padilla's situations, it was difficult for either party to make
specific racial claims. Even if the parties had asked the Court to examine the total of the 9/11-
related domestic detentions, they would likely have been unable to establish a prima facie claim of
discrimination.
157. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
158. Other cases in the series were Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
159. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
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the Japanese. 160  Hirabayashi, an American citizen and resident of
Seattle, 161 was indicted for violating the curfew provision of Public
Proclamation No. 3, which regulated specified military areas.
1 62
Hirabayashi challenged the constitutionality of the indictment, claiming
that the relevant military orders and proclamations violated the Fifth
Amendment and Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution.
163
The district court rejected Hirabayashi's claims, prefacing its
decision with a description of the grave exigency that triggered the
government's power to impose curfews.1 6 4 The court cautioned that its
decision should be viewed "in the light of the unprecedented world
conflict which so suddenly engulfed this nation."' 65 The district court
held that Congress and the President, acting together, had the power to
enact the restrictions at issue.166 The Court observed that Congress had
authorized the curfew order through The Act of March 21, 1942, which
explicitly made it a crime to "leave, or commit any act in any military
area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive
Order of the President... or by any military commander... contrary to
the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone."
' 167
The Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the order and certified the
constitutional issues to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, like the
district court, first emphasized that the government's actions "must be
160. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83-84.
161. Seattle had been designated a Military Area by General DeWitt on March 2, 1942. Id. at
86-87.
162. United States v. Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1942), af'd, 320 U.S. 81
(1943).
163. Id. at661.
164. The court observed,
[W]e have been engaged in a total war with enemies unbelievably treacherous and wholly
ruthless, who intend to totally destroy this nation, its Constitution, our way of life, and
trample all liberty and freedom everywhere from this earth. It must be realized that
civilization itself is at stake in this global conflict.
Id. at 659.
165. Id.
166. Id. Interestingly, a dialectical tool employed by the district court in furtherance of its goal
of rejecting Hirabayashi's claims was to contrast the character of the war as grave and fundamental
with the character of Hirabayashi's rights as minor and technical. The court stated that Hirabayashi
was given the "privilege" of challenging his indictment and concluded that a "technical right of an
individual should not be permitted to endanger all of the constitutional rights of the whole citizenry."
Id. at 658, 661 (emphasis added).
167. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173. The court then rejected Hirabayashi's equal
protection argument by holding that there was no federal right of equal protection, observing that
"the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause." Hirabayashi, 46 F.
Supp. at 661 (quoting Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,401 (1940)).
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appraised in the light of the conditions with which the President and
Congress were confronted."' 168  Specifically, the Court observed that
military officials needed to "consider our internal situation" in light of
"the danger of invasion."' 169  The Court then turned to the issue of
whether Congress had unlawfully delegated its legislative authority by
allowing military commanders to promulgate the curfew restriction. The
Court decided this issue by examining whether Congress itself had
authorized the curfew order. Relying on the language and legislative
history of the Act of March 21, 1942,7 ° the Court held that the Act
authorized Executive Order 9066 generally and the curfew restrictions
specifically' 7' and concluded that Congress had not unconstitutionally
delegated its power. 1
72
The Court also addressed whether the government had the power to
subject citizens to the curfew restriction. 173 Although it held that the
curfew was a valid exercise of war power,' 74 the Court nonetheless
required some showing on the part of the government as to the propriety
of the restriction. The Court's inquiry was
whether in the light of all the facts and circumstances there was any
substantial basis for the conclusion, in which Congress and the military
commander united, that the curfew as applied was a protective measure
necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would
substantially affect the war effort and which might reasonably be
expected to aid a threatened enemy invasion.
175
In one of the most disturbing instances of judicial fact finding, the
Court determined that the government had provided evidence
establishing a "substantial basis" for the conclusion that Japanese
Americans posed a threat. 176 Sadly, the Court relied on the purported
isolation of the Japanese-American community, largely produced by pre-
existing racist laws, to support the theory that Japanese Americans could
168. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,93 (1943).
169. Id. at 94. "The challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed purpose of
safeguarding the military area in question, at a time of threatened air raids and invasion by the
Japanese forces." Id. at 94-95. See also id. at 101 (noting that the government regulations occurred
"in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion").
170. Id. at 89-91.
171. Id. at91-92.
172. Id. at 104.
173. Id. at 95-99.
174. Id at 98-99.
175. Id. at 95.
176. Id. at96-97.
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be part of a disloyal "fifth column.' 1  Based on this information, the
Court opined, "we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of
that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and
quickly ascertained.'
178
In concluding that the government could constitutionally enact the
curfew, the Court was careful to avoid commenting on the larger
internment program. 179  The Court stated that it was "immediately
concerned with the question whether it is within the constitutional power
of the national government.., to impose this restriction as an emergency
war measure. The exercise of that power here involves no question
of... trial by military tribunal."'
180
Justice Douglas concurred in the decision but disagreed with the
notion of second guessing the judgment of military officials and
criticized the majority for "assum[ing] that as a matter of policy it might
have been wiser for the military to have dealt with these people on an
individual basis."'18' He asserted that because the Court did not possess
the ability to sit in judgment on military decisions, it was "necessary to
concede that the army had the power to deal temporarily with these
people on a group basis."'' 82  Justice Douglas took issue, however, with
the characterization of the Japanese "problem" as one of assimilation
rather than loyalty.' 
83
177. Id. at 96-97 n.4. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text for criticism of the Court's
analysis.
178. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99. Analyzing Hirabayashi's equal protection claims under due
process, the Court's test was whether the government had asserted "a reasonable basis for the action
taken in imposing the curfew." Id. at 101. The Court concluded that the classification passed
constitutional muster because the particular "facts and circumstances" afforded some "ground for
differentiating citizens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States." Id.
179. Id. at 91-92. This piecemeal method of legal analysis, which allowed the courts to
constitutionally approve the detention of citizens by dissecting the program down to its more
innocuous parts, has been heavily criticized. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
180. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92.
181. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 107.
183. Id. at 107-08. Justice Douglas agreed that Hirabayashi had no right to test the
constitutionality of the military orders by failing to follow them, but raised the important question of
whether Hirabayashi should have been given an opportunity to contest his categorization as disloyal.
Id. at 108. Justices Murphy and Rutledge, by contrast, separately concurred in the judgment and
objected to any contention that the Court could not sit in judgment of military officials. Id. at 113
(Murphy, J., concurring); Id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justice Murphy was also careful to
note that a racial classification could only be utilized in the most extreme circumstances of great
emergency, cautioning that "to sanction discrimination between groups of United States citizens on
the basis of ancestry ... goes to the very brink of constitutional power." Id. at 111 (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
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2. Korematsu v. United States
Fred Korematsu was convicted for violating a military order that
excluded ethnic Japanese from portions of California. 184  Korematsu
appealed, and the case initially went before the Supreme Court on the
government's contention that Korematsu could not appeal his conviction
before sentencing. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit did have
jurisdiction to hear Korematsu's appeal and remanded for consideration
of the merits of the appeal.
185
Interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Hirabayashi as broadly
standing for the proposition that "the United States, in prosecuting a war,
has the power to do all that is necessary to the successful prosecution of a
war although the exercise of those powers temporarily infringe some of
the inherent rights and liberties of individual citizens," the Ninth Circuit
engaged only in a superficial review of Korematsu's claims.186 The court
concluded, "that [Hirabayashi's] principle, thus decided, so clearly
sustains the validity of the proclamation for evacuation, which is here
involved, that it is not necessary to labor the point.' 1 7  Without any
discussion of the differences between curfew and exclusion or mention
of the larger detention scheme, the court affirmed Korematsu's
conviction.
Judge Denman, concurring in the result, agreed with the majority
that General DeWitt's series of orders were justified by the extreme
exigencies facing the nation, but chastised the Ninth Circuit for what he
considered to be its total abdication of its judicial role by disposing of
Korematsu's claims simply by citing Hirabayashi. 188 He argued that the
series of orders calling for Korematsu's exclusion and relocation
materially differed from a mere curfew order. 189  He also decried the
court's refusal to see Korematsu's exclusion order as part of a larger
detention scheme. 190
184. Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 289 (9th Cir. 1943), affd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
This order was part of the scheme to control the Japanese "Military Areas" covered by Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 433 n. I (1943).
185. Korematsu, 319 U.S. at435.
186. Korematsu, 140 F.2d at 290.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 291 (Denman, J., concurring) ("In this conspicuous appeal of such a member of one
of America's minority groups, the opinion of this court disposes of Korematsu's major contentions
without their mention, much less their consideration.").
189. 1d.
190. Id. ("Outstanding is the avoidance of the question of imprisonment and deportation. It is
buried in the euphemism 'evacuation,' without suggestion of its forced character or its
accomplishment by compulsory confinement.").
20061
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On certiorari, Justice Black, writing for the majority, began the
opinion by introducing the equal protection test now known as "strict
scrutiny,"'19 observing that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect."' 192 The Court
then turned to-the issue of the government's power to restrict the rights
of citizens during wartime. Relying primarily on the reasoning in
Hirabayashi, the Court answered this question in the affirmative. 193 As
in Hirabayashi, the Court described the triggering warfare condition as
particularly grave. Recognizing that exclusion was only permissible
"under circumstances of direst emergency and peril," the Court opined
that "when under conditions of modem warfare our shores are threatened
by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger."
' 194
Combined with this description of the dire nature of the triggering
emergency was a deliberate minimization of the restrictions imposed on
the Japanese. Rather than recognizing exclusion as part of the larger
incarceration scheme, which at the time of the opinion had already forced
thousands of Japanese families into detention, the Court adopted a
piecemeal approach, considering the exclusion order standing alone. 95
The Court stated, "we cannot say either as a matter of fact or law that his
presence in [an assembly] center would have resulted in his detention in
a relocation center."' 96  In addition to reducing the issue to the sole
question of exclusion, the Court minimized the severity of the relocation
centers, asserting, "we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration
camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies."' 97 Having thus
bolstered the triggering emergency and downplayed the restrictions, the
Supreme Court ruled that Congress and the executive branch acting
together could enact the exclusion order as a valid exercise of war
power.1 98  The Court did not address the President's power to act
191. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (modern usage of the "strict scrutiny" doctrine); Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995) (same).
192. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
193. Id. at 217-19.
194. Id. at 220.
195. Id. at 221 (asserting that "the only issues framed at the trial related to petitioner's remaining
in the prohibited area in violation of the exclusion order").
196. Id.
197. Id. at 223. The Court further opined, "we are dealing specifically with nothing but an
exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue." Id.
198. Id. at 217-18 ("[W]e are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress
and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time
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unilaterally, having found that Congress explicitly invested the executive
with authority to effect the order at issue.'
99
The Court nonetheless preserved some judicial review over the
purported bases for the exclusion order.200  The test for constitutionality
seems to have been whether the war measure bore a definite and close
relationship to a legitimate wartime goal. In concluding that the
exclusion order was valid, the Court observed that preventing sabotage
and espionage was a legitimate wartime objective20 1 to which the order
bore a "definite and close relationship. 20 2 As in Hirabayashi, the Court
relied on the conclusion that there were numerous disloyal Japanese
Americans, who were impossible to segregate from loyal Japanese
Americans.20 3 The Court patently refused to review the larger detention
scheme and even cross referenced Ex parte Endo,204 stating that it
illustrated the difference between the validity of an order to exclude and
the validity of a detention order after exclusion had been effected.,
20 5
Justice Roberts, in dissent, vehemently objected to the piecemeal
approach adopted by the majority. 06 He carefully laid out the series of
orders that both compelled Korematsu to leave the area of his home and
constrained him to that area, operatively giving Korematsu two options
only: military detention or criminal incarceration for violating military
orders.20 7 Justice Roberts described the order as a "cleverly devised trap
they did.").
199. Id. at 223 ("Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders-as
inevitably it must-determined that they should have the power to [promulgate the regulations].").
200. Id. at 218-19.
201. Id. at 218 ("(E]xclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a definite and close
relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage.").
202. Id.
203. Id. The Court went on to say that its conclusion that the restriction was a valid exercise of
war power rebutted Korematsu's assertion that the restriction was an unconstitutional exercise of
racial prejudice. Id. at 223.
204. 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (finding continued detention of Japanese internee Endo unlawful).
205. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222 (citation omitted).
206. He characterized Korematsu as a
case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a
concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without
evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United
States.
Id. at 226. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
207. He observed,
The predicament in which the petitioner thus found himself was this: He was forbidden,
by Military Order, to leave the zone in which he lived; he was forbidden, by Military
Order, after a date fixed, to be found within that zone unless he were in an Assembly
Center located in that zone .... [A]n Assembly Center was a euphemism for a prison.
Id. at 230.
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to accomplish the real purpose of the military authority, which was to
lock [Korematsu] up in a concentration camp. 2 °8  He further
characterized the majority's analysis as "a substitution of an hypothetical
case" for the case at hand and observed, "I might agree with the court's
disposition of the hypothetical case ... [b]ut the facts above recited, and
those set forth in Ex parte Endo, show that exclusion was but a part of an
over-all plan for forcible detention.,
20 9
Justice Murphy dissented to the contention that the race-based
restrictions were reasonably expedient military orders.210 He argued that
the order, which indiscriminately excluded Japanese Americans, bore no
rational relation to articulated military goals because it "must rely for its
reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry
11211may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.
Such judgment, according to Murphy, resulted from an irrational process
involving "erroneous assumption[s] of racial guilt rather than bona fide
military necessity. 212 Describing how the military orders were based
not on fact, but on racist stereotypes and insinuations, Justice Murphy
concluded that the Korematsu opinion was a "legalization of racism"
213
and "utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the
principles set forth in the Constitution.,
21 4
Justice Jackson's famous dissent stands primarily for a principle of
constitutional silence regarding military decision making. Upholding the
value of institutional competence, he asserted that jurists are not capable
208. Id. at 232.
209. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Roberts also objected to the implication of the majority's
analysis that even if detention were unconstitutional, Korematsu was nonetheless constrained to
submit to the exclusion order and later challenge his detention by way of petition for writ of habeas
corpus. He stated, "Again it is a new doctrine of constitutional law that one indicted for
disobedience to an unconstitutional statute may not defend on the ground of the invalidity of the
statue but must obey it though he knows it is no law." Id. at 233.
210. Justice Murphy's dissent set forth a clear test for determining the limits of military
discretion. He asserted that the military restriction must be "reasonably related to a public danger
that is so 'immediate, imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to permit the
intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger." Id. at 234 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 628 (1871)). Like the majority, Justice
Murphy accepted the prevention of invasion through combating sabotage and espionage as a valid
wartime goal. Id. at 235. However, he concluded that there was no rational relation between
exclusion and preventing espionage. Id. at 236-37. Justice Murphy also criticized the majority's
failure to call for a more narrowly tailored program to meet government needs, specifically
individual loyalty hearings like the ones afforded to those of German and Italian ancestry. Id. at 241.
211. Id. at235.
212. Id. at 235-36.
213. Id. at 242.
214. Id.
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of second guessing military commanders' decisions.21 5 Regarding
DeWitt's specific choices, Jackson admitted, "I cannot say, from any
evidence before me, that the orders of General DeWitt were not
reasonably expedient military precautions, nor could I say that they
were.'216 Justice Jackson objected to the majority's constitutional stamp
of approval on the internment, asserting that "a judicial construction of
the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle
blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself.,
217
Acknowledging the inherent problem in his abdication approach, namely
that it left the Court no power to remedy military abuses while issues are
ripe and deprivations ongoing,218 Justice Jackson responded that, "[a]
military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency." 219
3. Ex parte Endo
Mitsuye Endo's case220 came before the Supreme Court in a quite
different procedural posture than Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Endo had
complied with all military regulations and reported to the Tule Lake War
Relocation Center in Northern California.221 By the time the Supreme
Court reviewed Endo's petition, originally filed in the Northern District
of California, government authorities had moved her to a detention camp
in Utah. 222 Endo's petition alleged that she was "a loyal and law-abiding
citizen of the United States, that no charge had been made against her,
215. Id. at 244-45 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at245.
217. Id. at 245-46. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, also advocated limiting the role of
judicial review in military decision making. He argued that it was not for the Court to approve or
disapprove of the basis for any military decision. Rather, the Court's role is at an end once it is
determined that the "military orders are 'reasonably expedient military precautions' in time of war."
Id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He stated, "To find that the Constitution does not forbid the
military measures now complained of does not carry with it approval of that which Congress and the
Executive did. That is their business, not ours." Id.
218. Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 246. He also observed that in the absence of a judicial check on military discretion,
the military must be self-regulating, stating, "The chief restraint upon those who command the
physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political
judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history." Id at 248.
220. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
221. Id.at285.
222. Endo filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus from Tule Lake in July 1942 in the District
Court for the Northern District of California, which subsequently denied her petition in July 1943.
In August 1943, the denial was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and shortly thereafter Endo was moved
to a detention camp in Utah. The questions of law presented in the petition and record were certified
to the Supreme Court on May 8, 1944. Id.
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that she [was] being unlawfully detained, and that she [was] confined in
the Relocation Center under armed guard and held there against her
will.
,, 223
The Court ultimately resolved Endo's claims through legislative
interpretation, rather than constitutional analysis, determining that
Endo's "civilian" detention by the War Relocation Authority had not
been authorized by Congress and the President.224 In an effort to avoid
deciding constitutional and law-of-war issues, the Court characterized
the War Relocation Authority as a civilian agency and concluded that
"no questions of military law are involved., 225 In holding that the War
Relocation Authority had no power to detain a concededly loyal citizen,
the Court engaged in an in-depth examination of the executive orders and
legislation underlying the Japanese evacuation program. The Court
stated, "We approach the construction of Executive Order No. 9066 as
we would approach the construction of legislation in this field. That
Executive Order must indeed be considered along with the Act of March
21, 1942, which ratified and confirmed it."
226
The Court opined that the express purpose of both the Act of March
21, 1942, and Executive Order 9066 was to protect against espionage and
sabotage. In effectuating this goal, both directives called for the
administration of curfews and removal. 7  The Court noted, however,
that "[n]either the Act nor the orders use the language of detention.2 28
Moreover, the Court observed that, unlike the curfew order involved in
Hirabayashi, the legislative history of the Act was silent on detention
and "that silence may have special significance in view of the fact that
detention in Relocation Centers was no part of the original program of
evacuation., 2 9  The Court, however, narrowed its holding to the sole
223. Id. at 294.
224. Id. at 298-302.
225. Id. at 298.
226. Id. The Court then applied the canon of avoidance favoring the "interpretation of
legislation which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality." Id. at 299.
The Court was careful to impute to lawmakers the greatest possible regard for citizens' liberties,
stating, "We must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive
authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly
and unmistakably indicated by the language they used." Id. at 300.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 301. The government had argued that Congress ratified the detention scheme through
its appropriation of money to the program, and it presented several congressional hearings and
reports prior to appropriations in which Congress was apprised of the detention programs. Id. at 304
n.24. The Court declined to accept this information as indicative of express congressional intent,
asserting that "[w]e can hardly deduce such a purpose here where a lump appropriation was made for
the overall program of the Authority." Id.
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issue of the continued incarceration of a concededly loyal citizen,
indicating that the War Relocation Authority might possess other
detention powers.23°
The Court also addressed the procedural issue of whether the
Northern District of California retained jurisdiction over Endo's case,
given that Endo had been moved to Utah. Answering in the affirmative,
the Court did not suggest that the government had moved Endo to avoid
the proceedings, 231 but rather found continued jurisdiction proper
because of the presence in the district court's jurisdiction of those
"responsible for the detention of appellant and who would be an
appropriate respondent., 232  The Court noted that the presence of any
official of the War Relocation Authority in the district court's
jurisdiction would confer jurisdiction because such a person would be
able to produce "the corpus of appellant., 233 The Court was unmoved by
the objection that no respondent had been served, observing that "[a]
cause exists in that state of the proceedings and an appeal lies from
denial of a writ without the appearance of a respondent.,
234
B. The Terrorism Cases
1. Rumsfeld v. Padilla
On May 8, 2002, authorities arrested Jose Padilla, the suspected
"dirty bomber," 235 in Chicago pursuant to a material-witness warrant
issued by the Southern District of New York in connection with the 9/11
grand jury investigation.236 They transported Padilla to New York,
placed him in a maximum-security prison, and brought him before Chief
Judge Mukasey, who appointed Donna R. Newman as his attorney.
237
Newman moved the Court to release Padilla from detention, and the
230. Id. at 301.
231. Id. at 306-07.
232. Id. at 304.
233. Id. at 305.
234. Id.
235. Authorities believed Padilla had conspired to detonate a "radiological dispersal device" in
the United States. See infra note 245 (discussing the Mobbs Declaration).
236. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) aff d in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426
(2004). At the time of his arrest, Padilla had just arrived on a flight from Pakistan. Id. at 573. He
carried no weapons or contraband of any type. Brief of Respondent at 24, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027).
237. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
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motion was set for conference on June 11, 2002.238 On June 9, 2002,
President Bush issued an executive order designating Padilla an unlawful
enemy combatant and directing Secretary Rumsfeld to hold him in
military detention.239 Padilla was transferred to a military jail in South
Carolina and held incommunicado. 240  To date, Padilla remains
incarcerated.241
On June 11, Newman filed a habeas corpus petition in New York on
Padilla's behalf as a "next friend.' 2 42 On December 4, 2002, the district
court issued a lengthy opinion concluding that the government possessed
the power to detain Padilla militarily, based on the theory that he was an
enemy combatant.243 The court further held that the President, acting
alone, could exercise such authority.244  Over the government's
objections, 245 however, the court concluded that Padilla had the right to
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 571-72.
241. See infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text (discussing Padilla's current status).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000) provides that a claim being asserted on behalf of another "shall be
in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in
his behalf." According to the Supreme Court, there are two prerequisites for "next friend" standing:
(1) "'an adequate explanation-such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability-
why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action,"' and (2)
"'some significant relationship [between the next friend and] the real party in interest."' Padilla,
233 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990)).
243. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
244. The court observed, "'I read the Prize Cases to stand for the proposition that the President
has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific
congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of force selected."' Id. at 589
(quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring)). The
court ruled that, in any case, the Authorization for Use of Military Force, see infra note 259, was
sufficient congressional approval of the action. Id. at 590.
245. The government had argued that a conclusory, nine-paragraph statement by Defense
Department employee Michael Mobbs, who had no direct knowledge of events, was sufficient
standing alone to justify Padilla's classification. Id. at 603-04. The basic substance of the Mobbs
Declaration follows:
As part of my official duties, I have reviewed government records ....
... While in Afghanistan in 2001, Padilla met with senior Usama Bin Laden
lieutenant Abu Zubaydah .... Zubaydah directed Padilla and his associate to travel to
Pakistan for training from Al Qaeda operatives in wiring explosives.
... Padilla's discussions with Zubaydah specifically included the plan of Padilla and
his associate to build and detonate a "radiological dispersal device" (also known as a
"dirty bomb") within the United States, possibly in Washington, DC. The plan included
stealing radioactive material for the bomb within the United States. The "dirty bomb"
plan of Padilla and his associate allegedly was still in the initial planning stages, and there
was no specific time set for the operation to occur.
... Although one confidential source stated that he did not believe that Padilla was a
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challenge his classification as an enemy combatant by pursuing his
habeas petition,246 and to engage in limited communications with counsel
247in pursuance of the petition. The court set up a standard of judicial
review highly deferential to the government, stating that it would uphold
the designation if "the President had some evidence to support his
finding that Padilla was an enemy combatant. ' 248 The district court was
unmoved by Padilla's contention that because the War on Terror might
never end, the court had essentially approved indefinite detention. The
court opined that "insofar as [Padilla's] argument assumes that indefinite
confinement of one not convicted of a crime is per se unconstitutional,
that assumption is simply wrong.,
249
On appeal, the Second Circuit issued an order releasing Padilla from
military detention and holding that the President did not have authority to
detain Padilla as an unlawful combatant. 250  The court observed at the
outset that the "President's power 'must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.' ' 25' The court analyzed
Padilla's case under the legal framework set forth in Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.252  Justice
Jackson had articulated three categories of presidential wartime power:
(1) when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
"member" of Al Qaeda, Padilla has had significant and extended contacts with senior Al
Qaeda members and operatives.
Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.cnss.org/Mobbs 20Declaration.pdf. The court rejected
the government's argument and refused to allow the government to proceed unchallenged on the
gossamer speculation" presented in the Mobbs Declaration. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
246. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600.
247. Specifically, the court held that Padilla had a right to confer with counsel but only "under
conditions that will minimize the likelihood that he [could] use his lawyers as unwilling
intermediaries for the transmission of information to others." Id. at 610.
248. Id. at 570.
249. Id. at 591. The judge then ordered the parties to consult and make appropriate
arrangements for Padilla to meet with his counsel and report to the court by December 30, 2002. Id.
at 610. By that date, the government had not allowed Padilla to meet with counsel nor had it agreed
to conditions of such a meeting. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir.
2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (describing procedural history delaying Padilla's opportunity to
meet with counsel). Instead, the government filed an untimely motion to reconsider. See id. at 45
(stating that "the time for a motion to... reconsider had expired"). After addressing the motion
substantively, the Court declined to reconsider its position and firmly stated, "Lest any confusion
remain, this is not a suggestion or a request that Padilla be permitted to consult with counsel, and it
is certainly not an invitation to conduct a further 'dialogue' about whether he will be permitted to do
so. It is a ruling-a determination-that he will be permitted to do so." Id. at 57.
250. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724.
251. Id. at 711 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
252. Id.
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congressional authorization, such that "his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate;, 253 (2) when the President acts without congressional
authorization, and "he can only rely upon his own independent
powers;, 254 and (3) when the President acts in contravention of Congress,
such that "his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter."
255
The Second Circuit placed Padilla's detention in the third category
because the President had acted in contravention of the 1971
Nondetention Act, which provides, "No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress., 256  The court asserted that Padilla's detention was not an
inherent power of the President stemming from his status as Commander
in Chief that could overcome the congressional prohibition.257 The court
recognized, however, that the political branches, acting together, might
possess the power to detain Padilla.258 The government had urged that
Congress's Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force
(AUMF), which passed in the days after 9/11 and authorized the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against "nations,
253. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 637.
255. Id.
256. Nondetention Act, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347, 347 (1971) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)). The Nondetention Act, as amended in 1971, repealed the Emergency
Detention Act of 1950, in part as a response to the horrors of the internment. The House Report on
the Amendments states,
[G]roups of Japanese-American citizens regard the [Emergency Detention Act] as
permitting a recurrence of the round ups which resulted in the detention of Americans of
Japanese ancestry in 1941 and subsequently during World War II. They urge that the Act
should be repealed.
H. R. REP. No. 92-116, at 1436 (1971).
257. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721. The court drew a sharp distinction between inherent presidential
power to regulate foreign policy and detain combatants on the battlefield and the President's power
to affect domestic policy, stating that "the President, acting alone, possesses no inherent
constitutional authority to detain American citizens seized within the United States, away from a
zone of combat, as enemy combatants." Id.
258. The court stated, "while Congress-otherwise acting consistently with the Constitution-
may have the power to authorize the detention of United States citizens under the circumstances of
Padilla's case, the President, acting alone, does not." Id. at 715. The court thus distinguished
Padilla's case from Exparte Quirin, a case in which a U.S. citizen acting as a Nazi spy was arrested
on U.S. soil and tried by military tribunal, observing that Congress had specifically authorized
Quirin's military tribunal. 317 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1942). The Second Circuit further observed that
when the Supreme Court decided Quirin, Congress had not yet passed the Nondetention Act.
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 716.
RAISING THE RED FLAG
organizations, or persons" associated with the 9/11 attacks,259 was
congressional authorization of Padilla's detention.260  The court,
however, rejected the AUMF as a sufficient congressional mandate that
could overcome the clear language of the Nondetention Act.26'
Subsequently, the Second Circuit ordered Padilla's release, but stayed
the order pending resolution of the case by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in an ultimate exercise of judicial avoidance,
declined to rule on the merits of Padilla's claims and instead dismissed
his petition on the grounds that it named an improper respondent,
Secretary Rumsfeld, and was filed in an improper jurisdiction, New
York.262 Asserting that the proper respondent was the commander of the
South Carolina brig and the proper jurisdiction was South Carolina, the
Court stated, "Only in an exceptional case may a court deviate from
those basic rules to hear a habeas petition filed against some person other
than the immediate custodian of the prisoner, or in some court other than
the one in whose territory the custodian may be found.' ,263 The Court
held that Padilla's case was not exceptional because Newman had filed
the petition in New York after Padilla had been moved, and thus she
could have filed in South Carolina.26
The Court also rejected the contention, accepted by both courts
below, that Secretary Rumsfeld was a proper respondent given his
familiarity with Padilla's case and the control he asserted over Padilla's
detention. Instead, the Court favored the "default rule" that "the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held,
not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official. 265
The Court distinguished Padilla's case from Endo by observing that
Endo had initially filed her petition in the place where she was detained,
259. Authorization of Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
260. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724.
261. The court considered and rejected the government's contention that the Nondetention Act
was never meant to apply to military detentions. The court noted that the resolution must be
interpreted to assume "'that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than
was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used."' Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723
(quoting Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944)). The court also rejected the contention that 10
U.S.C. § 965(5), which appropriated funding to pay for persons detained pursuant to executive order,
authorized the detention of Padilla. Id. at 724.
262. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446-47 (2004).
263. Id. at 454. To address the many exceptions to strict filing rules for habeas petitions, the
Court characterized filing rules as analogous to venue or personal jurisdiction and thus waivable by
the government or subjected to certain equitable exceptions. Id. at 453.
264. Id. at 454-55.
265. Id. at 435.
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whereas Newman had filed in New York after Padilla had been moved to
South Carolina.266
Justice Stevens's dissent chastised the majority for its judicial
abdication, stating, "[t]he petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this
case raises questions of profound importance to the Nation. The
arguments set forth by the Court do not justify avoidance of our duty to
,,267answer those questions. Advocating in favor of finding jurisdiction,
Justice Stevens argued for a more "functional approach" to
jurisdiction.268  He asserted that Secretary Rumsfeld was a proper
respondent because of his direct involvement and that jurisdiction was
proper in the Southern District of New York at the time the petition was
filed.269 Justice Stevens was not concerned that Newman had filed the
motion in New York the day after Padilla had been moved, given that the
government had never informed Newman of the move and that she had
270heard about it only from press reports. In the end, Justice Stevens
called the majority's characterization of Padilla's petition "disingenuous
at best" and described the case as "singular not only because it calls into
question decisions made by the Secretary himself, but also because those
decisions have created a unique and unprecedented threat to the freedom
of every American citizen., 271 Stevens concluded, "At stake in this case
is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even more important
than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their successors is
266. The Court noted that "the Southern District never acquired jurisdiction over Padilla's
petition." The Court concluded that "Endo stands for the important but limited proposition that
when the Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her
immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent
within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's release." Id. at 441. The
Court further held that even if jurisdiction is sometimes proper when the prisoner is outside the
territorial limits of the issuing court, as in Endo, the custodian must nonetheless be within the issuing
court's territorial jurisdiction. The Court observed that it would encourage forum shopping to allow
prisoners to sue government subordinates in any district court in the nation. Id. at 447.
267. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at461.
269. Id. at 458-59 n.3. Justice Stevens saw no difference between Padilla's situation and
Endo's. Id. at 462 n.5.
270. Id. at 458-59 n.3. Justice Stevens emphasized that just two days before the scheduled
hearing on the criminal motions on June 11, 2002, the government informed the court ex parte that it
was transferring Padilla to military custody in South Carolina. The Court further described how
Newman only discovered the change of custody through the press, not the government, on June 10,
2002, the day after which she filed the habeas corpus motion. Justice Stevens observed that at the
time Padilla was being handcuffed by Defense Department officials in New York, unbeknownst to
Newman, Secretary Rumsfeld was the proper respondent and New York was the proper jurisdiction.
He then reasoned that denying jurisdiction on the narrow ground of the one-day delay in filing the
habeas corpus motion was tantamount to permitting "the Government to obtain a tactical advantage
as a consequence of an exparte proceeding." Id. at 459.
271. Id. at461.
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the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of
law. 272
Padilla's case was transferred to the District of South Carolina,
pursuant to the Supreme Court's directive. On February 28, 2005, the
district court in South Carolina held that Padilla's detention was
unconstitutional and gave the executive forty-five days to charge Padilla
criminally or release him. 273  The government appealed, and on
September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court.
Relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Hamdi, the court held that the
President possessed constitutional authority to detain Padilla as an enemy
combatant.274 The Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari to review
the Fourth Circuit's decision.275 On November 17, 2005, the government
filed an indictment in the Southern District of Florida charging Padilla
with conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim persons in a foreign
country, conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist
organization, and providing material support to a terrorist organization.
276
Padilla was transferred to the Southern District of Florida, where on
February 17, 2006, the district court denied his bail request. Padilla
remains incarcerated pending his criminal trial.277
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Unlike Padilla, Yaser Hamdi was taken into U.S. custody in
Afghanistan during ongoing hostilities.278 Of course, Hamdi's advocates
assert that he was a noncombatant unlawfully captured by the Northern
Alliance.279 Originally, authorities detained Hamdi at Guantanamo, but,
272. Id. at 465.
273. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir.
2005).
274. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). The Court asserted that the Supreme Court
decision in Hamdi compelled the conclusion that the President had such power and dismissed the
language in Hamdi confining the holding to "narrow issue" of Hamdi's circumstances. Id. at 393-
94. The Fourth Circuit held that the "actual reasoning" in Hamdi "simply does not admit of a
distinction between an enemy combatant captured abroad and detained in the United States." Id. at
393.
275. See Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S.Ct. 978 (2006) (stating that the "Court will consider the pending
petition for certiorari in due course").
276. United States v. Hassoun, Case No. 04-60001-CR-Cooke (Nov. 17, 2005).
277. See Phil Hirschkom, Former 'Enemy Combatant' Denied Bail, CNN.COM, Feb. 17, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/02/17/padilla.hearing/index.html.
278. Hamdi was turned over to U.S. forces by members of the Northern Alliance. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated,
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
279. Hamdi's contention appears to be vindicated by the subsequent actions of the Bush
2006]
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upon learning of his U.S. citizenship, transferred him to a military jail in
Virginia, where he remained in military custody for more than two years.
In June 2002, Hamdi's father filed a habeas corpus petition as a next
friend.280  The district court appointed a public defender to the case and
ordered the government to give Hamdi access to counsel. The
government appealed to the Fourth Circuit, urging reversal on grounds
that Hamdi's access to counsel posed security risks and that "courts may
not second-guess the military's determination that an individual is an
enemy combatant and should be detained as such., 281 The Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded for further inquiry on the counsel issue, asserting
that Hamdi's case was different from a "garden-variety" criminal case.282
Specifically, the court directed the district court to consider "what effect
petitioner's unmonitored access to counsel might have upon the
government's ongoing gathering of intelligence" and "to what extent
federal courts are permitted to review military judgments of combatant
status. 283
While this issue was pending in the district court, the government
submitted the sealed "Mobbs Declaration," a conclusory, nine-paragraph
document by defense department employee Michael H. Mobbs, and
asserted that the declaration, standing alone, provided a sufficient basis
for Hamdi's classification and detention as an enemy combatant.284 The
Administration. On October 10, 2004, the Bush Administration released Hamdi in exchange for a
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship and with the condition that he not return for five years. Phil
Hirschkorn, Saudi Once Held by US. Returns Home, CNN.COM, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004/WORLD/meast/10/l l/hamdi. The United States almost certainly would not have taken this
course of action had there been any evidence that Hamdi engaged in active combat against U.S.
forces. Simultaneously, the U.S. government is trying Guantanamo detainees in military tribunals as
military criminals for fighting in Afghanistan. See supra note 77. It is highly unlikely that Hamdi
received a "free pass," especially given the political pressure on the Administration to justify his
two-and-a-half year, process-less detention. Thus, it seems as if Hamdi's detention is further support
for David Cole's argument that "there are no mass preventive detention success stories in our
history." Cole, supra note 153, at 1755.
280. See supra note 242, for discussion of next-friend status. Initially, the public defender had
filed the habeas corpus action as a next friend. The Fourth Circuit ultimately dismissed that petition,
ruling that the relationship between the defender and Hamdi was not significant enough to establish
next-friend status. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 2002).
281. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting government brief).
282. Id. at 282-83.
283. Id. at 282. The court, however, rejected as "premature" the government's request to
dismiss the petition outright. Id. at 283.
284. Like the Mobbs Declaration in Padilla, the Mobbs Declaration in Hamdi was conclusive
and vague. It offered the following statements relating to Hamdi:
Yaser Esam Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan in approximately July or August of 2001. He
affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training. Hamdi remained
with his Taliban unit following the attacks of September 11 and after the United States
began military operations against the al Qaeda and Taliban on October 7, 2001.
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district court ruled that the Mobbs Declaration was not a proper basis for
the detention. The court acknowledged the importance of deference to
the political branches on matters of national security, but found that due
process required some meaningful judicial review of the detention of a
U.S. citizen,285 and that the Mobbs Declaration fell "far short of even...
minimal criteria for judicial review."
286
The Fourth Circuit once again reversed. The court began by
rejecting the contention that U.S. citizens could not be detained as
unlawful combatants, observing that the President could detain Hamdi
pursuant to his Article II powers as Commander in Chief.287 The court
further ruled that the Nondetention Act was no bar to the President's
actions because the AUMF had implicitly authorized the detention of
U.S. citizens engaged in enemy military activities abroad.2 88  The court
was not persuaded by Hamdi's argument that continued detention was
unjustified because hostilities in Afghanistan had ended and instead
observed that detention was valid so long as "American troops are still
on the ground in Afghanistan, dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in
the very country where Hamdi was captured.,
289
... In late 2001, Northern Alliance forces were engaged in battle with the Taliban.
During this time, Hamdi's Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance forces ....
[T]he Northern Alliance transferred Hamdi to a prison at Sheberghan, Afghanistan ....
... While in the Northern Alliance prison at Sheberghan, Hamdi was interviewed by a
U.S. interrogation team. He identified himself as a Saudi citizen who had been born in
the United States and who entered Afghanistan the previous summer to train with and, if
necessary, fight for the Taliban. Hamdi spoke English.
Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(July 24, 2002), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/hamdimobbs2.pdf.
285. The court opined that, at a minimum, meaningful judicial review would entail a
determination of (1) whether the detainee's classification was made by someone with appropriate
authority; (2) whether the method of classification was procedurally sound; (3) the basis for the
government's determination that detention without access to counsel served national security; and
(4) whether a different process was required by the Geneva Convention or the Joint Services
Regulation. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532-33 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450
(4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
286. Critically examining the declaration, the court concluded that the declaration did not
provide even minimal justification for detention because the declaration neither specifically
articulated Mobbs's expertise on or authority over enemy combatants, nor set forth any facts
supporting the conclusion that Hamdi was a combatant, save for the fact that he was captured by the
Northern Alliance and had previously trained with the Taliban. Id. at 533. The court concluded,
"While the Executive may very well be correct that Hamdi is an enemy combatant whose rights have
not been violated, the Court is unwilling, on the sparse facts before it to find so at this time on the
basis of the Mobbs Declaration." Id. at 536.
287. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473.
288. Id. at 467.
289. Id at 476.
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The court carved out a limited role for judicial review, holding that
executive decisions should not be set aside by the courts "without the
clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of
Congress constitutionally enacted., 290  Thus, the only issue appropriate
for judicial review was whether the President had acted "pursuant to the
war powers. ' 291 Examining the Mobbs Declaration, the court opined that
"Hamdi was indisputably seized in an active combat zone" and that this
fact alone was sufficient to establish that President Bush had exercised
legitimate war power.292 The court accordingly dismissed Hamdi's
petition.
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing
and remanding. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor,
held that the government possessed the authority to detain U.S. citizens
classified as enemy combatants, but that the courts retained ability to
review the bases for such classifications.293 The Court disapproved of
the Fourth Circuit's formulation of minimal judicial review and instead
endorsed a fuller process of individualized review.
294
The first substantive issue addressed by the Court was the scope of
the government's detention authority. The government had asserted that
the President, acting alone, could detain enemy combatants and, in the
alternative, that Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention by the
29AUMF.29  The Court agreed that Congress had authorized Hamdi's
detention and that together the political branches possessed authority to
detain Hamdi militarily.296 The Court thus declined to address whether
the President possessed such power unilaterally. The Court opined that
pursuant to the "laws of war," a nation engaged in war may detain enemy
fighters for the duration of the conflict to prevent them from rejoining the
foreign army.297 The Court, however, gave little guidance as to what
constituted a state of war or why Hamdi should be treated like any
290. Id. at 474. The court relied for this proposition on Ex parte Quirin, a World War II case
that justified military detention of a U.S. citizen who committed espionage for Germany. 317 U.S. 1
(1942); see infra notes 391-415 and accompanying text for further discussion of Quirin.
291. Id. at472.
292. Id. at 473. The Fourth Circuit did, however, limit its holding to the specific facts of
Hamdi's arrest and detention, noting that it had "no occasion, for example, to address the designation
as an enemy combatant of an American citizen captured on American soil or the role that counsel
might play in such a proceeding." Id. at 465.
293. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
294. Id. at 526.
295. Id. at 517.
296. Id. at 521.
297. The opinion indicates that Hamdi's detention is justified by "law of war" principles as set
forth by various treatises and the Quirin opinion. Id. at 523, 531.
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foreign fighter.298  O'Connor acknowledged that certain factual
circumstances might test the limit of what constituted a state of war, but
nonetheless concluded, "that is not the situation we face as of this
date.,, 299  O'Connor, like the Fourth Circuit, seems to have endorsed a
notion that military detention power can be exercised whenever U.S.
troops are engaged in conflict by justifying Hamdi's continued detention
with the existence of "active combat operations" in Afghanistan.
30 0
The Court more squarely addressed the issue of congressional
authorization for the detention, holding that the AUMF was an express
endorsement of Hamdi's detention.3 ' The Court reasoned that because
of the universality of the law of war, which includes the detention of
fighters, Congress must have intended the President to have the power to
detain U.S. citizen enemy combatants when it authorized the use of
"necessary and appropriate force" against those associated with 9/11.302
This imputed knowledge of the law of war was the only interpretive
technique the Court used to determine congressional intent.30 3 Moreover,
the Court glossed over the question of whether history was so
unequivocally clear that "appropriate force" always includes the military
detention of citizens, such that Congress's authorization of "appropriate
force" unambiguously approves military detention of citizens.30 4
The Court then concentrated on the appropriate process for judicial
oversight of the detention. The plurality dismissed outright the
298. While definitively permitting the government to detain citizens, the Court attempted to
narrow the scope of this power by defining an "enemy combatant" as a person who "was part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" and "engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States." Id. at 516 (internal quotations omitted). At first blush, this
definition seems to limit the world of possible enemy combatants to those who actively fight against
U.S. troops on the battlefield. The "engaged in armed conflict" prong, however, could easily be
extended to cases of suspected espionage, stepping dangerously close to the logic behind detaining
the Japanese. Indeed, the plurality relied extensively on Quirin, which defines "enemy combatant"
in terms of domestic espionage rather than foreign battle. Id. at 522. Furthermore, the Court
explicitly left to lower courts the obligation to establish the parameters of the enemy combatant
category, observing that "[t]he permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower
courts as subsequent cases are presented to them." Id. at 522 n.1. The Fourth Circuit subsequently
took up this invitation as an opportunity to expand the notion of enemy combatant to encompass
people who bear little resemblance to fighters captured on a foreign battlefied. Padilla v. Hanfi, 423
F.3d 386, 392 (4th Cir. 2005). The court relied on information that Padilla was somewhere in
Afghanistan trying escape to Pakistan during the U.S. invasion and likely armed to conclude that he
fit into the definition of an "enemy combatant." Id.




303. See id. O'Connor neither examined the plain language nor legislative history of the AUMF
to conclude that the AUMF constituted explicit congressional approval of U.S. citizen detention.
304. Id. at 518.
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contention that courts could never review military decision making,3 °5
citing Justice Murphy's Korematsu dissent for the proposition that a
"'military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its
reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests
reconciled. 306 Denying the government's assertion that judicial review
should be limited to bases for the broader detention scheme, the Court
ruled that Hamdi was entitled to individualized process. 307 Applying the
due process test from Mathews v. Eldridge,30 8 the Court balanced
Hamdi's private interests against the government's interests. The Court
weighed Hamdi's fundamental liberty interest in freedom from
involuntary confinement against the asserted government interest of
ensuring that captured combatants not return to fight with the enemy,30 9
also taking into account the "practical difficulties" of government
compliance with procedural requirements. 310 The Court determined that
due process required the government to give an alleged enemy combatant
notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to
rebut the government's factual averments in front of a neutral decision
maker.311 Because of administrative burdens, however, the government
would enjoy a rebuttable presumption of accuracy in the classification
and the ability to rely on hearsay evidence. 312 Further, the government
could establish its case with information as sparse as that contained in the
Mobbs Declaration.313
In a surprising political turn, Justice Scalia authored a dissent
squarely rejecting that the government may detain U.S. citizens on U.S.
soil as enemy combatants. Justice Scalia argued that the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution 314 makes clear that absent a congressional
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the government has no authority
305. Id. at 536.
306. Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)). The Court further noted that all parties agreed that, at the very least, the bare habeas
corpus process was available to Hamdi and that "the person detained may, under oath, deny any of
the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts." Id. at 525.
307. Id. at 528-29.
308. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
309. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32.
310. Id. at 531.
311. Id. at 533.
312. Id. at 533-34.
313. Even after the Court's declaration of the proper process for determining whether the
government's classification of a citizen as an unlawful combatant passes judicial muster, serious
questions remain. For example, the opinion is silent as to how much and what type of evidence the
detainee must present to rebut the presumption in favor of the government.
314. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
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to detain its own citizens outside of the criminal process. 315 Surveying
the legal history of detention, Scalia concluded that the Framers intended
normal criminal procedures to apply to all citizens, except when great
exigency rendered normal judicial processes unavailable.316
Responding to the contention that the law of war permits the
government to detain enemies to prevent them from rejoining hostile
forces, Scalia argued that the Constitution provides another way to
prevent citizens from rejoining the enemy, namely, prosecution for
treason.317 He asserted that while it may be the normal wartime practice
to detain foreign nationals as prisoners of war, the normal practice
regarding U.S. citizens who aid the enemy is criminal prosecution, rather
than military detention and release at the end of conflict.318  As to
concerns over criminal procedures interfering with war making, Scalia
responded that when military exigencies render traditional process
impracticable, the legislature has the constitutional power to suspend
normal judicial process.319
Justice Scalia also criticized the plurality's interpretation of the
AUMF as a congressional authorization of Hamdi's detention. He noted
that the Court's interpretation conflicted with the interpretive canon that
statutes should be construed to avoid grave constitutional concerns.32 °
He further argued that the AUMF did not possess the clarity of language
to overcome the Nondetention Act's clear prescription that U.S. citizens
may not be detained except through an Act of Congress.32'
315. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 561. He noted that, in the absence of suspension, the Court had historically
sanctioned noncriminal detention in only two scenarios-civil commitment of the mentally ill and
temporary detention for quarantine. Id. at 556.
317. Id. at 557.
318. Id. at 558-61.
319. Id. at 561. Justice Scalia patently dismissed the idea that the AUMF was a congressional
suspension of the writ. Id. at 574. He also criticized the plurality's reliance on Quirin,
characterizing Quirin as an improper departure from the holding in Ex Porte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2
(1866), a civil war case in which the Supreme Court deprived the government power to try citizens
militarily absent suspension of the writ. Id. at 570. See also infra note 429 and accompanying text
(further explaining the Milligan opinion). He also distinguished Quirin from Hamdi by observing
that the Nazi spy in Quirin, unlike Hamdi, was an "admitted enemy invader." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 574 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades




IV. A JURISPRUDENTIAL COMPARISON OF THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT
AND TERRORISM DETENTION CASES: HAVE WE PROGRESSED?
There is no denying that the result of the Supreme Court rulings in
Hamdi and Padilla is a mixed bag. On one hand, neither decision grants
unqualified and absolute authority to the executive to classify citizens as
enemy combatants and detain them indefinitely. On the other hand, the
cases do not deny that the executive branch acting alone has such power,
and they affirm that the political branches acting together have such
authority. Moreover, Hamdi definitively allows the government to
detain citizens militarily, but preserves judicial review. As a result, the
terrorism cases leave room for both civil libertarian and pro-government
interpretations. 2  The question is whether these cases, on the whole,
represent progress, as contended by the distancing arguments,323 or
regression. This Part compares the critical jurisprudential choices in the
terrorism and internment cases to determine whether the law has truly
progressed. In the end, the current cases do close some avenues toward
governmental oppression forged by the internment cases, but they also
leave many avenues open-and even expand them. As a consequence,
the law has not progressed to the point where invocations of the
internment are melodramatic or misplaced.
A. A Caveat on the Meaning of Progress
The concept of "progress" for the purposes of this Article is
specifically civil libertarian. One certainly may contest that protection of
civil liberties is more a benchmark of progress than safety and security,
and many conservative theorists argue the executive's option to initiate
actions like internment should be preserved. 324 Others support post-9/11
322. Thus, a court predisposed toward a rights-expanding view will rely on Hamdi for the
principle of governmental restraint. The district court in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, for
example, cited Hamdi for the proposition that the detainees had a right to challenge their
classifications as unlawful combatants before a neutral magistrate. See 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465
(D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Hamdi forms both the starting point and core of this Court's consideration of
what process is due to the Guantanamo detainees in these cases."). On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit relied almost exclusively on Hamdi in concluding that the President had authority to detain
Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the
government characterized Hamdi as standing for the proposition that detention powers may be
exercised in the "war" against al Qaeda. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 10, Padilla v.
Hanft, 125 S. Ct. 2906 (2005) (No. 04-1342). ("In Hamdi, this Court confirmed that the military
may seize and detain enemy combatants.., for the duration of the relevant conflict with al Qaeda.").
323. See supra Part II.B (discussing the arguments).
324. See, e.g., MALKIN, supra note 91 (arguing that internment and racial profiling are necessary
to protect the country).
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security measures short of internment, despite the negative effect on
liberties.325 Engaging these arguments, however, is not the purpose of
this Article. This Article is about the viability of invocations of the
internment in the face of distancing arguments that internment is
irrelevant because of the law and society's "progress." These distancing
arguments take for granted a definition of progress that necessarily
incorporates a higher regard for civil liberties than the conditions
predicating the internment and the Hirabayashi and Korematsu
decisions.326
In terms of defending civil liberties, the progress of the law can be
assessed through three models of legal reasoning. The least progressive
model is judicial reasoning that finds executive wartime overreaching
constitutional. Courts employ this reasoning when they approve military
actions either by holding that the Constitution precludes judicial review,
as did the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi,327 or by applying a constitutional test
and finding the military action passes, as in Korematsu.328 Obviously the
latter action is somewhat more progressive than the former, as the test
might allow for increased judicial scrutiny as attendant circumstances
change. For example, the strict scrutiny test, formulated in Korematsu,
which the internment policies met, has been subsequently used to strike
down racial classifications.329
In contrast, courts engage in the most progressive model of legal
reasoning when they fully review abusive government policies and find
them unconstitutional. Justice Murphy adopted this approach in
Korematsu, opining that the Constitution simply does not allow process-
less detention of citizens on the basis of race,33 ° as did the Second Circuit
in Padilla, holding that the Constitution does not permit the President to
militarily detain citizens absent explicit congressional approval.33' This
type of legal reasoning makes the detention power subject to
325. See, e.g., Muller, supra note 15.
326. Tushnet explains,
The social leaning is this: Knowing that government officials in the past have in fact
exaggerated threats to national security or have taken actions that were ineffective with
respect to the threats that actually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical
about contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of
proposed government responses to threats has decreased.
Tushnet, supra note 14, at 283-84.
327. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 466 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
328. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944).
329. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429 (1984).
330. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
331. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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constitutional restraint, thereby reducing the possibility of another
internment. Had Justice Murphy's dissent been the majority opinion, the
Supreme Court would have created a precedent that no matter the
exigency, internment of citizens is simply unacceptable. If that were the
case, my students could not defend racial profiling of terrorists on the
precedential value of Korematsu.
332
Somewhere uncomfortably in between these models is judicial
abdication. Judicial abdication occurs when a court omits or
mischaracterizes facts to reach a desired conclusion, or uses procedural
technicalities to dispose of an important case without reaching the merits.
For example, when the Court in Korematsu proclaimed, "we are dealing
specifically with nothing but an exclusion order,, 333 while ignoring the
undeniable consequence of detention, it abandoned its duty to review the
actual controversy at issue.334 Another example of abdication is the
Padilla decision, in which the Court declined to rule on the merits of the
case. The dissent accused the majority of using venue rules to avoid
addressing issues of great importance.335
Judicial abdication is a middle-of-the-road approach because the
court neither upholds nor condemns government abuses, but simply
avoids the issue. On one hand, the action is progressive because it does
not forge into law that which in hindsight is found to create
oppression.336 On the other hand, abdication restricts rights because it
takes away any possibility of a judicial remedy for individuals affected
by the overreaching.337 Justice Jackson endorsed a policy of nearly total
judicial abdication on wartime decisions in his Korematsu dissent.338
Similarly, scholars such as Mark Tushnet and Bruce Ackerman believe
that judicial abdication is better than the alternative, which will
332. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
333. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
334. See id. at 225-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for ignoring the reality of
detention).
335. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
validating racial discrimination).
337. See id. at 225-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
338. He famously stated,
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.
Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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necessarily consist of politically minded judges fashioning decisions that
give the executive undue latitude.
339
Judicial abdication is an uncomfortable model, however, because it
strikes both conservatives and liberals alike as not only unfair to litigants,
but also distasteful as a matter of judicial integrity.340 Nonetheless, for
the purposes of assessing whether the law has "progressed" from
Hirabayashi and Korematsu to Hamdi, it seems judicial abdication is
more protective of civil liberties and thus a higher measure of progress
than constitutionally sanctioning executive overreaching. The next
several subsections analyze whether certain choices made in the
terrorism cases evidence a shift toward civil libertarian progress. They
examine avenues toward governmental repression established in the
internment cases and discuss whether these avenues have been closed,
limited, or expanded by choices made by the modem Supreme Court.
B. Government Power to Detain U.S. Citizens Militarily
One of the crucial choices facing the Supreme Court in both the
internment and terrorism detention cases was whether the government,
during wartime, possesses the power to detain citizens militarily. This
question implicates two separate but related issues. First, there is the
issue of what predicate conditions allow the government to invoke the
"war power" that permits military detention. Second, there is the
question of whether, even when conditions establish wartime, the
Constitution allows the military detention of U.S. citizens.
1. Predicates of War Power
The World War II cases provide only brief analyses of the proper
triggers of war power, because at the time the United States clearly was
engaged in a declared war.34 1 In Hirabayashi, the Court recognized
339. Ackerman, supra note 113, at 1030; Tushnet, supra note 14, at 307.
340. Indeed, there is something inherently distasteful about the Supreme Court mischaracterizing
factual issues for the sole purpose of avoiding the real constitutional questions. Eugene Rostow
criticizes Justice Jackson's abdication approach:
What Justice Jackson is saying seems to be this: Courts should refuse to decide hard
cases, for in the hands of foolish judges they make bad law. The ark of the law must be
protected against contamination .... Judges are thus to be relieved of the political
responsibilities of citizenship and their office.
Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 511-12 (1945).
341. The United States declared war against Japan on December 8, 1941, and Executive Order
9066 was issued on February 19, 1942. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Congress's declaration of war on Japan as part of the series of events
creating authority for the military restrictions. It also characterized the
military restrictions as taking place "in the crisis of war and of threatened
invasion. 34 2  In other passages, the Court mentioned the "conditions
with which the President and Congress were confronted," which included
the attack of Pearl Harbor during diplomatic negotiations and Japanese
military advances in the Pacific theater.343  The Court in Korematsu
portrayed the exclusion order as "issued after we were at war with
Japan. 344 Similarly, the Court in Exparte Quirin described Article II as
invest[ing] the President as Commander in Chief with the power to
wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect all
laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government
and reyulation of the Armed Forces. and all laws defining and
punishing offences against the law of nations.
345
Unlike the World War II cases, Hamdi did not address directly the
factual predicates for invocation of war power. The Court never clearly
stated whether the conflict in Afghanistan combined with the AUMF
amounted to conditions of war sufficient to trigger Article II powers.
The Court discussed at length Hamdi's detention as an exercise of war
power, appearing to take for granted that exercise of war power was
appropriate at the time President Bush detained Hamdi.346 The Court
also repeatedly referred to "active hostilities ' 347 and "armed conflict,' 348
without definitively concluding that such conditions were themselves
enough to trigger the exercise of extra-constitutional war power. The
Court was also vague as to the role of the AUMF in initiating war
power.349  The Court did not address whether the AUMF was the
functional equivalent of a declaration of war that engendered the full
panoply of war powers. Rather, the Court referenced the AUMF
primarily to establish that Congress specifically approved Hamdi's
detention.3 5 °
342. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
343. Id. at 93.
344. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
345. 317 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1942) (emphasis added).
346. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536-37 (2004).
347. Id. at 520.
348. Id. at 520-21, 526.
349. Id. at 523.
350. Id. at519-22.
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The Fourth Circuit, in Hamdi, had more overtly addressed the issue
of the predicates of war power.35' The court asserted that the military
detention scheme was dependent, not on a formal declaration of war, but
rather on the scheme "aris[ing] in the context of foreign relations and
national security. 352  The Fourth Circuit sought to give the political
branches extremely broad, review-free authority, not only to create
policy regarding foreign combat operations, but also more generally to
wage the War on Terror. The court opined that "the 'political branches
are best positioned to comprehend this global war in its full context,' and
neither the absence of set-piece battles nor the intervals of calm between
terrorist assaults suffice to nullify the warmaking authority entrusted to
the executive and legislative branches.
353
The Supreme Court in Hamdi did not embrace explicitly the broad
view that the political branches could exercise war powers in the name of
the War on Terror, absent active military conflict.354 Nonetheless, even
interpreting the case in the most restrictive manner as requiring both the
AUMF (or a legislative equivalent) and factual war-like conditions to
trigger war powers, those requirements still fall well short of a formal
declaration of war, as contemplated in Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and
Quirin. A formal declaration of war requires specificity on the part of
Congress, such that congressional intent to engage in combat with a
particular country is easily established.35 5 The AUMF, by contrast,
generally authorizes "necessary" action against those parties responsible
for the 9/11 attacks.356 Construing the AUMF as the functional
equivalent of a declaration of war allows the President to exercise war
power pursuant to a vague approval of military force against parties yet
unknown. Under this approach, any military action in the name of
terrorism prevention triggers the same powers as a declared war.
357
351. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2002).
352. Id. at 281.
353. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 464 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(quoting Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283). Elsewhere in the Hamdi opinions, the Fourth Circuit articulates a
slightly more restrictive view of the war power by characterizing it as triggered "in times of active
hostilities," Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281, and dependent on being exercised as a "military judgment[] in
the field," Hanidi, 316 F.3d at 465.
354. See supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
355. See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259, 1272 (2002) (stating that "a declaration of war usefully confines the
circumstances in which military tribunals may be used and limits their jurisdiction to a finite period
of time").
356. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
357. Katyal and Tribe reject the contention that the AUMF acts as a formal declaration of war.
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 355, at 1284-85 ("Nothing even close to that World War II
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Consequently, equating the AUMF with a formal declaration of war
grants more power to the executive to create unilaterally the predicates
for expansive war power.
Moreover, a declaration of war contemplates a finite length of
conflict, such that when a peace treaty is executed with the particular
enemy country, the war power authority generally ends.358 In contrast,
the AUMF is incredibly broad, allowing for the existence of war powers
in perpetuity so long as the executive engages in military actions directed
against Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups. As a result, the executive
can assert, as the Fourth Circuit did, that any military detention in the
name of terrorism prevention is an exercise of a war power.35 9 Granted,
the Supreme Court in Hamdi was careful to note the existence of war-
like conditions in Afghanistan, including active fighting and troop
deployment.3 60  The problem is that in the absence of a formal
declaration of war, the issue of the conditions triggering war power
becomes more open to interpretation and expansion. Hamdi leaves open
the possibility that the AUMF allows for military detention power, even
when there is little indication of war-like conditions, for example, during
continued military occupation, engagement in isolated skirmishes,
ongoing police actions, or deployment as peacekeepers. 36'
In addition, the Hamdi opinion does not make clear that legislation is
necessary to trigger war powers. While Hamdi relies on the existence of
the AUMF to find congressional approval for the specific detention
scheme, it does not explicate that congressional action is required to
authorization, or a wartime emergency in which Congress's consent cannot be obtained, is present
today.").
358. See id. at 1272 (discussing the role of a declaration of war); see also Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, 166-70 (1948) (stating that a peace treaty is a major factor in determining that war
powers have ceased); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) ("The extent to which the power to
prosecute violations of the law of war shall be exercised ... may itself be governed by the terms of
an armistice or the treaty of peace."); John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When
Does It End?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221 (2004) (examining U.S. law regarding the
formal declaration of war).
359. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2002).
360. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-22 (2004).
361. See id. This is a departure from the norm that military detention power only exists during a
time of war. Major Michael Newton explains,
During operations other than war, commanders could view military commissions as an
aspect of their inherent authority to prosecute any offender for any violation of
international law that impedes the military mission. However,... history and judicial
precedent show that military commissions have jurisdiction only in the context of what
was historically termed war ....
Major Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who
Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996).
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362trigger war power. Rather, the Court pointed to the continued troop
engagement with "Taliban fighters" as a basis for the ongoing detention
of Hamdi.363 This allows for the interpretation that war powers are
triggered even when the executive engages unilaterally in armed conflict
abroad. In the end, the Hamdi case leaves open the possibility that war
powers can be invoked absent a declaration of war, or even any
congressional approval of military action, and/or in the absence of
paradigmatic war-like conditions. This is a far more broad construction
of "wartime" than in Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Quirin.
The potential for repression inherent in broadening the triggers of
war power is illustrated by the government and district court's position in
Padilla. The government had set forth an interpretation of wartime, in
which the President may properly exercise war power pursuant to "an
undeclared war ... between Al Qaeda and the United States." 364 The
government urged broad exercise of Article II power in the absence of
both traditional armed conflict and congressional approval. The district
court agreed, finding that war power could be properly derived from the
undefined War on Terror.365 Relying on The Prize Cases,366 the court
reasoned that "a formal declaration of war is not necessary for the
executive to exercise its constitutional authority to prosecute an armed
conflict., 367  The Prize Cases involved an executive-ordered blockade
during an insurrection leading up to the Civil War.3 68 The Supreme
Court held that certain war powers could be invoked in the absence of a
formal declaration of war when the nation was threatened by civil
insurgency or foreign invasion. 369 The district court in Padilla concluded
that The Prize Cases broadly stood "'for the proposition that the
President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third
parties even without specific congressional authorization. ' 37  The
district court thus assumed, without reasoning, that Padilla's detention
was in the context of "repel[ling] an aggressive act., 371  The court
362. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-19.
363. Id. at 521.
364. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003), rev 'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
365. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 588-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) aff'd in
part, rev 'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev 'd, 542 U.S. 426
U.S. 426 (2004).
366. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
367. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
368. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 640-41.
369. Id. at 668.
370. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589 (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Silberman, J., concurring)).
371. Here the court conflated repelling an attack with retaliating for an attack and preventing
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likened the general threat of acts of terror to the specific threat of
invasion discussed in The Prize Cases. By elevating the current
terrorism risk to the level of exigency facing the nation during The Prize
Cases, the court endorsed the notion that the government may freely
ignore the Constitution in any prosecution of alleged terrorists.
The Second Circuit in Padilla declined to address the issue of
whether the predicate conditions for invoking war power existed,372
instead ruling that even the proper invocation of war power would not
permit the detention of a U.S. citizen without an express authorization
from Congress, which, according to the court, was not present in the
AUMF.373 The Supreme Court did not rule on any of the substantive
issues in Padilla and therefore neither endorsed nor rejected the
contention that the War on Terror gave the government the ability to
exercise military detention power in the name of antiterrorism. 374 There
is, however, Some language in Hamdi indicating that a semantic War on
Terror may not be enough of a predicate for the invocation of war
powers. Specifically, the Court recognized that war power might not be
appropriate "if the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of
war. ' ' 375  The Court nonetheless found war power appropriate because
"[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are
ongoing in Afghanistan.' 376 One can read this to require at least "active
combat operations" or some equivalent as a predicate for the use of war
future attacks. The court noted that in the last several "wars," the executive took unilateral military
action. Id. at 589-90. There are, however, significant differences between the Vietnam War and the
War on Terror. First of all, the Vietnam War was war-like in the sense that it involved military
action against an organized, identifiable foreign army, in a distinct geographical region, with
temporal limitations. More importantly, the Vietnam-era cases cited in Padilla only dealt with
whether courts could get involved in the conflict between Congress and the executive in the
declaration of war in Vietnam. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The courts were loath to get involved in a dispute between the political branches and found ways to
avoid it. This is a wholly different issue than the issue of detention power during such a conflict.
The executive's possible ability to constitutionally prosecute a war for a period of time without a
formal declaration from Congress does not necessarily compel the conclusion that during that period
of time the executive may invoke the full panoply of war powers, including military detention power
and the authority to expel enemy aliens. The Youngstown case made clear that during the undeclared
Korean War, the president did not have the authority to seize steel companies. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
372. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) ("[W]e
do not address the government's underlying assumption that an undeclared war exists between al
Qaeda and the United States.").
373. Id. at 724.
374. See supra notes 262-72 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution of Padilla on
procedural grounds).
375. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
376. Id.
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powers. However, this still leaves room for an interpretation that the
existence of "active combat operations" against terrorist organizations
somewhere in the world authorizes the President to detain militarily all
suspected members of those and other terrorist organizations.
377
Consequently, even putting the most civil libertarian spin on the
Supreme Court's treatment of war power in Hamdi, the case expands the
triggering events from a narrow, formal declaration of war against a
specific country to, at best, military operations combined with a
generalized authorization of force against terrorists and, at worst, the
undeclared War on Terror. The Court in Padilla declined to issue a
holding reigning in the authorizing power of the AUMF or narrowing the
concept of war powers. As a result, these cases taken together inflate the
government's ability to exercise extensive war power and engage in
military detentions. Thus, on this particular issue, Hamdi and Padilla
cannot be said to represent a more progressive stance than Hirabayashi
and Korematsu.
2. Applicability of Military Detention to U.S. Citizens
Once a court decides that triggering wartime conditions exist, it must
determine whether the governmental program at issue is a legitimate
exercise of war power. The particular program at issue in both Hamdi
and Padilla was the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.
Hamdi represents the narrower program of militarily detaining U.S.
citizens who purportedly fight with the enemy in a foreign theater,
378
whereas Padilla represents the broader program of militarily detaining
U.S. citizens with purported ties to terrorism who were captured
domestically.379  The Supreme Court's approach to these detention
programs should be understood on a backdrop of the Court's
jurisprudence on citizen military detentions, starting with the Civil War
case Ex Parte Milligan.38°
377. The district court in Padilla adopted this precise interpretation when it found that combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan allowed the president to detain Jose Padilla, who had alleged ties
to terrorism, but no particular ties to the conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v.
Rumsfcld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
378. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
("We shall, in fact, go no further in this case than the specific context before us-that of the
undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country and a
determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces.").
379. See generally Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005), rev 'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2005).
380. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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In 1864, Lamdin Milligan, an American citizen and Indiana resident,
went to trial before a military tribunal on charges of conspiracy against
the United States, affording aid and comfort to rebels, inciting
insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation of the laws of war.3 '
Milligan challenged his military detention and trial, and the case
eventually went to the Supreme Court. The Court sought primarily to
answer the question of whether "the military commission [had]
jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence said Milligan. '382 The Court
began by venerating the rights attendant to a criminal trial. The Court
characterized the criminal trial as "the birthright of every American
citizen" 383 and stated, "By the protection of the law human rights are
secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked
rulers. 384
The Court then considered the government's contention that military
jurisdiction over alleged war criminals was "complete under the laws and
usages of war."385 In denying the government's argument, the Court
denounced the idea that the existence of conflict necessitated
abandonment of constitutional protections:
All... persons, citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged
with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.
This privilege is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration
of criminal justice; it is not held by sufferance, and cannot be frittered
away on any plea of state or political necessity. When peace prevails,
and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no difficulty
of preserving the safeguards of liberty... but if society is disturbed by
civil commotion-if the passions of men are aroused and the restraints
of law weakened, if not disregarded-these safeguards need, and
should receive, the watchful care of those entrusted with the
guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other way can we
transmit to oosteritv unimoaired the blessings of liberty, consecrated by
the sacrifices of the Revolution.
386
To illustrate the sensitivity of the "Revolutionary fathers 3 87 to the
concept of military justice usurping the Constitution, the Court cited the
1815 case of Smith v. Shaw,388 in which it had held that although military
381. Id. at 6.
382. Id. at 8.
383. Id. at 119.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 121.
386. Id. at 123-24.
387. Id. at 128.
388. 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. 1815), cited in Milligan, 71 U.S. at 129.
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charges might be appropriate for suspected foreign spies, if an individual
"was an American citizen, he could not be charged with such an
offence., 389  The Court observed that an American citizen "might be
amenable to the civil authority for treason; but could not be punished,
under martial law, as a spy.
' 39 °
The Supreme Court made its next statement on wartime power to
detain U.S. citizens in Ex parte Quirin,39 1 a case Justice Scalia has
characterized as "not this Court's finest hour., 392  Professor Jonathan
Turley writes of the "little known background to Quirin" and concludes
that the case's history "should give pause to anyone relying on its
precedential value or the specific tribunal rules written in World War II
for these trials. 3 93  Quirin involved eight German saboteurs sent by
Hitler to the United States during World War II. Two of the spies, Haupt
and Burger, were U.S. citizens.394 After the spies arrived on American
shores, the leader of the group, Dasch, revealed that he intended to betray
the mission.395  Dasch called the FBI, reported the mission, and was
promptly ignored.39 6 Only after Dasch flew to Washington, showed the
FBI funds, and gave a 254-page statement, did the FBI, with Dasch's
help, round up the remaining spies.397 Subsequent to the surrender of the
spies, J. Edgar Hoover convened a press conference and falsely
announced that the FBI had alone investigated and initiated the arrests.398
The FBI falsified Dasch's arrest date to make it appear that the group of
spies had been arrested en masse. 399 This announcement led to public
accolades for the FBI, and Hoover received a congressional medal for his
efforts.4 °°
From the outset, President Roosevelt and Attorney General Biddle
made it clear that they did not want the men tried in open proceedings
where legal presumptions and standards applied.40  The Attorney
General suggested a makeshift military procedure, which would allow
389. Smith, 12 Johns. at 265.
390. Id.
391. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
392. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
393. Turley, supra note 71, at 734.










for a trial without constitutional protections, while not requiring
congressional suspension of the writ.40 2  From the beginning, President
Roosevelt engaged the Supreme Court in overseeing the military
proceedings and advising the parties on how to proceed.40 3 The President
wrote a memo to the Attorney General, which was later communicated to
the Supreme Court, stating, "'I won't give them up ... I won't hand
them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas
corpus. Understand? ' ' 404 After six of the eight men were executed, the
Supreme Court labored for a decision approving the process that had
been so important to the President and in which they had been so
intimately involved. Professor Turley comments,
After the executions, the Court attempted to justify its decision, a
process that Justice Stone called "a mortification of the flesh." Stone
struggled with the iustification, particularlv in light of Ex Parte
Millizan. Historian Belknap has denounced the decision as an effort
"not to elucidate the law ... but rather to justify as best he could a
dubious decision.,
40 5
As to the substance of the Quirin opinion itself, the Court gave broad
authority to the political branches to bypass the Constitution in trying
enemy combatants during time of war. The Court began with the
406observation that a declared war triggers broad war powers. The Court
then opined that under the laws of war, enemy belligerents could be
captured and subjected to military detention and procedures.40 7 It further
stated that the law of war distinguished between lawful combatants, who
are treated as prisoners of war, and those who violate the laws of war,
who are treated as unlawful combatants and subject to trial by military
402. Turley explains,
Biddle asked Roosevelt to issue an order that would effectively close civil courts to the
men, who were transferred from civilian to military control.... This executive control
was so great that the military officers given the duty to defend the Germans were not
clear that they could file a constitutional challenge that would effectively disobey their
Commander in Chief
Id. at 736-37.
403. See id. at 737 (stating that "from the earliest stage, the Administration enlisted the advice of
Supreme Court justices who would ultimately decide the case").
404. See id. at 738 (quoting David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. OF SUP. CT. HIST. 61,
68 (1996)).
405. Id. at 739-40 (quoting respectively ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF
THE LAW 659 (1956) & Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and
Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 87 (1980)).
406. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
407. Id. at 30-31.
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tribunal.4 °8 In concluding that the German spies were indeed unlawful
combatants, the Court asserted that "those who during time of war pass
surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their
uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving
destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants
punishable as such by military commission.
4 °9
The Court gave incredibly short shrift to the question of whether a
U.S. citizen could be subjected to military proceedings, despite the
existence of a plethora of criminal causes of action addressing the same
behavior.41 ° In a single, conclusory paragraph the Court declared,
"Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve
him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because
in violation of the law of war."411  Later in the opinion, the Court
attempted to justify its holding in the face of Milligan. In a similar
conclusory fashion, the Court distinguished Quirin by describing the
Milligan holding as dependent on the characterization of Milligan as "a
non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war.A1
2
Justice Scalia, in his Hamdi dissent, criticized Quirin's treatment of
Milligan as "seek[ing] to revise Milligan rather than describe it.A
13
Scalia argued that Milligan contains "categorical language" that the law
of war is inapplicable to citizens while civilian courts are functioning.414
Scalia asserted that alternatively the only way Quirin and Milligan could
be reconciled was if the law of war applied only to "conceded" citizen
belligerents, like Haupt, and not to those who contest their belligerent
status, like Milligan and Hamdi.415
Although issued by the same Court that issued Quirin, the internment
cases basically ignore the question of whether the government, in
wartime, can militarily detain its own citizens. It seems beyond belief
that when addressing the largest systematic military detention of U.S.
citizens in history,416 the Court would simply side step the question of
detention power. The Court, however, patently refused to characterize
408. Id.
409. Id. at 35.
410. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 567 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the
conclusory nature of Quirin's treatment of the citizenship issue).
411. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.
412. Id. at 45.
413. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
414. Id.
415. Id. at 572. He also noted that, other than Haupt, all the American citizens who aided the
German spies were subject to criminal rather than military procedures. Id. at 560.
416. See supra note 8 (observing that 120,313 individuals were interned).
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the combination of curfew and exclusion orders as amounting to a
417scheme in which the only option left to the Japanese was incarceration.
Rather, it put a stamp of approval only on the government's ability to
restrict certain rights to prevent espionage.418 Much to the dismay of
Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court approved of a fictional situation, in
which citizens were not detained, rather than analyzing the reality of
internment.4 19
In Endo, the Supreme Court could not ignore the issue of detention
in a relocation camp. 420 The Court, however, characterized the detention
program as civilian to conclude that no issues of military law were
present, making Quirin and Milligan inapplicable.42' Moreover, the
Court disposed of the case, not by deciding whether the government
could detain citizens as an exercise of war power, but rather by
determining that Congress had not delegated to the civilian War
Relocation Authority power to effectuate the particular policy that
detained Endo.422  The Court thus characterized Endo's continued
detention as beyond the scope of War Relocation Authority powers and
granted Endo relief, without addressing any constitutional issues.4 23
Consequently, as to the particular issue of military detention of U.S.
citizens, the Court in the internment cases engaged in total judicial
abdication. Many view this approach as the worst possible response to
governmental abuse and lodge critiques like that of Justice Roberts.424
Again, however, this Article places the abdication response in the middle
ground because of the reasoning outlined by Justice Douglas and
Professor Tushnet.425 Although abdication renders the law unable to
address problems in real time, it still falls short of putting the
constitutional stamp of approval on rights infringements to accommodate
the emergency policies of the political branches. One benefit of the
judicial abdication in Korematsu is that it rendered the case ill fit to serve
417. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1944).
418. See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (approving of an exclusion order); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (approving of a curfew order).
419. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
420. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Endo had actually challenged her continued detention
rather than the exclusion order that predicated the detention. Id. at 294.
421. Id. at 297-98.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 304.
424. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
425. See supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text (discussing why judicial abdication is a
middle-ground approach).
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as formal precedent for future military detention of citizens such as
Hamdi and Padilla.
Unlike the internment cases, Hamdi answered the question of
whether war power includes the power to detain U.S. citizens militarily
in the affirmative, announcing concretely that the government can detain
citizens as enemy combatants.426 The Court unequivocally stated, "There
is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy
combatant. 427 The Court reasoned that a U.S. citizen, just like a foreign
soldier, could be detained during hostilities because "such a citizen, if
released, would pose the same threat of returning to the front during the
ongoing conflict. ' '428 This reasoning, however, completely ignores the
contention, accepted in Milligan, that alternate detention procedures exist
for citizens who consort with the enemy. The situation of a U.S. citizen
combatant is extremely different from that of a foreign combatant who
has not otherwise violated U.S. law and cannot be held except
militarily.
429
In addition, Hamdi not only approved of detention of citizens who
fought for the enemy overseas, but also, by relying on Quirin, endorsed a
domestic espionage rationale for citizen detention,43 ° precisely the
rationale that Korematsu used to justify the restrictions on the
Japanese.43 O'Connor quoted Quirin for the proposition that "citizens
who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government.., are enemy belligerents within the meaning.., of the law
of war.' ' 32 There is no express limitation that the combatants either be
active frontline fighters or captured abroad.433  Consequently, the
Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned the view that war powers include
the ability to detain citizens for aiding the enemy domestically or abroad.
426. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. See id. at 553-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further support for the criticism of the plurality's
assumption that Hamdi's case mirrored that of a foreign prisoner of war is that the government never
treated Hamdi like a garden-variety prisoner of war. See id. at 539-53 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus,
even the government assumed that Hamdi would eventually be subjected to criminal proceedings.
430. This is because Quirin premised the enemy combatant classification not on the fact that the
detainees had fought against the United States in a foreign theater, but on the fact that the detainees
had committed domestic espionage. See supra notes 393-412 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Quirin case.
431. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text (noting that the government based the
restrictions on the presumed disloyalty of the Japanese).
432. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
433. Relying on Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit in Padilla, 423 F.3d 386, held that a person who
never took up arms against the United States in a foreign battlefield and was captured domestically
was nonetheless an enemy combatant.
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This is a far more direct empowerment of the government, and hence a
greater restriction of civil liberties, than the position represented in the
internment cases.
The most progressive modern approach to the question of citizen
detention was forged by conservative Justice Scalia in his Hamdi dissent,
which states, relying on Milligan, that absent invocation of the
Suspension Clause, the government simply does not have the power to
detain U.S. citizens militarily whether or not a war is ongoing.434 Justice
Scalia framed the main question as "whether there is a different, special
procedure for imprisonment of a citizen accused of wrongdoing by
aiding the enemy in wartime.435  Scalia asserted that the process
described by the plurality for detaining the enemy until hostilities ceased
was a process that applied to foreigners but not citizens. Rather, citizen-
enemies are subject to the traditional criminal procedures outlined in the
Constitution. Scalia extolled the Constitution's capability to address and
meet crises of war and criticized the plurality for eroding rights in a
nondemocratic fashion. He stated, "If civil rights are to be curtailed
during wartime, it must be done openly and democratically, as the
Constitution requires, rather than by silent erosion through an opinion of
this Court.'A36  While Justice Scalia's dissent represents a more
progressive approach to military detention power than the judicial silence
of the internment cases, the plurality opinion in Hamdi does not. Rather
than denying the government authority to militarily detain citizens or
remaining silent on the issue, the Court expressly upholds such authority.
C. Executive Unilateralism
The second critical choice presented to the Supreme Court in both
the internment cases and Hamdi concerned the issue of unilateral or
plenary executive detention power during wartime. Specifically, each
Court had to determine whether the President, as Commander in Chief,
alone possessed the detention power.437 Again, in context, the most
progressive approach to this issue would require both branches of
438government to act in tandem when carrying out wartime detentions.
434. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
435. Id. at 558.
436. Id. at 578.
437. See id. at 516 (majority opinion).
438. This approach is exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in Padilla, which required
that the detention power always be exercised by both branches of government. Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
352 F.3d 695, 712-13 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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The most rights-restricting approach would grant the President unilateral
authority.439 The internment cases and Hamdi are situated in between,
but on different areas of the spectrum. The cases do not reach the
question of executive unilateralism because they conclude that the
President and Congress had, in fact, acted together.440  The critical
difference between the internment cases and Hamdi, however, is how the
Supreme Court came to the conclusion that Congress had authorized the
policies at issue. The Hamdi Court strained to find legislative
authorization in a way that gave much more leeway to the President to
act unilaterally in carrying out military detentions.
Turning to the internment cases first, in Hirabayashi, the petitioner
argued that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its power by
granting the executive broad authority to carry out war measures without
specifically mandating policies, such as the curfew at issue. 44 1 The Court
meticulously analyzed the language of the delegating legislation, its
history, and the timing of executive policy making and congressional
approval442 to hold "that the Act of March 21, 1942, contemplated and
authorized the curfew order which we have before us." 3 The Court
observed that the express purpose of the Act, according to committee
reports, was to implement Executive Order No. 9066444 and that
committee reports mentioned curfews as the precise type of policy
contemplated by the Executive Order.4 45 The Court further noted that
during the time the Act was under consideration by Congress, the
Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee stated on the floor of
the Senate that the proposed legislation was a means of enforcing
Executive Order No. 9066 and its policies, including curfews.446 These
facts, taken together, prompted the Court to conclude that "the legislative
history demonstrates that Congress was advised that curfew orders were
439. For example, the district court in Padilla held that the President, acting alone, had
constitutional power to detain enemy combatants. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd in part, revd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695
(2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
440. See supra note 364 and accompanying text (explaining that when the political branches act
together to declare war, the executive's use of war powers is constitutional).
441. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89 (1943).
442. Id. at 89-92.
443. Id. at 89.
444. Id. at 89-90. See also supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing directive of
Executive Order 9066).
445. Id. at 89-92.
446. During the time the Act was under consideration by Congress, General DeWitt sent letters
to the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee requesting that the Act grant military
commanders the power to impose curfews. Id. at 90-91.
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among those intended, and was advised also that regulation of citizen and
alien Japanese alike was contemplated. 447  The Court characterized
Congress's action as unequivocal, stating that "so far as it lawfully could,
Congress authorized and implemented such curfew orders as the
commanding officer should promulgate pursuant to the Executive Order
of the President,"" 8 and held that "[t]he conclusion is inescapable that
Congress, by the Act of March 21, 1942, ratified and confirmed
Executive Order No. 9066.",4 4' The Court thus declined to address the
issue of executive unilateralism, stating, "We have no occasion to
consider whether the President, acting alone, could lawfully have made
the curfew order in question, or have authorized others to make it."
450
Similarly, in Korematsu, the Court easily dismissed the question of
executive unilateralism, as Korematsu was arrested for violation of a
specific legislative provision making it a crime to "enter, remain in,
leave, or commit any act in a military area or military zone.
'45
1
The Quirin case represents a slightly more executive-empowering
approach than the internment cases, but still falls well short of Hamdi.
As in the internment cases, the Court did not answer the question of
whether the executive had unilateral authority to detain and try enemy
combatants because it concluded that the military trials at issue were
authorized by Congress. The Court stated that it was "unnecessary for
present purposes to determine to what extent the President as
Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation., 45 2 In
finding congressional authorization, the Court relied not only on the
declaration of war, but also on specific language in the congressional
Articles of War. The Court held,
By the Articles of War, Congress has provided rules for the
government of the Army.... [T]he Articles also recognize
the "military commission" appointed by military command as
an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses
against the law of war not ordinarily tried by court martial.453
447. Id. at 91.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 92.
451. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
452. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).
453. Id. at 26-27 (internal citation omitted).
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While Article 15 made it rather clear that military commissions had
jurisdiction to try offenses against the laws of war (as defined elsewhere
in the Articles of War), it was less clear whether the Articles provided
jurisdiction over foreign nationals and U.S. civilians rather than just
military personnel.454 Because the justices were unwilling to find
retrospectively that the government had acted unconstitutionally in
militarily trying the spies, the difficult choice confronting them was
whether to find that the President had unilateral authority to try the spies
or whether to read Article 15 as applying to foreign nationals and
civilians as well as to military personnel.455 Professor Edward White
explains that "none of Stone's fellow justices was prepared to deny that
U.S. military commissions could properly try agents of enemy nations
for going behind American lines in civilian dress to commit hostile
acts. 456  Accordingly, the Court interpreted the Articles of War as
permitting the military tribunals.
Another potential problem for the Court was that it was not clear
whether the process Roosevelt had set up to govern the tribunals fully
conformed with the Articles of War. For example, the process did not
include approval by a Judge Advocate General review board, as required
by Articles 46 and 50-1/2.4 5 ' Nevertheless, the Court summarily ruled
that the military tribunals conformed to the Articles of War and was
''unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in question could not at
any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing the writ [of
habeas corpus]., 458 Despite the existence of these inconsistencies, the
Articles of War contained specific language from which the Supreme
Court could conclude that Congress had specifically authorized the
executive to try unlawful combatants by military proceedings.459
454. Professor Edward White observes that "it was not clear that Congress had contemplated the
use of such commissions to try foreign nationals, or Americans not serving in the military, for
offenses based on the international law of war as well as violations of the Articles of War
themselves." G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter's "Soliloquy' in Ex parte Quirin: Nazi Sabotage
& Constitutional Conundrums, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 430 (2002).
455. Id. at 431.
456. Id. at 430.
457. Id. at 427.
458. Id. at 435.
459. Provisions of the Articles of War still exist today in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). Specifically, the statute states, "The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2005). Given this provision, one might wonder whether the Supreme Court could have found
authorization for Hamdi's detention in the UCMJ, as did the Quirin Court. None of the courts
reviewing Hamdi or Padilla's detention have found the UCMJ to be an expression of congressional
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Moving forward to the terrorism cases, it is important to note that
between World War II and now, in response to the horrors of internment,
Congress passed the Nondetention Act, signifying its intention to
prohibit any detention of a U.S. citizen without its express assent.460 In
Hamdi, the Supreme Court declined to comment on whether the
President had authority acting alone to imprison a citizen because it
found congressional approval of the detention.461 The Court relied
exclusively on the AUMF as the necessary expression of congressional
462agreement. It essentially had no other choice but to place sole reliance
on the AUMF, as Congress was otherwise silent on the President's
detention decisions.
Days after 9/11, Congress enacted the AUMF, which authorized the
use of military force against those responsible for 9/11 and their aides.
463
Shortly thereafter, the President ordered attacks on Afghanistan for the
purpose of capturing Al Qaeda members and responding to the Taliban,
which had given shelter to Osama bin Laden.464 On November 13, 2001,
during the ongoing military campaign against the Taliban, President
Bush issued a Military Order entitled, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. ' 465 This order
provided for the military detention of noncitizens the President
determined to be members of Al Qaeda, who engaged in terrorism and
represented a threat to the United States.466 In the months following the
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, it came to light that the United States was
transporting Afghan war captives to a military base in Guantanamo Bay,
authorization for the detention. Simply, the UCMJ recognizes the power of military commissions
when they have proper jurisdiction. This is not meant to be a grant of authority to the President to
convene a military tribunal for any reason. David Stoelting explains,
No U.S. statute permits military commissions to try terrorists. The statutory authority
cited in the Military Order, Section 821 of the [UCMJ] does not state that military
tribunals can be used to try terrorists. Instead, it simply preserves the well-established
jurisdiction of military commissions over crimes as established by statute or by the laws
of war.
David Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 427, 429
(2003).
460. See supra note 256.
461. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
462. Id. at 517.
463. The joint resolution was signed on Sept. 14, 2002. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001)
(enacted).
464. Bush Announces Opening of Attacks, CNN.coM, Oct. 7, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
US/10/07/ret.attack.bush/index.html.
465. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Issues Military Order
(Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html.
466. Id.
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Cuba.467 At that time, Congress passed no legislation ratifying or
otherwise commenting on the presidentially ordered military
468detentions.
In April 2002, the military discovered that Hamdi was a citizen and
transferred him to military custody in the United States, but continued to
hold him as an enemy combatant.469 Congress was again silent on the
military detention of foreign nationals or U.S. citizen belligerents.47°
Thus, Hamdi's case differed greatly from Hirabayashi and Korematsu, in
which Congress had specifically ratified the President's executive orders
and lesser officials' military policies regarding the Japanese. 471 From a
timing perspective, there is no evidence that the current Congress had
military detentions in mind when it passed the AUMF, given that no such
detentions had yet occurred.
467. Detainees began arriving at Guantanamo in January 2002. Security "Well at Hand" at
Camp X-ray, CNN.COM, Jan. 12, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/12/gen.war.against.
terror/index.html.
468. Interestingly, Congress has recently passed the "Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005," which is the first piece of legislation to contain language
specifically addressing recent military detentions, including those in Guantanamo. Section 1091,
entitled "Sense of Congress and Policy Concerning Persons Detained by the United States," provides
in part,
It is the policy of the United States to... ensure that, in a case in which there is doubt as
to whether a detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions,
such detainee receives the protections accorded to prisoners of war until the detainee's
status is determined by a competent tribunal.
H.R. REP. No. 4200, at § 1091 (2004).
469. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
470. The Fourth Circuit had mentioned that congressional authorization for Hamdi's detention
could be inferred from an appropriations bill that provided funding for prisoners of war. The court
stated, "Congress has specifically authorized the expenditure of funds for 'the maintenance, pay, and
allowances of prisoners of war [and] other persons in the custody of the [military] whose status is
determined... to be similar to prisoners of war."' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467-68
(2003), vacated 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) (2002)).
This statement, however, is generic language that has been in similar bills for years and in no way
references Hamdi's particular detention or otherwise indicates that Congress meant to approve of the
detention of U.S. citizens. Stephen Vladeck states,
To argue that § 956(5) authorizes the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants is
thus not only to argue that it authorizes the detention of anyone detained pursuant to a
presidential proclamation, but also to argue that it rendered § 4001(a) moot, ab initio, for
it is a contention that Congress, in enacting § 956(5)-and in codifying it in 1984-
delegated its entire detention authority to the President. If this is not an absurd result,
what is?
Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 189 (2004).
Moreover, in Endo, the Court specifically rejected that the intent to allow the detention of loyal
Japanese could be inferred from a lump appropriation. The lump appropriation at issue in Endo,
unlike § 956(5), specifically referenced finding the relocation camps. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,
304 n.24 (1944).
471. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
Japanese restrictions).
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Turning to the language of the AUMF, the legislation is silent on
military detention.472 The legislative history also fails to indicate that by
passing the AUMF, Congress intended to authorize any military
detention, much less the detention of U.S. civilians.473  In fact, some
legislative history suggests that Congress was keenly aware of the
differences between the AUMF and a declaration of war, which triggers
presidential war powers. House Representative Conyers, for example,
stated, "By not declaring war, the resolution preserves our precious civil
liberties. This is important because declarations of war trigger broad
statutes that not only criminalize interference with troops and recruitment
but also authorize the President to apprehend 'alien enemies.'
4 74
As a result, the Supreme Court was forced to engage in an incredible
feat of interpretive grasping to find that the AUMF authorized Hamdi's
detention.475 Bypassing both plain language and history, the Court
asserted that given the background of the law of war, any authorization
of military force must necessarily include endorsement of military
detention, even citizen detention.476  Here, the Court appears to have
relied on the interpretive canon -that Congress is presumed to "legislate[]
against [a] background of law, scholarship, and history."477 To complete
the argument, however, the Court needed to characterize the law,
scholarship, and history of military detention power-and indeed power
to detain citizens-as clear enough to compel the conclusion that by
472. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
473. See Vladeck, supra note 470, at 193 (noting "evidence in the legislative history that
Congress explicitly meant to foreclose [the Bush Administration's) reading [of the AUMF]").
Justice Souter argued that provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act militated against a finding that
Congress intended to approve of a Hamdi-type detention by passing the AUMF. He stated that
considering that the USA PATRIOT Act
authorized the detention of alien terrorists for no more than seven days in the absence of
criminal charges or deportation proceedings, [i]t is very difficult to believe that the same
Congress that carefully circumscribed Executive power over alien terrorists on home soil
would not have meant to require the Government to justify clearly its detention of an
American citizen held on home soil incommunicado.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 551 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
474. 147 Cong. Rec. H5638, H5680 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers). See
also id. at H5673 (statement of Rep. Wu) ("I would have strong reservations about a resolution
authorizing the use of force in an open ended manner reaching far beyond responding to this specific
terrorist attack on America. This is not that resolution.").
475. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-20.
476. The Court stated,
We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are
considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so
fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the "necessary and
appropriate force" Congress has authorized the President to use.
Id. at 518.
477. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2004).
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enacting the AUMF, Congress intended to allow the executive to engage
in such detentions.478 In attempting this characterization, the Court
devoted a few paragraphs to discussing the importance of capturing and
detaining enemies during war so that they do not return to the front
line.479 In addition, to show that the law is well-settled on the issue of
citizen detentions, the Court relied heavily on Quirin and In re Territo, a
World War II case upholding the military detention of an American
citizen fighting for Italy.480 Having surveyed the history of the law of
war in this manner, the Court determined that "it is of no moment that
the AUMF does not use specific language of detention" and concluded,
"Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary
and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably
authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here. ' 81
Having found "specific" congressional authorization for Hamdi's
detention, the Court noted that it complied with the mandate of the
Nondetention Act that citizens be detained only pursuant to an act of
Congress.
482
There are several problems with the Court's treatment of legislative
intent, beyond its disregard for both the plain language and legislative
history of the AUMF.483  First, the question of citizen detention raises
thorny constitutional issues-issues Congress is presumed to have
intended to avoid. The plurality, however, completely ignored the canon
of avoidance, which dictates that the "Court will not pass on the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided., 484  This canon
"rest[s] on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the
478. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-20.
479. The Court stated, for example, that "[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and
the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are
'important incident[s] of war,"' and "[t]he purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals
from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again." Id. at 518 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942)).
480. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1946).
481. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
482. Id. at 516-18. But see id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not think this statute even
authorizes detention of a citizen with the clarity necessary... to overcome the statutory prescription
that '[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress."') (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
483. See id. at 573-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the AUMF did not contain language
specific enough to comport with the dictates of cases like Endo).
484. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980). See also New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582 & n.22 (1979) (holding that a court must first use a plain meaning
construction).
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alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts. 'A85  In Hamdi,
however, the Court found congressional assent from silence486 and went
on to painstakingly analyze the constitutionality of the military
procedures governing Hamdi's case.487
Possibly even more problematic is the Court's brief and simplistic
treatment of the history of detentions, especially citizen detentions,488 to
conclude that it is well settled that authorizations of force always
approve military detention of citizens. The Court's reliance on the
purported axiomatic nature of the need to temporarily detain enemy
combatants to prevent them from rejoining enemy forces is troubling in
light of the fact, discussed earlier, that U.S. citizens who fight for an
enemy are subject to criminal penalties.489 Moreover, the relative paucity
of the number of cases on citizen detentions, the fact that the two major
cases on the issue, Milligan and Quirin, plainly conflict,49° and the tomes
of legal literature discussing the constitutional difficulties with wartime
detention of citizens491 show that the legal history on this issue is far
from clear. The plurality, however, dismissed outright any interpretive
485. Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2005).
486. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not think this statute even
authorizes detention of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the interpretive canon that
statutes should be construed so as to avoid grave constitutional concerns.").
487. See id at 532 (majority opinion) ("Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our
calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is
American citizenship.").
488. To dispose of the citizenship issue, the Court simply cited Quirin and concluded that there
was "no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant." Id. at 519.
The Court further stated,
A citizen, no less than an alien, can be "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners" and "engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States[;]" such a citizen, if released, would pose the same threat of returning to the front
during the ongoing conflict.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
489. Justice Scalia stated that military detention, as described by the plurality "is probably an
accurate description of wartime practice with respect to enemy aliens. The tradition with respect to
American citizens, however, has been quite different. Citizens aiding the enemy have been treated
as traitors subject to the criminal process." Id. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
490. See id. at 572 (stating that "[t]he plurality's claim that Quirin's one-paragraph discussion of
Milligan" is a clear disavowal of Milligan's principles "defies logic").
491. See, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 309, 330
("A number of considerations warrant restricting the opinion in Quirin."); Rostow, supra note 340
(analyzing constitutional dimension of internment cases); Turley, supra note 71, at 685 ("[T]he
Court has viewed the exercise of military jurisdiction over citizens as inimical to basic constitutional
guarantees."); White, supra note 454 (discussing constitutional issues in Quirin); Vladeck, supra
note 470, at 195 (asserting that the executive does not have power to militarily detain citizens);
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants ": Modern Lessons
from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1567, 1569 (2004) (arguing "that the
President lacks the constitutional power to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants").
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importance of Milligan, noting that "Quirin was a unanimous opinion. It
both postdates and clarifies Milligan, providing us with the most apposite
precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens may be
detained in such circumstances. '" 492  The Court, of course, made no
mention of the particular circumstances of Quirin or its disanalogies to
Hamdi's situation.4
A bigger problem is that the Court seems to have conflated the issue
of the current state of the law, as evidenced by Quirin's precedential
value, with the issue of whether the state of the law is sufficiently
unambiguous that legislative intent can be established by its mere
existence. Let us agree with the Supreme Court for the moment that
Quirin and not Milligan represented the true state of the law when
Congress enacted the AUMF. Under this view, the law permitted the
President to order military detention of U.S. citizen enemy combatants
during a declared war and with the assent of Congress. 494 Even if that
much were clear, until the Hamdi decision itself, it was not apparent that
the law permitted the President to possess such power without specific
legislation and in the absence of a declared war.4 95 Of course, the
Supreme Court has now expanded Quirin to serve as precedent for the
proposition that the President has the power to detain citizens in the
absence of specific legislation and a declaration of war. Even accepting
this expansive interpretation of Quirin, there is not the slightest amount
of evidence that, when passing the AUMF, Congress had interpreted
Quirin in this manner and purposefully neglected to mention military
detentions (although it meant to authorize them) because it believed that,
pursuant to Quirin, the President did not need its explicit consent.49 6 The
plurality must make this precise assumption to complete its argument-
an assumption that is far fetched at best and disingenuous at worst.4 97
492. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523.
493. Justice Scalia observed, "The plurality rejects any need for 'specific language of detention'
on the ground that detention of alleged combatants is a 'fundamental incident of waging war.' Its
authorities do not support that holding in the context of the present case." Id. at 574 n.5 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). See also supra notes 341-63 and accompanying text (discussing
differences between Quirin and Hamdi).
494. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 ("Even accepting that [Milligan] once could have been viewed
as standing for the sweeping proposition for which Justice Scalia cites them-that the military does
not have authority to try an American citizen accused of spying against his country during
wartime-Quirin makes undeniably clear that this is not the law today.").
495. See supra notes 452-59 and accompanying text (discussing how Quirin involved both a
declared war and specific legislation).
496. See supra notes 475-76 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
AUMF).
497. Indeed, the plurality did not mention the legislative history of the AUMF even once.
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Thus, like the internment cases, Hamdi did not grant unilateral
authority to the President to detain citizens militarily. Unlike the
internment cases, however, it expanded the President's ability to act
without specific congressional approval. In the internment cases, the
Court was careful to make sure that Congress did actually consent, not
just to the war in general, but to the specific policies at issue in the cases.
The Court in Hamdi did nearly the opposite. Rather than trying to
ascertain the true intent of Congress, the Court was determined to find
congressional assent by hook or crook so as to avoid addressing the
problematic issue of executive unilateralism. In attempting to avoid the
issue, however, the Court generously bolstered the executive's power.
The Court set up a precedent whereby the President may unilaterally
initiate a program of citizen detention, which is constitutional so long as
there has at some point been congressional authorization of military force
against those with whom the citizen is alleged to be a sympathizer. To
the extent that executive unilateralism often goes hand in hand with the
restriction of rights, by bolstering the executive's power to act without
Congress, Hamdi cannot be said to represent civil libertarian progress.
498
D. Individual Process
Having decided that the President had authority to detain citizen
enemy combatants and that the AUMF provided adequate congressional
support, the Court turned to the issue of the process due to citizens so
detained. The decision here is likely what has heartened civil
libertarians.499  The Court, rather than issuing vague warnings against
military overreaching as in the internment cases, articulated specific
498. Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes characterize executive unilateralists
and civil libertarians as polarized factions:
Executive unilateralists are advocates of national security [who] conclude that unilateral
executive discretion, not subject to oversight from other institutions, is required. On the
other side are what might be called civil libertarian idealists. Advocates of this view
sometimes deny, to themselves or to their audiences, that shifts in the institutional
frameworks and substantive rules of liberty/security tradeoffs do, indeed, regularly take
place during times of serious security threats ....
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism:
An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 4
(2004).
499. See Jenny S. Martinez, International Decision, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004),
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 785 (David D. Caron ed., 2004) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi-
along with its decision to exercise jurisdiction over the Guantfnamo detainees in Rasul v. Bush-is a
sharp and much needed rebuke to the U.S. government's position that its treatment of detainees in
the so-called 'war on terrorism' is immune from judicial oversight."); see also supra note 35
(describing how Hamdi was considered a civil libertarian victory).
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operational due process limits on military discretion.50 0  Despite the
government's urging that the Court could only examine the
government's bases for the overall detention scheme, the Court went
much further and articulated the process due to each individual detained
as an enemy combatant. 5°1 In the internment cases, on the other hand,
the Court focused not on the individual process involved in any given
detention, but solely on whether the larger restrictive scheme was within
the proper exercise of military discretion. 0 2 This divergence between
the internment cases and the terrorism cases appears to lend credence to
the argument that the law has progressed. Naturally, it seems more
progressive to engage in judicial review of both the government's
purported bases for the detention scheme and the details of the
government's procedures rather than solely focusing on the bases.
50 3
This "progression," however, may have less to do with a civil
libertarian movement of the Court and more with the factual differences
between the military programs at issue in Hamdi and the internment
cases. In the internment cases, the restrictions applied overtly to a racial
category,5°4 whereas in Hamdi the detention scheme applied to a
conduct-based category, namely those who "fight" for the enemy.'°
Because of the use of a nefarious racial proxy for dangerous conduct,
506
the issue of individualized process was rendered relatively unimportant
in the internment cases. The category to which one needed to belong
was "Japanese" and there was hardly a need for individualized hearings
on whether a given person was Japanese.50 7 Had the government based
500. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532-34 (2004).
501. Id. at 533-34.
502. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (citing and discussing
Hirabayashi); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (holding that courts cannot
review whether Congress was justified in excluding Japanese Americans from the West Coast).
503. Interestingly, the Court in Hamdi looked only at the procedures and not at the purported
bases for the larger detention scheme, seeming to assume the larger program of detaining citizen
"enemy combatants" needed no specific justification so long as conflict existed. See supra notes
297-300 and accompanying text.
504. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88 ("[T]he present situation requires... the establishment of
certain regulations pertaining to all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry .... ); supra
notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing racialized bases for the internment).
505. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (confining the issue to the constitutionality of detaining a
person who "was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in
Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States" (internal quotations
omitted)).
506. Justice Murphy consistently criticized the racial basis for the Japanese internment. See Ex
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring) (stating that Endo's detention was
"another example of the unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the entire evacuation
program").
507. During the internment, other ethnic Asian groups were careful to differentiate themselves
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the restrictions on disloyalty rather than race, there would have been an
important issue of the detainee's opportunity to challenge her
classification as disloyal. 08 One signal of social progress, then, might be
in the race category. At the very least, the Bush Administration was
uncomfortable with overtly basing detention on race rather than
conduct.
509
Basing detention classification on conduct, however, only reigns in
the government's power to incarcerate if there is a meaningful avenue for
a detainee to challenge the allegation that he engaged in the qualifying
conduct. If the Executive, without challenge, could designate anyone an
enemy combatant, the detention power would prove to be broader even
than during the internment, where detention was limited by race.
Although the government had urged just such a position,51 the Hamdi
from the Japanese. Frank Wu explains, "Chinese Americans and Korean Americans did their best to
distinguish themselves from Japanese Americans. They posted signs and wore buttons that read,
'Chinese, not Japanese' and 'I hate the Japs more than you do."' Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the
Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the Japanese American Internment, CRIM. JUST., Summer
2002, at 52, 53. Natsu Saito Taylor details a disturbing Time Magazine article entitled "How to Tell
Your Friends From the Japs," which stated,
"Virtually all Japanese are short. Japanese are likely to be stockier and broader-hipped
than short Chinese. Japanese are seldom fat; they often dry up and grow lean as they age.
Although both have the typical epicanthic fold of the upper eyelid, Japanese eyes are
usually set closer together. The Chinese expression is likely to be more placid, kindly,
open; the Japanese more positive, dogmatic, arrogant. Japanese are hesitant, nervous in
conversation, laugh loudly at the wrong time. Japanese walk stiffly erect, hard heeled.
Chinese, more relaxed, have an easy gait, sometimes shuffle."
Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of "'Foreignness" in the Construction
of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71, 83 (1997) (quoting RONALD TAKAKI,
STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 370 (1989)).
Moreover, the Japanese were generally compliant with the internment orders and did not seek to
challenge or hide their "Japanese-ness." See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (explaining
that many Japanese prided themselves on being cooperative). By exception, Fred Korematsu had
made an unsuccessful attempt to hide his Japanese features by getting plastic surgery. Korematsu v.
United States, 140 F.2d 289, 293 (1943) (Denman, J., concurring), affd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
508. Indeed, the Court later held that detention of a loyal citizen was impermissible. Endo, 323
U.S. at 302-04. It resolved this issue, however, on nonconstitutional grounds. Supra notes 226-28
and accompanying text.
509. As others have mentioned, there is a racial element to the Bush terrorism policies, supra
notes 95-97 and accompanying text, but because that racial element was not raised by the parties, it
was not an issue for adjudication. Supra note 156.
510. This was precisely the Bush Administration's position regarding Hamdi. The government
asserted that Hamdi had no right to meet with an attorney or challenge his individual detention in
court. As to judicial review, the government argued that a "court's inquiry should come to an end
once the military has shown in the return that it has determined that the detainee is an enemy
combatant." Brief for Respondents-Appellants at *11, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895), available at 2002 WL 32728567. As to counsel, the government stated, "it is
well-settled that the military has the authority to capture and detain individuals whom it has
determined are enemy combatants in connection with hostilities in which the Nation is engaged,
including enemy combatants claiming American citizenship." Id. at * 10. Even Japanese detained in
the internment had some opportunity to prove their loyalty and apply for a release. See Endo, 323
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decision provided detainees some ability to challenge the government's
classification."' Using the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge,51 2 a
case involving deprivation of social security benefits, the Court
determined that detainees were entitled under due process to some ability
to rebut the government's claim that they were enemy combatants.
513
The government, however, enjoys a presumption of accuracy in its
classification and may base the classification on unsupported hearsay
documents like the Mobbs Declaration.1 4
Does this show progress? In some sense, yes. If the government
were to use the enemy combatant category to sweep thousands of Arab
Americans into military detention asserting that they aided Al Qaeda,
Hezbollah, the Taliban, insurgents in Iraq, or other disfavored groups, at
least those detainees would have some ability to challenge their statuses
as enemy combatants. Remember, however, that internment policies
technically allowed the Japanese to demonstrate their loyalty and apply
for release.515 For the Japanese, this was an option, but largely an un-
516exercisable option. 16 Likewise, for potential terrorism detainees, it is a
near impossible hurdle for a military detainee (especially if there are
thousands) to overcome a presumption of enemy status and disprove
conclusory hearsay statements, 517 particularly if such statements involve
U.S. at 291-93 (describing the leave application process).
511. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
512. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
513. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532-33.
514. See id. at 533-34 (stating that to reduce the burden upon an engaged military, the
government may enjoy a rebuttable presumption in favor of its evidence, which may include
hearsay); see also supra note 245 (Mobbs Declaration).
515. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 291-93 (describing the leave application process).
516. Christine Ann Lobasso describes the failings of the internment leave process and reaches
the following conclusion:
This process did not operate to assess whether or not there was a necessity for the
individual's detention. Rather, it operated to assess whether or not the individual was
worthy enough to be released. Hence we see a total failure of the initial procedure that is
guaranteed to an individual who is deprived of his right to liberty.
Christine Ann Lobasso, Elevation of the Individual: International Legal Issues that Flow from the
American Internment of the West Coast Japanese During World War 11, 8 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 45,
89 (1998).
517. The difficulty in overcoming a presumption of dangerousness is exemplified by criminal
defendants who attempt to challenge a dangerousness presumption under the Bail Reform Act. See
generally John A. Washington, Note, Preventive Detention: Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 271 (1988) (arguing that a dangerousness presumption runs counter to a desire to
protect the innocent). The War on Terror's use of preventive detention puts an even harder burden
on the detainee as mere criminal danger is elevated to danger of ultimate acts of terror. See Laurie
L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1217,
1220 (2002) (noting the trend toward acceptance of preventive detention in the post-9/11 world).
2006]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
purportedly sensitive terrorism intelligence.518 Scholars invoke the
internment precisely to illustrate the problem with conclusory "military
judgment." 51 9  Even in the face of the process crafted in Hamdi, the
government may proceed with detention upon evidence as conclusory as
the Mobbs Declaration. 520 Hence, Professor Chris lijima appears to be
correct in characterizing as "chillingly prophetic' 521  Justice Jackson's
criticism that the Korematsu majority justified detention on the basis of
518. The difficulty in challenging the government in its terrorism decisions is exemplified by the
Zacarias Moussaoui case. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), amended on reh'g by 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.
2004). Moussaoui attempted to defend against charges that he was involved in the 9/11 attacks. The
judge who presided over his case
several times.., expressed her concern that the government may be denying Moussaoui
information that could assist him as he represents himself. She... questioned whether
Moussaoui could receive a fair trial in open court, given the government's secrecy, and
reminded prosecutors of their obligation to turn over material that could aid the defense.
Feds: Moussaoui Judge Out of Bounds, CBSNEWS.COM, Apr. 24, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/07/22/attack/main515896.shtml. Also illustrative is the military process currently
afforded to Guantanamo detainees, in which the government may rely on classified information. In
finding these proceedings to violate due process, the district court in In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases excerpted testimony from a tribunal:
Tribunal President: Did you know of anybody that was a member ofAl Qaida?
Detainee: No. This is something the interrogators told me a long while ago. I asked
the interrogators to tell me who this person was. Then I could tell you if I might have
known this person, but not if this person is a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person as a
friend. Maybe it was a person that worked with me. Maybe it was a person that was on
my team. But I do not know if this person is Bosnian, Indian or whatever. If you tell me
the name, then I can respond and defend myself against this accusation.
Detainee: That is it, but I was hoping you had evidence that you can give me. If I was
in your place-and I apologize in advance for these words-but if a supervisor came to
me and showed me accusations like these, I would take these accusations and I would hit
him in the face with them. Sorry about that.
[Everyone in the Tribunal room laughs.]
Tribunal President: We had to laugh, but it is okay.
Detainee: Why? Because these are accusations that I can't even answer. I am not
able to answer them. You tell me I am from Al Qaida, but I am not an Al Qaida. I don't
have any proof to give you except to ask you to catch Bin Laden and ask him if I am a
part of Al Qaida. To tell me that I thought, I'll just tell you that I did not. I don't have
proof regarding this. What should be done is you should give me evidence regarding
these accusations because I am not able to give you any evidence. I can just tell you no,
and that is it.
355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 469-70 (D.D.C. 2005).
519. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (noting some scholars use the example of the
internment to criticize the Bush Administration's detaining of individuals without process).
520. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (Mobbs Declaration).
521. lijima, supra note 13, at 124.
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an "unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination.
' 522
E. Scope of War Powers: Nature and Length of Military Detention
Even after the Supreme Court had taken the rights-restricting view
that the President may detain U.S. citizens militarily in the absence of a
declared war and explicit congressional approval, it still could have made
some progressive choices regarding the character and length of the
detention. Unfortunately, these choices also cannot be said to represent
progress from the internment cases.
1. Character of Detention
As illustrated in the introduction, the Japanese internees suffered
greatly, and the repercussions of their bondage linger. 23 While quite
horrible, their incarceration conditions were not nearly as deplorable as
those of detainees in the War on Terror. Detainees like Hamdi, Padilla,
and those in Guantanamo have been held in conditions worse than those
of convicted criminals.5 24  They have been held, not in barracks or
temporary houses, but rather in jails, locked down, incommunicado, and
unable to see family.5 25 The Guantanamo prisoners have even been
522. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
523. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (describing Japanese Americans' pervasive
suffering).
524. Hamdi, for example, was placed at the Naval Brig in Norfolk Virginia. He was not,
however, treated like the rest of the inmates, who were military criminals. Rather, "Hamdi was kept
in one of the brig's two solitary confinement cells [which the Commander] declined to show... or
discuss." Matthew Dolan, No Ordinary Jail. The Military Brig at Norfolk Naval Station-Holds 145
Prisoners, but its Operations are Almost Completely Secret, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, February 23,
2004, at Al. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has documented the particular
negative effect of detention on terrorism detainees because of the uncertainty of the length and status
of their detention. The ICRC has "'observed what [it] consider[s] to be a worrying deterioration in
the psychological health of a large number of the internees' because of the uncertainty of their
situation." Red Cross: Deteriorating Conditions at Guantanamo, CNN.COM, October 10, 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/10/10/redcross.guantanamo.ap/ (quoting ICRC
spokesman Florian Westphal).
525. Even after the district court granted Padilla access to counsel, information was severely
restricted.
[T]he military made sure the meeting would be virtually useless to Padilla: It barred the
two lawyers from telling the court, the public or even the rest of their legal team anything
Padilla told them. The government, however, held a news conference weeks later,
claiming Padilla had planned to blow up apartment buildings using natural gas-
allegations that Padilla had no chance to hear, much less answer.
Joan Ryan, Not All Citizens Have Rights, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2005, at B 1.
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detained in cage-like cells. 526  Both the internment cases and the
terrorism cases allowed the government to place military restrictions on
its own citizens. Each Court had a choice, however, as to how much
hardship those restrictions would place on the individuals. The question
is whether the Court in Hamdi made a more progressive choice than in
the internment cases.
In understanding this choice, some background to jurisprudential
limits on the character of noncriminal detention is helpful. The Court
has permitted detention outside the protections of the criminal process in
a limited category of cases, 527  including cases involving civil
commitment of the mentally ill or pedophiles, 528 quarantine of disease
carriers,529  and detention of aliens pending deportation.530  The
constitutionality of such detentions, however, has been premised on the
fact that such detentions were not punitive in nature but rather necessary
to serve a public need.531  Similarly, the Hamdi plurality reasoned that
Hamdi's detention was justified on the grounds of military necessity and
not on punishment. 32 The Court stated, "'Captivity is neither a
punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but 'merely a temporary detention
which is devoid of all penal character.'
533
526. Hamdi described his conditions in Guantanamo as follows: "It was a jail for slow death,
especially since it's located in an area that's unbearably humid and is like a cage for animals and not
a prison for humans." Saudi-American Speaks Out on Confinement, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 16,
2004.
527. The Court has opined,
Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects. And
this Court has said that government detention violates that Clause unless the detention is
ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or in certain
special and "narrow" nonpunitive "circumstances."
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citations omitted).
528. E.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
529. E.g., R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877).
530. E.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
531. The Court in Hendricks allowed civil confinement because the state had
disavowed any punitive intent; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly
dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; directed that confined
persons be segregated from the general prison population and afforded the same status as
others who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and
permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or
mentally impaired.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
532. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) ("'The object of capture is to prevent
the captured individual from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on must be removed
as completely as practicable from the front, treated humanely, and in time exchanged, repatriated, or
otherwise released."' (quoting In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946))).
533. Id. (quoting Territo, 156 F.2d at 145).
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In assessing the constitutionality of such detentions, the Court has
addressed what limitations must be placed on noncriminal detention to
differentiate it from punishment. The conservative answer to this
question is that civil detention may look and feel exactly like criminal
punishment so long as the state articulates a reason for the detention
outside of retribution or deterrence.534 The most progressive stance on
this issue is that civil detention must be wholly different from criminal
incarceration.535
The Supreme Court has indicated in the past that noncriminal
detention should be materially different from the incarceration of
convicted criminals. In Allen v. Illinois, the Court upheld a statute
providing for the civil commitment of certain sexual offenders by finding
the detention civil in nature.5 36 Essential to this finding was the fact that
the civilly detained individuals were treated differently from the ordinary
criminal. The Court observed that it may have struck down the statute
"[h]ad petitioner shown, for example, that the confinement of such
persons imposes on them a regimen which is essentially identical to that
imposed upon felons. 53 7  The Court also noted that "counsel for the
State assures us that under Illinois law sexually dangerous persons must
not be treated like ordinary prisoners.,
538
The more recent case of Seling v. Young 539 seems to point to a shift
away from differentiating the character of noncriminal confinement from
that of criminal punishment. Specifically, the Court ruled in Seling that
it would not entertain an as-applied challenge to a civil commitment
statute previously determined to be nonpunitive in nature, based on the
petitioner's claim that his actual conditions of confinement were
indistinguishable from criminal conditions. 540 The Court did leave room
for the possibility, however, that the actual conditions of the civil
confinement could be essential to an initial determination that the
detention regime was a facially valid civil regulation rather than
534. This approach is exemplified by Justice Scalia's concurrence in Seling v. Young, 531 U.S.
250, 267-68 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring), which states that the character of detention can never
bear on the question of the true purpose of the purportedly civil detention statute.
535. Justice Stevens has adopted such an approach to the constitutionality of civil detention of
sex offenders: "A goal of treatment is not sufficient, in and of itself, to render inapplicable the Fifth
Amendment, or to prevent a characterization of proceedings as 'criminal."' Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
536. Id. at 364 (majority opinion).
537. Id. at 373.
538. Id. at 374.
539. 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
540. Id. at 266.
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unconstitutional criminal punishment. 541 Justice Scalia adopted a more
conservative position and objected to the view that the constitutionality
of a civil detention statute, even in the first instance, depends on the
nature of the actual detention, arguing instead that the actual nature of
the petitioner's confinement is always irrelevant.542 Justice Stevens's
dissent in Seling reflects the most progressive approach to this particular
issue. He argued that the Court had "consistently looked to the
conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose
behind the statute and its actual effect., 543 He further asserted that "the
question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered
solely by reference to the text of the statute." 5 4
The internment cases, as mentioned before, represent judicial
abdication on the issue of detention all together. 545  Consequently,
because the majority court ignored that detention had taken place, it
could hardly pass on any conditions of that detention. The few passages
in Korematsu that reference detention evidence a deliberate minimization
of the burdens of military detention.546 The Court scoffed at the notion
that the relocation camps could be called "concentration camps" and
indicated rather that they were innocuous temporary relocation
shelters.547 Thus, although affording no relief to the Japanese at the time,
the Court did not forge into law approval of detention in camps, much
less approval of outright incarceration and its attendant conditions.
The Hamdi Court, on the other hand, did precisely this. By overtly
approving Hamdi's incarceration, the Court constitutionally cemented
the government's ability, not only to detain its own citizens for military
reasons, but also to detain them like criminals.548 While characterizing
541. Id. at 266-67.
542. Id. at 274 (Scalia, J., concurring). Even he conceded, however, that the Court possessed
some leeway to analyze "effects apparent upon the face of the [civil commitment] statute." Id. at
269.
543. Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
544. Id.
545. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (noting some academics believe the
internment cases stand for the principle of judicial abstention).
546. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
547. Id.
548. Although the Court did not put an explicit stamp of approval on the conditions of Hamdi's
incarceration, once the Court upheld Hamdi's detention, his possibility of challenging the conditions
of that detention was greatly reduced. The public internalizes judicial approval of incarceration,
reducing the viability of any future challenge to the detention. Laurie Levenson explains how the
public internalized the concept of preventive detention after United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), in which the Court upheld pretrial detention. She states that Salerno
fundamentally changed how the criminal justice system views detention-a change that
reverberates in the War on Terrorism today. Up to that time, there had been a
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Hamdi's detention as a temporary measure solely designed to prevent
him from returning to the enemy 549 rather than for retribution, the Court
said absolutely nothing about the conditions of Hamdi's detention or
whether that detention may be exactly like criminal punishment. The
Court merely remained silent in the face of the indisputable fact that
Hamdi was being held in a jail like a criminal.
Notably, the Geneva Convention lays out the conditions of
internment of combatants detained for the express purpose of preventing
their return to the enemy. Article 22 of the Convention expressly
prohibits the incarceration of prisoners of war, "[e]xcept in particular
cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they
shall not be interned in penitentiaries."550 Article 22 further provides,
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp
compounds according to their nationality, language and customs,
provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of
war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the
time of their capture, except with their consent.
5 51
In addition, the Convention provides that "[p]risoners of war shall be
quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area., 552 The Convention
also specifies other positive detention conditions, including, among other
things, that detainees receive advance pay,553 have access to a canteen in
which to purchase products at market price,554 be permitted to receive
outside money,555 and have the ability to manage personal funds556 and
receive personal packages.557  Such provisions, taken together,
emphasize the idea that prisoners of war are not being punished for
fighting with the enemy. Rather, they are detained as a temporary
presumption that a defendant should not be prejudged as a threat to security. Salerno
altered that. We moved into an era in which there might technically be a presumption of
innocence, but there are a host of criminal and civil laws that allow the government to
detain individuals because it suspects they could cause future harm.
Levenson, supra note 517, at 1218.
549. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004).
550. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 22, Oct. 21, 1950,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (emphasis added).
551. 1d.
552. Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 25.
553. Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 60.
554. Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 28.
555. Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 64-65.
556. Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 65.
557. Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 71.
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measure to prevent the enemy from gaining a tactical advantage, and thus
prisoner-of-war detention should resemble field living conditions of U.S.
military personnel.558
Obviously, the government has not complied with any of these
dictates in its treatment of Hamdi, Padilla, or the Guantanamo detainees.
Hamdi and Padilla, perhaps as a product of the nonparadigmatic nature
of their capture, were separated from members of the forces with whom
they were alleged to have associated, stripped of their customs, and held
in jail.559  While such incarceration might be justified if Hamdi and
Padilla were dangerous criminal defendants who posed a risk of flight,56 °
the government has insisted that the nature of the detentions is not
criminal, and the Court expressly ruled that Hamdi's detention was
justified solely by military necessity.561  The Court, however, did not
state that Hamdi's military detention must accord with the dictates of the
Geneva Convention.562 Obviously, the Court was not unaware that
Hamdi had been detained in a jail, in lockdown condition, without any
access to family.563 By endorsing such detention, without qualification,
the Court implicitly adopted the more conservative view that military
detention could be as, or more, severe than criminal incarceration.
2. Length of Detention
In addition, the Hamdi Court adopted an interpretation of "wartime"
that greatly increased the chances of individuals being detained
indefinitely. Before Hamdi, the Supreme Court recognized that when an
558. See Geneva Convention, supra note 550, art. 24 ("Transit or screening camps of a
permanent kind shall be fitted out under conditions similar to those described in the present Section,
and the prisoners therein shall have the same treatment as in other camps.").
559. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-21 (2004) (describing conditions in which
detainees are held).
560. Criminal defendants who are a flight risk or dangerous may be detained prior to a trial. The
decision to detain defendants, however, must be made after a contested hearing in which the
government proves by clear and convincing evidence that no other conditions or combination of
conditions will assure their presence at trial or the safety of society. United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
561. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
562. The Court only mentioned the Geneva Convention as support for the proposition that the
law of war permits temporary detention of prisoners of war. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. While relying
on the Geneva Convention to establish the legality of Hamdi's detention, the Court provided none of
the safeguards required by the Geneva Convention. Justice Souter concluded that the government's
treatment of Hamdi likely violated its provisions. See id at 549 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Government obviously has not been treating him as a prisoner of war, and in fact the Government
claims that no Taliban detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status. This treatment appears to be a
violation of the Geneva Convention .... (internal citation omitted)).
563. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Hamdi's case).
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individual was detained because of an emergency of a determinate
length, his detention must be limited in duration. For example, the Court
held that quarantine may last only as long as necessary for the risk of
disease to pass.56 In United States v. Salerno, the Court approved of
pretrial detention for dangerousness because the length of such detention
was limited by effective speedy trial laws. 6 5
The legal duration of war for the purpose of exercising war powers
has been the subject of much historical debate. In the World War II case
of Ludecke v. Watkins,566 the Supreme Court addressed a German
national's challenge to his removal pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act of
1798,567 after the cease-fire between Germany and the U.S.568 The Act
provided that during a declared war, invasion, or incursion "all natives,
citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being
of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United
States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended,
restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies.,, 569 Ludecke argued
that the President did not have the authority to deport him because at the
time of his deportation proceedings, Germany had already
unconditionally surrendered to the United States.570  Ludecke further
asserted that any interpretation allowing the President to deport him after
Germany surrendered would render the Act unconstitutional.571
The Supreme Court denied Ludecke's petition in a five-to-four
decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter accepted that the
President's power under the Enemy Alien Act necessarily depended on
the existence of a declared war,572 but rejected the contention that
Germany's surrender without a formal peace treaty ended the President's
ability to exercise war power under the Act. 573  Frankfurter observed,
564. See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) ("[I]n every well-ordered
society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint
[of free will] to be enforced ... as the safety of the general public may demand.").
565. 481 U.S. at 747.
566. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
567. 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2000).
568. Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163-65.
569. 50 U.S.C. § 21. The Court characterized the Act as a recognition of the President's plenary
power over immigration, which is virtually immune from judicial review. See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at
164 ("The very nature of the President's power to order the removal of all enemy aliens rejects the
notion that courts may pass judgment upon the exercise of his discretion.").
570. Ludecke, 335 U.S at 166.
571. See id. at 169-71 (addressing the issues of whether the war had ended and whether the Act
was constitutional).




"War does not cease with a cease-fire order, and power to be exercised
by the President such as that conferred by the Act of 1798 is a process
which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the
shooting stops. ' 574 The Court urged a "common sense" approach that
would allow for the existence of a state of war after the cessation of
hostilities so long as the exigencies necessitating the specific war power
at issue continued.575
There is, however, limiting language in Ludecke. First, the Court
was clear that a peace treaty or declaration of peace by the political
branches operatively ended a state of war.576 Second, the Court indicated
that the issue of whether wartime emergencies continued to exist after a
cease-fire, thus justifying continued assertion of certain war powers,
depended on the nature of the continuing emergency and the power
sought by the President. The Court observed,
The war power includes the power "to remedy the evils which have
arisen from its rise and progress" and continues during that emergency.
Whatever may be the reach of that power, it is plainly adequate to deal
with roblems of law enforcement which arise durine the oeriod of
hostilities but do not cease with them. No more is involved here.
577
In Ludecke, the President sought deportation power, a police power the
Court characterized as only fully exercisable after the cessation of the
"shooting war., 578 Even the executive-empowering logic of Ludecke,
however, would not appear to justify the President in continuing to detain
prisoners of war to prevent them from rejoining the enemy after the
enemy's unconditional surrender.
Justice Black's dissent, in which justices Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge joined, represents the more progressive stance on this issue.
Justice Black strenuously objected to the notion that a qualified state of
war continued even after Germany had surrendered. Characterizing the
"idea that we are still at war with Germany" as a "fiction,"5 79 Black
opined, "I think there is no act of Congress which lends the slightest
basis to the claim that after hostilities with a foreign country have ended
574. Id. at 167.
575. Id. at 166-67.
576. Id. at 168-69 ("'The state of war' may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential
proclamation. Whatever the modes, its termination is a political act.").
577. Id. at 166 n.10 (quoting Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116
(1947) (internal citation omitted)).
578. Id. at 166.
579. Id. at 175 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the President or the Attorney General, one or both, can deport aliens
without a fair hearing reviewable in the courts. 58 ° Justice Black further
stated that the Enemy Alien Act "did not grant its extraordinary and
dangerous powers to be used during the period of fictional wars. 581 He
also rejected the idea that such aliens were amenable to wartime
deportation on the basis of their "potency for mischief. ' 582  Instead,
Black opined that the only justification for their deportation was to
prevent acts of sabotage on behalf of an enemy who had ceased to
exist. 583 He observed, "German aliens could not now, if they would, aid
the German government in war hostilities against the United States. For
as declared by the United States Department of State, June 5, 1945, the
German armed forces on land and sea had been completely subjugated
and had unconditionally surrendered.,
584
The Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases involved a declared war and
temporary detention for the purposes of evacuation. 585 There was every
expectation that the restrictions would be abandoned once a peace treaty
was reached. In Hirabayashi the Court specified that the curfew was to
586last only as long as the danger of war and invasion remained present.
The Court stated, "We need not now attempt to define the ultimate
boundaries of the war power. We decide only the issue as we have
580. Id.
581. Id. at 178.
582. Id. at 181.
583. Id. at 181-82.
584. Id. at 177. Justice Douglas's dissent was even more progressive, stating that deportation of
aliens not pursuant to fair procedure, whether during peace or war, violated due process. He
asserted,
A nation at war need not be detained by time-consuming procedures while the enemy
bores from within. But with an alien enemy behind bars, that danger has passed. If he is
to be deported only after a hearing, our constitutional requirements are that the hearing be
a fair one.
Id. at 187 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
585. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 107 (1943) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also supra notes 341-77 and accompanying
text (discussing the triggering conditions of war powers in the internment cases).
586. See Hiraboyashi, 320 U.S. at 99. The Court premised the validity of the curfew on the
existence of a temporary danger that required immediate redress. The Court compared the curfew
order to other temporary emergency measures:
Like every military control of the population of a dangerous zone in war time, it
necessarily involves some infringement of individual liberty, just as does the police
establishment of fire lines during a fire, or the confinement of people to their houses
during an air raid alarm-neither of which could be thought to be an infringement of
constitutional right. Like them, the validity of the restraints of the curfew order depends
on all the conditions which obtain at the time the curfew is imposed and which support
the order imposing it.
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defined it-we decide only that the curfew order as applied, and at the
time it was applied, was within the boundaries of the war power.',
587
Similarly, in Korematsu, the Court referred to the exclusion order as
"temporary" and indicated that it was justified only by the ongoing war
with Japan and threat of invasion.
5 88
The factual situation presented to the Court in Hamdi was far
different from that of the World War II cases. Unlike a conventional
wartime conflict, the majority of military activity in Afghanistan had
been in the form of an extended occupation rather than a "shooting
war. ' 589 Once the Taliban government fell and the U.S.-friendly Hamid
Karzai was installed as interim prime minister, the United States kept
troops deployed in a rather undefined peacekeeping mission. One expert
noted,
Four months after the last major military engagement of the Afghan
war, the U.S.-led military coalition has more than 10,000 troops on the
ground. Their mission has evolved from a clear-cut effort to topple the
Taliban and cripple Al Qaeda into an increasingly uncertain operation.... 590
mired in the complexities of Afghan politics.
Extended occupations are rarely skirmish free, especially in the Arab
world where many groups vie for control of regions.59' Consequently, to
avoid sanctioning indefinite detention, it was imperative for the Court to
set up a viable proxy for a peace treaty that would signify the termination
of war for the purpose of ending the war power. A logical route might
have been to deem the regime change as the triggering factor, given that
the enemy fighter could not rejoin an army that no longer existed. 92 The
587. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
588. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
589. See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 166 (using the term "shooting war"). The war in Afghanistan
began in October 2001, and Hamid Karzai was named interim prime minister by December 5, 2001.
See Afghan Factions Sign Power Deal, CNN.cOM, December 5, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/12/05/gen.bonn.talks/index.html. For the past three years troops have been
deployed in Afghanistan fighting skirmishes and serving security and peacekeeping roles. See U.N.:
New Afghan Government in Accord on Peacekeepers, CNN.COM, Dec. 30, 2001, http://archives.cnn.
com/2001WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/30/ret.afghanistan.campaign (stating that the first U.N.
peacekeepers arrived in Afghanistan on December 22,2001).
590. Susan B. Glasser, U.S. Challenged To Define Role In Afghanistan, WASHINGTON
POST.COm, Aug. 3, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node
=
&contentld=A38181-2002Aug2&notFound--true.
591. In Afghanistan, these skirmishes often involve factions with no connection to the former
Taliban regime. See Warlord Behind Afghan Rocket Attacks, CNN.COM, Apr. 29, 2002
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/04/29/afghan.rocket/index.htm] ("Rivalries
between warlords have turned parts of Paktia into warzones, terrifying residents, with some saying
they miss the more stringent control of the Taliban.").
592. This was the position urged by Hamdi. See Martinez, supra note 499, at 783-84
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Court, however, instead used the presence of troops engaged in fighting
to deny that hostilities had ended sufficiently to release military
prisoners.593 Although the Court formally justified Hamdi's detention by
the need to prevent him from rejoining the enemy army,594 by the time
the Court reviewed Hamdi's case the enemy army had already fallen to
U.S. forces. 595  Thus, upon closer examination, the logic of detaining
Hamdi was not the stated reason of preventing him from rejoining an
enemy army, but rather preventing him from acting on any decision he
might make in the future to participate in insurgent activity.
The concept that wartime detentions may continue after the fall of
the enemy government and installation of a U.S.-friendly government
goes beyond the scope of even the Ludecke opinion and certainly beyond
the time frame contemplated in the internment cases. The Ludecke
opinion approved of limited exercise of war-related police powers in the
months following termination of the shooting war.596 The Hamdi case
greatly expands this principle to full detention years after the enemy
government has fallen. This broad definition of the length of military
detention has precedent neither in domestic law nor customary
international law. Experts note that
any authority for detention provided by the Third Geneva Convention
may possibly have ceased when the U.S.-friendly government of
Hamid Karzai took control of Afghanistan, arguably ending the
international armed conflict there. Fighting within the territory of
Afghanistan after the change of governments could potentially be
classified by international humanitarian law as a non-international
armed conflict.
597
(explaining that the Supreme Court argued that detention was justified so long as U.S. troops were in
Afghanistan).
593. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (holding that Hamdi's detention was
justified "[i]f the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in
Afghanistan").
594. Id. at 519.
595. See supra note 589 (noting that the Taliban government was dismantled by December 5,
2001).
596. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1948) (stating that the police power is not
necessarily exhausted when the shooting stops and that certain powers such as that of deportation
may not be practicable until the shooting stops).
597. Martinez, supra note 499, at 786. The fact that customary international law is not clear that
Hamdi's continued detention is justified by the conflict in Afghanistan makes the Court's conclusion
that Congress implicitly authorized Hamdi's detention by the AUMF because of the universality of
the law of war even more untenable. Even if the law of war was well settled that Hamdi, despite his
citizenship status, could be detained during the relevant conduct, it is very far from clear that the law




Had the Court adopted a similar approach after World War II, the
United States could have detained "security threats"-for example,
unhappy Japanese internees-for many years after the shooting war, so
long as the United States continued to maintain troops in Japan. As a
result, the Hamdi decision greatly extended the duration of wartime and
allowed for the possibility of prolonged, if not indefinite, detention, even
if the military to which the detainee belonged had been dismantled.
V. CONCLUSION
The Japanese internment is our country's burden to bear. It is our
reminder to "never forget" the atrocious consequences of government
overreaching. After 9/11 and the ensuing Bush Administration policies,
this reminder resurfaced as a warning that we not be complacent in the
face of repression, despite our understandable and grave fears of
terrorism. Naturally, the invocation of the internment by civil
libertarians engendered a backlash from Bush supporters and security-
minded conservatives. Backlash arguments ranged from noxious
justifications of the internment to more subtle attempts to distance
current policies from the internment through optimistic arguments that
society and its laws have progressed. Even the most benign distancing
arguments, however, undercut the persuasive power of the internment
invocation, much in the way reminders of slavery and gender repression
used to fight current discrimination are undermined by the claim that
society has "gotten better."
This Article has assessed the claim that society has "gotten better"
through a legal prism. Specifically, it has concentrated on four
jurisprudential choices made in both the internment and terrorism cases
to determine whether the current Supreme Court has progressed in its
analysis of wartime presidential powers. The Court's crafting of
individual judicial processes for military detention signals some progress
from World War II, as the Court definitively moved away from the
notion that courts may not sit in judgment of military decisions.
Instead of confronting international humanitarian law, with all its limitations, the
Supreme Court appears in Hamdi to have embarked on a questionable path toward
creating its own, new constitutional common law of war, ungrounded either in
international humanitarian law or in any specific legislation enacted by the U.S.
Congress. It may be that international humanitarian law should be modified to respond to
the changing factual circumstances of contemporary armed conflict, but the U.S.
Supreme Court seems a body particularly ill suited by institutional competence to be the
principal author of this new regime.
Id. at 787.
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However, other choices made in the terrorism cases do not manifest
progress and in fact seem to indicate regression. The Court made it
much easier for the political branches to exercise war power and detain
individuals outside normal criminal processes. It definitively approved
of military detention of U.S. citizens, resolving the conflict between
Quirin and Milligan in the least progressive way, and cementing the
precedential value of the oft-criticized Quirin opinion. While not going
so far as granting the executive unilateral authority to exercise wartime
detention powers, the Court greatly reduced the role of Congress in
authorizing detentions. Relying on the sparse AUMF and the "clear" law
of war, the Court required neither explicit nor implicit congressional
approval for citizen detention. The Court moreover approved of military
detention that was carried out, not according to the dictates of the
Geneva Convention, but rather in jails, solitary confinement, and
criminal conditions. Finally, the Court's "troops on the ground" analysis
allowed military detention to be prolonged beyond what was
contemplated in the World War II cases and possibly indefinitely.
If we are to "step out a bit from the shadow" 598 of the internment, our
laws must step into the light. By treating Hamdi as if he were a prisoner
of war captured in a traditional declared armed conflict, the Court has
greatly augmented the government's ability to exercise wartime
detention power. The fact is that the War on Terror is vague and may
never end, and the Court must construct realistic limits on military
detention power that make sense given current political realities. To the
extent that the Court has actually expanded rather than restricted the
detention power, cautionary tales of past abuses remain relevant.
Defenders of civil liberties must therefore continue to raise the red flag,
be vigilant about government overreaching, and passionately invoke the
caution of the internment.
598. Muller, supra note 15, at 130.
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